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Noah didn't have this problem. Faced with a crisis of truly
biblical proportions, he was not afforded any choice about
which animals to protect from the coming flood. Instead, Genesis
reports, God instructed Noah to bring every kind of animal onto
the ark "to keep the species alive on the face of all the earth."'
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, nagle-
joh@shu.edu. I am grateful for comments shared by Ann Alexander, Angela
Carmella, Abner Greene, Ed Hartnett, Oliver Houck, Lisa Nagle, Mike
Paulsen, Zygmunt Plater, Mark Plummer, Marc Poirier, J.B. Ruhl, Steve
Smith, Eugene Volokh, and the members of the Evangelical Environmental
Network internet discussion group. Howard Benard, Paul Vance, and Kather-
ine Vasiliades performed invaluable research assistance.
L Genesis 7:1-3 (New King James). All scripture quotations are to the
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Noah obeyed, the passengers of the ark survived the flood, and
"every beast" returned to inhabit the earth.2
The Endangered Species Act (ESA) seems to embody the
same idea. The ESA protects all species from extinction.
Grizzly bears and kangaroo rats, alligators and salamanders,
bald eagles and black-capped vireos-all are entitled to the
same protection from government and private action once they
are determined to be endangered or threatened with extinc-
tion. There are a few exceptions, but generally the ESA does not
allow society to decide that one bird is more important than
another, or that we will save one animal but not another.
Yet there is a competing biblical metaphor for the ESA.
Judges, legislators, professors, and others have described the
law as "playing God."3 The "God Squad" is the popular term for
the Endangered Species Committee, the seven federal officials
charged by the ESA with determining which federal projects
will proceed despite the likely extinctions they will leave in
their paths.4 Other parts of the ESA provide numerous oppor-
tunities for enforcement authorities and interested parties to prefer
some species over others. And some advocates of amending the
ESA explicitly endorse a system that allows us to decide which
species will live and which species will die.
New King James Version unless otherwise indicated.
2. Genesis 7:5-8:19. I describe the story in somewhat greater detail infra
text accompanying notes 177-178.
3. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. E304 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Kolbe) (asserting that the Fish & Wildlife Service has "the power to play
God" through its interpretation of the ESA, quoting Hugh Holub, Feds Should
Let States Handle Environmental Issues, TucSON CITIZEN, Jan. 30, 1995);
Amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 2899 Before the
Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub.
Works, 95th Cong. 39 (1978) (statement of Sen. Culver) ("Who plays God the
second time around?"); John Lowe Weston, Comment, The Endangered Species
Committee and the Northern Spotted Owl: Did the "God Squad" Play God?, 7
ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 779 (1994).
4. Despite the statute's command that the group is "to be known as the
Endangered Species Committee," 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(1) (1994), everyone calls
it the God Squad. See, e.g., Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th Cir. 1993); Endangered Species Act-
Bakersfield, California: Hearing Before the Task Force on Endangered Species
of the Comm. on Resources House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 41 (1995)
[hereinafter Bakersfield ESA Hearing] (statement of Leslie V. Reid, Pine
Mountain Club, California); 141 CONG. REC. S6342 (daily ed. May 9, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Johnston); Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process
Under the Endangered Species Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why, 66
NOTRE DAmE L. REV. 825 (1991).
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The choice between biblical metaphors lies at the heart of
the current debate over the future of the ESA. Once viewed as
too popular to criticize, the ESA has become the focal point of
intense controversy. On the one hand, critics of the law see it
as a threat to private property unrivaled in environmental law.
On the other hand, defenders of the ESA insist that its existing
provisions are inadequate to the task of protecting biodiversity
threatened by rampant habitat destruction. Thus "[elndangered
species have been used as a whipping post for the left and the
right, to no one's advantage."5 Most of the dispute has centered
on the ESA's ban on activities on private property that would
harm the habitat of an endangered species, but the prohibition
against federal government activities that jeopardize the exis-
tence of a species and the very process of listing a species as
endangered or threatened have sparked numerous controver-
sies themselves.6
Three recent events illustrate the debate over the ESA and
the relevance of the competing biblical metaphors. First, the
104th Congress subjected the ESA to its most intensive cri-
tique since a nearly unanimous Congress and President Nixon
approved the law in 1973. Early in 1995, a special House task
force held a series of hearings in parts of the country where the
ESA is often viewed as the enemy of the people.7 Six bills de-
5. 143 CONG. REC. E1596 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Miller); see also Sharon Begley & Daniel Glick, The Eye of the Storm,
NEWSWEEK, July 1, 1996, at 59 (reporting on the polarization that now at-
tends discussions of the ESA).
6. For a general overview of the ESA's requirements, see MICHAEL J.
BEAN, THE EvoLuTiON OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 329-83 (1983).
7. The task force held hearings in Belle Chasse, Louisiana; Boerne,
Texas; New Bern, North Carolina; Bakersfield, Riverside, and Stockton, Cali-
fornia; Vancouver, Washington; and finally in Washington, D.C. To say that
the ESA was on the defensive during these hearings would be an understate-
ment. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act: Washington, DC-Part I: Oversight
Hearing Before the Task Force on Endangered Species Act of the Comm. on
Resources, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 46 (1995) [hereinafter Wash-
ington ESA Hearing Part 1] (statement of Rep. Shadegg) (claiming that the
ESA "is being used to violate property rights on a massive scale and to
threaten our liberty. It is destroying jobs and causing enormous economic
dislocation."); Endangered Species Act-Vancouver, Washington: Hearing Before
the Task Force on Endangered Species Act of the Comm. on Resources, House
of Representatives, 104th Cong. 65 (1995) [hereinafter Vancouver ESA Hear-
ing] (testimony of Lois Van Hoover) (claiming that "it is time to scrap the ESA
and start anew"); Bakersfield ESA Hearing, supra note 4, at 2 (statement of
Rep. Pombo) ("Many of my constituents are frustrated and angry about a law
that allows government bureaucrats to put the protection of a rat, or fairy
shrimp, or any other species, above the lives and safety of human beings.").
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signed to make the law more palatable to those who encounter
its requirements followed from those hearings.' The outcry
from environmentalists, the Clinton Administration, and others
doomed each of the bills before they reached the floor of the
House or the Senate. The episode repeated itself in 1997,
when efforts to exempt flood control projects from the ESA
prompted accusations that the same forces were trying once
again to gut the Act Throughout each debate, the rhetoric
has betrayed the desires of the speaker. Environmentalists,
the Clinton Administration, and other supporters of the Act
spoke of bald eagles, grizzly bears, whooping cranes, and alli-
gators. Landowners, western House Republicans, and other
critics of the ESA referred to kangaroo rats, fairy shrimp, am-
bersnails, tiger beetles, and of course, the snail darter.'I
Some environmentalists, by contrast, viewed the hearings as a sham. See
Endangered Species and Wetlands-Part I: Oversight Hearings Before the
Task Force on Endangered Species and Task Force on Wetlands of the Comm.
on Resources, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 65-66 (1995) [hereinafter
Louisiana & Texas ESA Hearings] (colloquy between Rep. Tauzin and Paul
Davidson, president of the Louisiana Wildlife Federation); Paul Rauber, Eco-
thug: Richard Pombo, SIERIA Jan.-Feb. 1996 at 16 (describing the hearings
as "an anti-ESA road show" held in "out-of-the-way locales, soliciting anecdo-
tal anti-ESA testimony while deliberately excluding expert and scientific
opinion on its benefits").
8. See S. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Kempthorne);
H.R. 2444, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Saxton); H.R. 2374, 104th
Cong. (1995) (introduced by Rep. Gilchrest); H.R. 2364, 104th Cong. (1995)
(introduced by Rep. Shadegg); H.R. 2275, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by
Rep. Young of Alaska); S. 768, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Gor-
ton). The leading bills were extremely unpopular with environmentalists. See
Endangered Species Act Amendments: Hearing on H.R. 2275 Before the
Comm. on Resources, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 4 (1995)
[hereinafter H.R. 2275 Hearing] (statement of Rep. Studds) (characterizing
H.R. 2275 as "an outright repeal of the Endangered Species Act"); id. at 9
(statement of Rep. Miller) (claiming that H.R. 2275 "is the repeal of the En-
dangered Species Act as people have come to know it"). For analysis of each
of the bills, see J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the "New" Endangered Species Act:
Rediscovering and Redefining the Untapped Power of Federal Agencies' Duty
to Conserve Species, 25 ENVTL. L. 1107, 1153-59 (1995).
9. See 143 CONG. REC. H2282 (daily ed. May 7, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Slaughter); id. at H2287 (statement of Rep. DeGette); id. at H2284 (statement
of Rep. Boehlert); id. at H2300 (statement of Rep. Vento); id. at H2300-01
(statement of Rep. Miller). But see id. at H2290 (statement of Rep. Young)
("We did not repeal the Endangered Species Act, nor did we attempt to. We
tried to rewrite it without any help from the minority at all, and this admini-
stration has been asked many times, and they sit on their fat never mind.").
10. The rhetorical force of the kangaroo rat illustration provoked a Fish &
Wildlife Service memo instructing that government officials should "[a]lways
call it a 'kangaroo rat, never a 'K-rat, or 'rodent.'" Endangered Species Act:
Washington, DC-Part II: Oversight Hearing Before the Task Force on En-
[Vol. 82:11711174
PLAYING NOAH
The second event was the publication of Noah's Choice:
The Future of Endangered Species, the excellent discussion of
endangered species and the Endangered Species Act written by
Charles Mann and Mark Plummer." The book demonstrates,
if nothing else, why The New York Times Magazine, Smith-
sonian, and The Atlantic are more widely read than your favorite
law review. Mann and Plummer have written for these publica-
tions (and then some), and they succeed in telling the story of
endangered species in a way that resembles a mystery novel
more than a technical scientific journal. Their book was pub-
lished one month after the beginning of the 104th Congress,
and the proponents of rewriting the ESA often credited Noah's
Choice as a source of intellectual inspiration. 2  Mann and
Plummer see the ESA as the embodiment of the 'Noah Principle,"
scientists' term for the human obligation to protect all species
from whatever ecological disasters that come their way. Faced
with a conflict between protecting endangered species and any
other human aspiration, the endangered species always wins.
Mann and Plummer argue that it is impossible to protect all
dangered Species Act of the Comm. on Resources, House of Representatives,
104th Cong. 175 (1995) [hereinafter Washington ESA Hearing Part III
(quoting a 1987 memorandum regarding the anticipated listing of Stephens'
kangaroo rat). The kangaroo rat controversy is discussed infra at note 241.
11. CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE
FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995).
12. See 143 CONG. REC. S9412 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1997) (remarks of Sen.
Kempthorne) (citing Noah's Choice with approval); 141 CONG. REC. S6339
(daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (describing Noah's Choice
as "a wonderful book"); Endangered Species Act Implementation: Oversight
Hearing Before the Comm. On Resources, House of Representatives, 104th
Cong. 141 (1996) (prepared statement of Robert J. Vincze, Counsel, MO-ARK
Ass'n, Improving the Endangered Species Act: Recommended Amendments);
Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 47 (statement of Rep.
Cooley); id. at 152 (prepared statement of Ike C. Sugg, Competitive Enter-
prise Institute, Reforming the Endangered Species Act: The Property Rights
Perspective); Bakersfield ESA Hearing, supra note 4, at 41 (statement of Rep.
Chenoweth); Endangered Species Act: Washington, D.C.-Part III: Hearing
Before the Task Force on the Endangered Species Act of the Comm. on Re-
sources, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 147 (1996) [hereinafter Wash-
ington ESA Hearing Part H1] (prepared statement of Patrick Kangas, Natural
Resources Management Program, University of Maryland); see also Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of the Endan-
gered Species Act, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 356 (1997) (reviewing Noah's Choice)
(noting that "the book has been influential in the Congress's numerous hear-
ings on reform of the Act"). Mark Plummer himself testified at one of the
hearings. See Endangered Species Reauthorization: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Drinking Water, Fisheries and Wildlife of the Comm. On Environ-
ment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 61-62 (1995) [hereinafter
ESA Reauthorization Hearing].
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endangered wildlife and plants because we lack the resources
and the will to do so. They further contend that continued alle-
giance to the Noah Principle prevents a real discussion of the
choices we must make. Mann and Plummer thus propose an
alternative system that would allow society to choose between
endangered species and other concerns (e.g., whooping cranes
or oil fields), or between one endangered species and another
(e.g., whooping cranes or black-capped vireos). In other words,
they prefer a law in which we play God instead of Noah. God can
choose who lives and who dies; Noah could not. 3
Third, and most surprisingly, the 104th Congress heard a
series of religious arguments in favor of the protection of biodi-
versity. Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt has argued that
"religious values remain at the heart of the Endangered Species
Act."4 He recognizes the utilitarian arguments for preserving
species, but he prefers 'the moral and spiritual imperative that
there may be a higher purpose inherent in creation, one de-
manding our respect and our stewardship quite apart from
whether a particular species is or ever will be of material use
to mankind." 5 Or consider the position of the Evangelical En-
vironmental Network (EEN), an evangelical Protestant group
whose recent lobbying and nationwide advertising campaign
regarding the ESA gained widespread attention. 6 The EEN
13. See infra at text accompanying notes 225-231 (describing Mann and
Plummer's proposal). Mann and Plummer never quite say that we should
"play God," but they understand the difference between the biblical meta-
phors. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 170 (noting that the Endan-
gered Species Committee "was promptly nicknamed the 'God Committee,' af-
ter the only power able to overrule Noah").
14. Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Our Covenant to
Protect the Whole of Creation, 2 ANIMAL L. 1, 8 (1996).
15. Id. at 1, 3, 8; see also Bruce Babbitt, Between the Flood and the Rain-
bow: Stewards of Creation, 113 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 500, 502 (1996); U.S. De-
partment of the Interior, Statement of Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt on
Evangelical Support of Endangered Species Act (Jan. 31, 1996) (press re-
lease), available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
16. See, e.g., Endangered Species Recovery Act: Hearings on S. 1180 Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 105th Cong. (1997)
(testimony of the Evangelical Environmental Network, the Coalition on the
Environment and Jewish Life, and the National Council of Churches of
Christ, USA); Steve Kloehn, Evangelicals See Beasts as Blessed by Their
Creator; More Churches Take Up the Environmental Cause, CmH. TRIB., Feb.
10, 1997, at 1; Bill Broadway, Tending God's Garden: Evangelical Group Em-
braces Environment, WASH. PosT, Feb. 17, 1996, at C8; Peter Steinfels, Evan-
gelical Group Defends Laws Protecting Endangered Species as a Modern
7'oah's Ark', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at A12; ABC World News Tonight:
Evangelical Environmentalists (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 31, 1996),
[Vol. 82:11711176
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believes that "[a] species should be preserved because it has
been created by God."' 7 Thus the EEN "opposes any Congres-
sional action that would weaken, hamper, reduce or end the
protection, recovery and preservation of God's creatures, in-
cluding their habitats, especially as accomplished under the
Endangered Species Act." 8 Likewise, the Coalition on Envi-
ronment and Jewish Life (COEJL) emphasizes that
"[e]ndangered species are God's creatures." 9
In each instance, the story of Noah has served as a justifi-
cation for the protection of endangered species. Secretary
Babbitt has delivered speeches and written articles defending
the ESA as an imitation of Noah's example. 0 EEN has relied
on the story of Noah as the centerpiece of its campaign sup-
porting the ESA.21 COEJL has sponsored "Operation Noah" in
an effort to defend "God's endangered creatures."" Each group
defends the ESA as the modern way by which we imitate Noah,
much to the dismay of those favoring more sweeping changes
in the law.Y
available in LEXIS, NewsLibrary, Arcnws File; News: Eco-Evangelical Move-
ment Works to Preserve Environment (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 24,
1996), available in LEXIS, NewsLibrary, Arcuws File; All Things Considered:
Evangelical Christians Defend Endangered Species Act (National Public Radio
broadcast, Jan. 30, 1996), available in LEXIS, NewsLibrary, Arcnws File.
EEN's million dollar advertising campaign targeted eighteen states, see ABC
World News Tonight, supra, while one thousand churches responded to EEN's
call to become "Noah congregations," see Broadway, supra, at C8. I am a
member of EEN, but I have had no involvement in its work on the ESA.
17. Fred Krueger, Editorial, GREEN CROSS, Winter 1996, at 2.
18. Resolution on the Care and Keeping of Creation and Its Living Spe-
cies, GREEN CROSS, Winter 1996, at 17; accord H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note
8, at 82-83, 419-21 (testimony of Reverend John D. Paarlberg, Reformed
Church in America).
19. See Washington ESA Hearing Part H, supra note 10, at 9 (testimony
of Rabbi David Saperstein, Religious Partnership for the Environment)
(asserting that "[e]very species is sacred"); Endangered Species Recovery Act:
Hearings on S. 1180 Before the Senate Comm. on the Env't and Pub. Works,
105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of the Coalition on the Environment and Jewish
Life, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, and the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations); Endangered Species Recovery Act: Hearings on S. 1180 Before
the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, supra note 16; Coalition on the
Environment and Jewish Life, Operation Noah: Defending God's Endangered
Creatures 1 (1996) (visited Feb. 25, 1997) <http//www.jtsa.edu/org/coejlI
source/invite.htm>.
20. See, e.g., Babbitt, supra note 14, at 5.
21 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
22. Coalition on the Environment and Jewish Life, supra note 19.
23. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
for 1997: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Dep't of the Interior and Related
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The idea of amending the ESA to give more protection to
the species we care most about-bald eagles, grizzly bears, and
the like-and less protection to species with less appeal is ab-
horrent to ecologists. Most opponents of the law approach the
issue gingerly, and even the most sweeping bills to amend the
ESA avoid any direct consideration of the value of particular
species. But the effort to treat all species equally faces a di-
lemma. Choices between species appear inevitable because of
the huge number of species and the limited amount of re-
sources available to protect them. Choices between species occur
in the implementation of the law, notwithstanding the image of
the ESA as prohibiting discrimination between species. Yet
the story of Noah suggests that choices among species are im-
permissible. In other words, when confronted with the task of
choosing among species, we have to, we do, but we shouldn't.
Part I of this Article explains why choosing among species
is inevitable. The large number of species that are endan-
gered, the limited amount of resources for preserving biodiver-
sity, and the competing demands presented by other societal
problems make it impossible to protect every species. Part II
describes how the implementation of the ESA acknowledges
this inevitability by preferring some species over others in a
variety of contexts. Part III examines how plants and animals
provide invaluable utilitarian benefits ranging from food to
medicine to tourism. Nonetheless, Mann and Plummer and
other critics of the existing law are extremely effective in dem-
onstrating that such utilitarian arguments do not justify
treating all species equally. Instead, the case for protecting all
species must depend on moral, religious or ethical arguments.
Part IV considers the implications of Noah's example-and the
biblical context in which it occurs-along with the theological,
constitutional, moral, and legal arguments against reliance
upon Noah as the basis for the ESA. I conclude that Noah
Agencies of the House Appropriations Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1081-82
(1996) [hereinafter 1997 Interior Appropriations Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Taylor) (indicating that EEN appears to be "a rouse" and that "the evangelical
environmental movement might have been more in the Clinton/Gore cam-
paign than with God"); Marcia Gelbart, "Environmental Evangelism" Raises
Hackles of Rep. Pombo, HILL, Feb. 21, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Arcnws File (quoting Representative Pombo's press spokesman as
characterizing EEN as a "phony Christian conservative group"); Don Young,
$1 Million Endangered Species Lobbying Effort (Feb. 1, 1996) (press release),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (quoting letter from Repre-
sentatives Young and Pombo asking EEN to "keep the debate honest and
don't use the pulpit to mislead people").
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provides a compelling case for protecting all endangered species
regardless of whether one believes that a flood actually oc-
curred or whether one finds the scriptures authoritative. That
appears to be impossible, though, so Part V contemplates how
Noah would have made choices among species if he was forced
to do so. My guess is that Noah would have tried to save the
most species and the most different kinds of species possible.
While Noah avoided making any such choices, the fact that we
are already choosing among species today demands that we
take greater care in determining how we do so. This approach
does not answer many of the hard questions about how we
should protect biodiversity or whether the ESA is working, but
Noah's example does show that the goals of the ESA remain
sound.
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF CHOOSING AMONG SPECIES
The multiple threats to endangered species lead to one
conclusion: not all species can be saved. The threshold issue is
to define what constitutes a "species." In Noah's Choice, Mann
and Plummer chart the evolution of scientific thinking from
classifying the animals that were carried on the ark, to the
taxonomical work of eighteenth century Swedish botanist Carl
Linnaeus, to Darwin's theories, and finally to the current un-
derstanding of species as "special groups of organisms that
breed together."24 That technical debate has significant ramifi-
cations for the protections of endangered "species." As the
definition of "species" becomes more and more precise, the
number of species increases, and more animals or plants will
be eligible to stake a claim for protection. The scientific de-
bates have spilled over into the law as parties dispute the ap-
propriate classification of a species.2 As one author recently
24. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 30-36. More specifically, "[a]
species is a reproductive community of populations, reproductively isolated
from other populations, that occupies a specific niche in nature," id. at 36
(quoting ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DiVERsirY,
EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE 273 (1982) (emphasis omitted)), a definition
that Mann and Plummer analyze at some length. See id. at 37-39; see also
Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why
Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L. Q. 1029, 1088-1112
(1997); Kevin D. Hill, The Endangered Species Act: What Do We Mean By Spe-
cies?, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 247-53 (1993) (discussing briefly the
history of taxonomy and the various approaches used to define species).
25. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Notice of
Reclassification of a Candidate Taxon: Clematis Hirsutissima var. Arizonica
(Arizona Leatherflower), 63 Fed. Reg. 1,418 (1998) (removing the Arizona
1998] 1179
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put it, "the classification of animals, like that of any group of
significant objects, is apt to tell as much about the classifiers
as about the classified." 6 With this in mind, some reformers
have targeted the ESA's protection of "subspecies" as unjusti-
fied.27 Such a change would have dramatic consequences: the
northern spotted owl, for example, is a subspecies of the spotted
owl, and would no longer receive the ESA's protection."
Thus defined, the first problem confronting any effort to
prevent a species from going extinct is the sheer number of
Leatherflower from the list of candidate species because recent studies show
no clear differences from another species); Endangered and Threatened Wild-
life and Plants; 12-Month Finding for a Petition to List the Alexander Archi-
pelago Wolf as Threatened and to Designate Critical Habitat, 62 Fed. Reg.
46,709 (1997) (noting that "[tihe taxonomic status of wolves in southeast
Alaska ... is uncertain," and refusing to list the wolf under the ESA for other
reasons).
26. HARRIET RITVO, THE PLATYPUS AND THE MERMAID AND OTHER
FIGMENTS OF THE CLASSIFYING IMAGINATION, at xii (1997). Ritvo's wonderful
book documents the way in which politics, military strategy, and other agen-
das influenced the classification of animals--and ultimately, people-in eight-
eenth and nineteenth century Britain.
27. The ESA defines "species" to include "any subspecies of fish or wildlife
or plants." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994). "Subspecies" is undefined in the stat-
ute and imprecisely defined elsewhere. See, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, THE
DWERSITY OF LIFE 406 (1992) (definition of a "subspecies" is "[slubdivision of
a species. Usually defined narrowly as a geographical race: a population or
series of populations occupying a discrete range and differing genetically from
other geographical races of the same species."). For competing views of the
protection of subspecies, compare Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra
note 10, at 76 (statement of Glenn English, Vice Chairman, National endan-
gered Species Act Reform Coalition) (criticizing the protection of subspecies),
id. at 104 (statement of Dean Kleckner, President, The American Farm Bu-
reau Federation) (same), and Vancouver ESA Hearing, supra note 7, at 39
(testimony of Barbara Tilly, Chairman, Chelan County Public Utility District
Board of Commissioners) (same), with Washington ESA Hearing Part III, su-
pra note 12, at 261-62 (statement of Bruce Babbitt, Secretary, U.S. Dept. Of
Interior) (defending the inclusion of subspecies), NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL ET AL., SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 46-67 (1995)
(supporting the inclusion of subspecies), and THE WILDERNESS SOCkY FOR THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES COALITION, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A
COMMITMENT WORTH KEEPING 15-17 (1992) (providing ecological, evolution-
ary and aesthetic justifications for protecting subspecies).
28. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114
(1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 300). Note that the ESA also protects
distinct populations of a species that is endangered in one place but not in an-
other. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Threatened
Status for the Alaska Breeding Population of the Steller's Eider, 62 Fed. Reg.
31, 748 (1997) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (listing the population of the
Steller's eider-a sea duck-that breeds in Alaska, but declining to list the
balance of the species that lives in Russia).
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species present in the United States and throughout the world.
Mann and Plummer present a staggering number of statistics:
1.8 million species have been discovered, but drawing on the
type of scientific research that identified 1200 different kinds
of beetles in a single tree, scientists estimate that there may be
as many as 100 million different species on the earth today.29
Other sources provide similar numbers.3" And those numbers
do not include subspecies. Furthermore, the total number of
species itself is far less important than the number of species
that are endangered. Scientists disagree on that number. At
one end of the spectrum, Harvard biologist Edward 0. Wilson
estimates that 27,000 species are becoming extinct each year;
at the other end, the World Conservation Monitoring Centre
counts only 1237 extinctions since the year 1600.31 The uncer-
tainty is compounded by our inability to know when an extinc-
tion occurs.32
29. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 8, 249 (citing WILSON, supra
note 27, at 132-41, who estimated that there could be anywhere from 10 mil-
lion to 100 million total species in the world); id. at 41 (describing the re-
search of entomologist Terry L. Erwin in a Panamanian forest).
30. See, e.g., NORMAN MYERS, THE SINKING ARK 15-18 (1979)
(summarizing the scientific estimates of the number of species). See generally
EXTINCTION RATES (John H. Lawton & Robert M. May eds., 1995) (providing a
collection of studies of extinction rates of species throughout the world).
31. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 14, 51; see also GREGG
EASTERBROOK, A MOMENT ON THE EARTH 556-62 (1995) (questioning the
higher estimates of extinction rates); MYERS, supra note 30, at 5 (suggesting
that "it is not unrealistic to suppose that... at least one species is disappear-
ing each day"); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 27, at 33-35
(summarizing studies of extinction rates); Stephen Budiansky, Chaos in Eden,
NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 14, 1995, at 33, 34 (j[Actual field studies document a
global extinction rate of one species per year. The true number is almost cer-
tainly much greater, but there is simply no hard evidence of the numbers
cited by Wilson").
32. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed
Threatened Status for the Plant Astragalus Deserticus (Deseret milk-vetch),
63 Fed. Reg. 4,207 (1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt .17) (proposing to list
a plant "considered extinct for 72 years prior to 1981"); Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Endangered Status for Erigeron
decumbens var. decumbens (Willamette Daisy) and Fender's Blue Butterfly
(Icaricia icarioides fenderi) and Proposed Threatened Status for Lupinus sul-
phureus ssp. kincaidii (Kincaid's lupine), 63 Fed. Reg. 3,863, 3,865-66 (1998)
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (referring to the 1989 rediscovery of
Fender's blue butterfly over sixty years after the last previous sighting); Once
Thought Extinct, Wallaby Breed Found Far From Home, CNN Interactive
(visited Jan. 24, 1998) <http www.cnmcom/EARTHI98OI/24/wallaby/>
(reporting the discovery in New Zealand of a species of wallaby that vanished
from South Australia early this century); CNN Interactive, Shark Believed
Extinct Found in Malaysian River (Apr. 10, 1997) (reporting the discovery of a
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Determining the number of species in danger of extinction
would assist in planning for the effort to protect such species,
but again, that number is less important to the current political
debate than the number of species listed as endangered or
threatened under the ESA. The protections of the ESA extend to
species that are formally listed as "endangered" (i.e., "in danger
of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range")
or "threatened" (i.e., 9ikely to become endangered... within the
foreseeable future").33 The list includes 896 endangered species
and 230 threatened species.34 But the list could grow much
longer. Over 20,000 species were proposed for listing before
the ESA was two years old.35 The United States Fish & Wildlife
Service (FWS) has formally identified 173 species as candi-
dates for listing.36 Another 10,000 may deserve further consid-
eration.37
The huge (albeit uncertain) number of species combined
with environmentally destructive human activities and natural
events results in many endangered species, which in turn
yields a growing list of such species. As the number of listed
species grows, the cost of protecting endangered species grows
as well. For example, the Karner blue butterfly lives in fields
of lupine, a flower that flourished throughout the east and
Borneo River Shark one hundred years after it was last seen alive).
33. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (1994).
34. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Division of Endangered Species, Box
Score: Listings and Recovery Plans as of July 31, 1997 (visited Feb. 23, 1998)
<http'//www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/boxseore.html> [hereinafter FWS Box Score].
35. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 162.
36. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Division of Endangered Species, En-
dangered Species General Statistics 1 (1996) (visited Feb. 23, 1998)
<http'/www.fws.gov/-r9endspp/esastats.html> (providing data as of May 31,
1997). "Candidate" species are those that are warranted to be proposed for
placement on the list once resources permit. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service Issues Revised List of "Candidates" for Endan-
gered Species List (Feb. 27, 1996) (press release), available in 1996 WL 87666.
Prior to 1996, the Fish & Wildlife Service distinguished between "Category 1
species" (species that are now called candidate species) and "Category 2 spe-
cies" (species for which additional information was required before they could
be proposed to be placed on the list). See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET
AL., supra note 27, at 151 (reprinting definitions published in 58 Fed. Reg.
51,145 (1993)); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERv., FACTS ABOUT THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT, ch. I (1995) [hereinafter ESA FACTS], reprinted in Washington
ESA Hearing Part III, supra note 12, at 277. There is no equivalent to Cate-
gory 2 species today.
37. See Oliver A. Houck, Reflections on the Endangered Species Act, 25
ENVTL. L. 689, 690 n.10 (1995) (citing the 1990 report of the Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality).
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midwest during the nineteenth century but which has become
much less common today. The destruction of the lupine fields
has left scattered populations of the Karner blue butterfly in a
line of states ranging from New Hampshire to Minnesota. The
FWS listed the Karner blue as endangered in 1992.38 Buying
the land necessary to protect the Karner blues that live near
Albany, New York alone would cost at least $150 million. 9
Protecting Karner blues elsewhere, as would be necessary to
prevent a catastrophic event from wiping out a single popula-
tion of the species, would cost "billions of dollars."'
A similar controversy has surrounded two songbirds (the
black-capped vireo and the golden-cheeked warbler), the Bar-
ton springs salamander, and several cave-dwelling insects in
the Hill Country west of Austin, Texas. Efforts have long been
underway to establish a system of preserves for those species
amidst the rapid urban sprawl of Austin.4 Estimates of the
cost of protecting the Hill Country species range from hun-
dreds of millions of dollars (to fully implement the biologists'
initial plan) to $86 million (to purchase the land to be set aside
38. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Endangered Status for the Karner Blue Butterfly, 57 Fed. Reg. 59,236
(1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The FWS, located within the Inte-
rior Department, is responsible for animals and plants found on land or fresh
water. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) within the Commerce
Department is responsible for marine animals and plants. See, e.g., RICHARD
LITTELL, ENDANGERED AND OTHER PROTECTED SPECIES: FEDERAL LAW AND
REGULATION 15 & n.6 (1992).
39. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 109.
40. Id. at 110. For example, Midwest Steel paid $1.5 million to relocate
1454 lupine plants (and the butterflies they attracted) from the company's
Indiana plant to a new site. See id. at 105; see also Mike Beirne, Mill Turns
Gardener to Save Endangered Species of Butterfly, AMERICAN METAL
MARKET, Apr. 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 3119901. Mann and Plummer
previously wrote about a conflict involving another endangered butterfly in
Oregon, see Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 47, 47, prompting the FWS to rebut their
claims in a published report. See ESA FACTS, supra note 36, at ch. III
(indicating that Oregon state law, not the ESA, blocked the proposed golf
course described by Mann and Plummer), reprinted in Washington ESA Hear-
ing Part III, supra note 12, at 291.
41. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 176-211. For other descrip-
tions of Austin's experience with the ESA, see Louisiana & Texas ESA Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 103-52, 222-79; J.B. Ruhl, Regional Habitat Conserva-
tion Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: Pushing the Practical and
Legal Limits of Species Protection, 44 Sw. L.J. 1393, 1413-23 (1991); Melinda
E. Taylor, Promoting Recovery or Hedging a Bet Against Extinction: Austin,
Texas's Risky Approach to Ensuring Endangered Species' Survival in the
Texas Hill Country, 24 ENVTL. L. 581 (1994).
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under a 1990 plan).42 Those estimates only include the cost of
purchasing the land; ongoing maintenance costs and the other
costs of establishing a system of preserves would drive the to-
tal sum higher. Moreover, the effect of the regulatory demands
of the ESA adds over $9000 per acre to the cost of development
in the area. 3
There are many other examples. The recovery plan for en-
dangered salmon will cost hundreds of millions dollars annu-
ally." California gnatcatchers live on undeveloped coastal land
north of Los Angeles-land worth as much as $200,000 per lot,
so that establishing reserves for the gnatcatcher could cost billions
of dollars.45 The San Bernadino County Medical Center Re-
42. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 195, 199.
43. See J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web
of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Com-
pletely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 583 n.71 (1995); see also Endan-
gered Species Protection: Hearing Before the House Resources Comm., 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. 325-49 (1996) [hereinafter Endangered Species Protection
Hearing] (reprinting a consultant's 1995 study of the impact of the ESA on
rural Texas land values).
44. See 142 CONG. REC. H2888 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Hastings of Wash.) (estimating that "the Pacific Northwest is likely to
spend close to $1 billion annually on salmon recovery alone by the turn of the
21st century"); Washington ESA Hearing Part I, supra note 7, at 56
(statement of Rep. Doolittle) (indicating that the recovery plan will cost $350
in 1995, $500 million in 1996, and nearly $750 million in 1997); Vancouver
ESA Hearing, supra note 7, at 44 (testimony of Bud Mercer, Chairman, Co-
lumbia/Snake River Irrigators Ass'n) (estimating the cost at as much as $600
million annually).
45. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 112. Gnatcatchers (like
other birds) suffer when cowbirds steal their nests, but the FWS's plan to
eliminate the cowbirds has drawn congressional ire. See 142 CoNG. REc.
H4440 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Traficant) (complaining that
the government is planning on spending $67 million to kill California cow-
birds in order to preserve the gnatcatcher); see also Charles C. Mann & Mark
L. Plummer, California v. Gnatcatcher, AUDUBON, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 38
(describing the gnatcatcher conflict in greater detail). For other examples of
how protecting endangered species can increase housing costs, see Endan-
gered Species Act-Riverside, California: Oversight Hearing Before the Task
Force on Endangered Species of the House Resources Comm., 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 11 (1995) [hereinafter Riverside ESA Hearing] (testimony of Scott
Woodward, Building Industry Ass'n of Southern California) ("In the final
analysis, every additional $1000 added to the price of a home forces two per-
cent of the buying population here in southern California out of the market.");
Washington ESA Hearing Part III, supra note 12, at 234-35 (statement of the
National Association of Realtors) (reporting that the impact of the ESA in-
creased the cost per home by $5,064 to preserve the kit fox and Swainson's
hawk in California, by $6,550 to preserve the bald eagle in Florida, and by
$5,025 to preserve the golden-cheeked warbler in Texas). See generally
Rachlinski, supra note 12, at 362 n.45 (citing additional sources).
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placement Facility spent over $3 million to mitigate its impact
on the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly.' Protecting the Stephens
kangaroo rat might cost $50 million.4 7 And these examples only
show the cost of protecting a few species, not protecting all
species. In Mann and Plummer's words, "protecting all species
would be a fantastically costly enterprise.""
"Fantastically costly" lacks the precision required by an
accounting firm, but it provides a fair description of the bottom-
line cost of protecting the increasing number of endangered
species. The other side of the ledger shows that we have lim-
ited resources available for endangered species protection and
many competing demands to use our limited resources for
other purposes. Mann and Plummer complain of the
"scandalous unwillingness of Congress to back this lofty mission
with significant budget outlays."49 The appropriations numbers
prove their point.
All parts of the enforcement of the ESA are affected by the
limited funds available. The FWS does not have nearly enough
resources to process all of the Candidates proposed for the list.
It would have taken the seven agency listing experts 500 years
to review all of the 20,000 candidates proposed for the list in
the first two years that the ESA was in effect. 0 The situation
has not improved much since then. Funding for the FWS in-
creased "slightly faster than the pace of listings for native U.S.
46. See Riverside ESA Hearing, supra note 45, at 56-57 (testimony of
Jerry Eaves, Fifth District Supervisor, San Bernadino County); see also 143
CONG. REC. H2298 (daily ed. May 7, 1997) (colloquy between Reps. Pombo and
Bonilla ridiculing the effort to save the fly); John Copeland Nagle, The Com-
merce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Lowing Fly, 97 MIcH. L. REv.
(forthcoming Oct. 1998) (describing the conflict between the fly and the hospi-
tal).
47. See Riverside ESA Hearing, supra note 45, at 11 (testimony of Scott
Woodward, Building Industry Association of Southern California).
48. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 133. The estimates of the cost
of protecting the species currently listed as endangered range from $4.6 bil-
lion to $9.1 billion. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 1115 n.35 (citing a 1990 FWS
report); H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 371 (fact sheet prepared by the
Grassroots ESA Coalition relying on FWS estimates that the cost of recovery
alone will be between $7.3 and $9.1 billion, based on the average cost to list,
recover and delist a species).
49. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 220; see also id. at 232-33
(chastising Congress for "refusing to back necessary increases in the budget
for protection," and referring to the FWS's "impossible task of saving every-
thing on a tiny budget").
50. See id. at 162.
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species" between 1974 and 1989.1 Even by 1993, however, it
was estimated that it would take another forty-three years to
list just those species already under consideration. 52 Thus, the
agency has cited its "limited budget" as the reason for not listing
certain species earlier,53 and the courts have agreed that it is
"impossible" for the FWS to list all deserving species because of
the insufficient funding.54 Accordingly, "When the [FWS] un-
dertakes one listing activity, it inevitably forgoes another."55
Likewise, the ESA's provision empowering the government
to acquire the habitat of endangered species "is woefully under-
funded and shows no signs of changing in that respect."56 The
51. Faith Campbell, The Appropriations History, in BALANCING ON THE
BRINK OF EXTINCTION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE
FUTURE 134, 135 (Kathryn A. Kohm ed., 1991) [hereinafter KOHM]. The ap-
propriations for the endangered species program of the FWS, the lead agency
for most endangered species, increased from less than $5 million in 1974 to
over $83 million in 1995, as detailed in id. tbl. 2 (1974-1989 statistics); ESA
FACTS, supra note 36, at ch. 1 (1990-1995 statistics), reprinted in Washington
ESA Hearing Part III, supra note 12, at 276. The figures for the endangered
species programs of the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
are provided in Campbell, supra, at 135 tbl. 3.
52. See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implemen-
tation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV.
277, 292 (1993). Houck adds that "the pace of listing has reflected the pace of
funding," and that "Interior has steadfastly resisted additional funding for
ESA listing" because it is perceived as a low priority. Id. at 293.
53. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Notice of Second
Reopening of Comment Period on Proposed Endangered Status for the Penin-
sular Ranges Population of the Desert Bighorn Sheep, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,733
(1997); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Reopening of Public
Comment Period on the Proposed Rule to List the Pallid Manzanita as
Threatened, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,388 (1997); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants, Notice of Reopening of Comment Period on Proposed Threatened
Status for the Flat-Tailed Horned Lizard, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,016 (1997). See
generally Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Listing Pri-
ority Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,475 (1996) [hereinafter
FWS 1997 Priority Guidance] (describing the funding constraints faced by the
FWS's listing program).
54. Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 948 F. Supp. 56,57 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (upholding
the FWS's failure to list the peninsular big horn sheep because of limited
funds).
55. FWS 1997 Priority Guidance, supra note 53, at 64,480.
56. Ruhl, supra note 43, at 585 & n.77 (indicating that the FWS spent
$238,457,238 to acquire 349,405 acres of land between 1967 and 1993); see
also id. at 656-57 n.311 (noting that "funding Austin's biodiversity initiative
alone would almost match all the federal governments historical endangered
species habitat preservation outlays for all species, and even then full funding
of the Austin proposal would not satisfy all the habitat preservation goals of
the various Austin area endangered species' recovery plans"); Campbell, supra
note 51, at 141-43 (describing the history of funding for land acquisition).
PLAYING NOAH
cooperative grants from the federal government to help states
preserve federally protected species receive one quarter of the
appropriations that would be necessary to fund each agree-
ment.57 Recovery plans suffer from a similar lack of funding.
The 306 existing recovery plans would cost nearly $900 million
to complete, but the FWS requested only $84 million in fiscal
year 1995 to implement them." Likewise, each Habitat Con-
servation Plan (HCP) "requires considerable expense," though
usually most of the cost is paid by affected private parties.59
The current federal budget for spending on endangered species
programs pales in comparison to these needs, and calls for
dramatically increased funding are likely to go unheeded. The
budget for endangered species programs fluctuated during the
104th Congress, which cut funding one year and then raised it
57. See Campbell, supra note 51, at 141. For a description of the role of
cooperative agreements between states and the federal government, see THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A COMMImENT WORTH KEEPING, supra note 27,
at 24-25.
58. See Rubl, supra note 43, at 588 n.87 (citing NATIONAL WILDERNESS
INSTITUTE, GOING BROKE? COSTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES AT AS
REVEALED IN ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY PLANS 1 (1994)); see also
Campbell, supra note 51, at 14041 (discussing the lack of fimding for recov-
ery plans); Houck, supra note 52, at 346-47 (same). The FWS cautions, how-
ever, that the cost estimates contained in recovery plans overstate the true
cost of achieving the recovery goal for a species. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., Division of Endangered Species, Endangered Species Recovery (visited
Apr. 13, 1998) <http//www.fws.gov/r9endspp/faqrecov.html> ("The recovery
plan is best thought of as a menu. To have a healthy meal in a restaurant,
one would not total an entire menu to arrive at the cost of one dinner. Not all
the tasks in a recovery plan need to be implemented to reach the recovery
goal.").
59. MICHAEL J. BEAN ET AL., RECONCILING CONFLICTS UNDER THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: THE HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN EXPERIENCE
15 (1991); see also id. at 33 (noting that one group seeking a HCP "was con-
strained by the prohibitive cost (potentially $100 million) of a preserve net-
work'); William J. Snape, Biodiversity's Safety Net: Saving Endangered Species,
in BIODIvERSITY AND THE LAW 37 (William J. Snape ed., 1996) ("In addition to
the costly requirements of biological research and land planning, millions of
dollars will be needed to purchase easements or fee simple title to wildlife
corridors and reserves."). The 1982 amendments to the ESA authorized HCPs
as a means by which a private party can incidentally 'take" endangered species,
otherwise prohibited by section 9, provided that the party has developed a
sufficient plan to protect the species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (1994). Few
HCPs were approved prior to the 1990's, see BEAN, supra, at 7-10 (describing
each HCP), but the Clinton Administration has made the development of
HCPs a priority. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosys-
tem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 954-59 (1997) (describing the evolu-
tion of HCPs).
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the next.' When Secretary Babbitt refers to "an era of con-
strained budgets"6' and President Clinton announces that "the
era of big government is over," even the most favorable sce-
nario will not produce the kind of money needed to preserve all
endangered species.
But the problem is not the lack of resources per se. It is
conceivable (though still not entirely certain) that we could
implement every plan to protect every endangered species if we
spent the entire $1.5 trillion annual federal budget on endan-
gered species protection. Obviously we have other priorities.
Sometimes those priorities appear frivolous. The 1991 FWS
budget for endangered species was matched by the money
spent on Domino's pizza in Washington, D.C., that year.6 In
other instances our priorities reflect our affluent society. The
endangered species living in the Hill Country west of Austin
have conflicted with the building of single-family homes,
apartment buildings, fast-food restaurants, convenience stores,
gas stations, light industry, supermarkets, and countless other
projects." The habitat of the Karner blue butterfly in Albany
was replaced by residential subdivisions, a racetrack, the Al-
60. Compare Brian Broderick, Budget: Endangered Species Funds
Boosted in FY 1997 Interior Dept. Appropriations, 1996 Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) 200 (Oct. 16,1996), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DEN Database (noting
a $13 million increase in funding for endangered species programs), with H.R.
REP. No. 104-173, at 23 (1995) (Appropriations Committee recommending
that the FWS receive $53 million for endangered species activities in 1996 in-
stead of the $77 million requested by the agency and the $69 million appro-
priated in 1995); see also 141 CONG. REC. H6942 (daily ed. July 13, 1995)
(statement of Rep. McDermott) (accusing the Republicans of "using the ap-
propriations process as a devious back-door strategy to slightly eliminate the
ESA by no longer funding its activities"). But see Endangered Species Protec-
tion Hearing, supra note 43, at 192-210 (House Resources Committee majority
staff report disputing the claim that the ESA is inadequately funded).
61. FY98 Interior Appropriations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Interior and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 105th
Cong. (1997) [hereinafter 1998 Interior Appropriations Hearing] (statement of
Bruce Babbitt), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Cngtst File; see also De-
partment of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of Representatives,
104th Cong. 167 (1996) (testimony of Mollie H. Beattie, Director of the FWS)
(agreeing that "[w]e have to balance and put priorities on the financial re-
sources in this current fiscal climate").
62. President William Clinton, State of the Union Address of the Presi-
dent, (Jan. 23, 1996), available in 1996 WL 23253.
63. See David Wilcove, Getting Ahead of the Extinction Curve, 3
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 218, 219 (1993). I was there, but I don't remem-
ber contributing to the latter figure.
64. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 179, 183.
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bany Country Club, a state office complex, a Niagara Mohawk
power substation, four lanes of Interstate Highway 90, the
State University of New York at Albany, and the Crossgates
Mall." The development of hot springs into commercial resorts
has helped nine species of plants become endangered in Cali-
fornia." The famous snail darter almost defeated the Tellico
Dam.67
Protecting endangered species habitat instead of building
another 7-Eleven presents an easy choice. But Mann and
Plummer worry about the cumulative effects of such decisions:
We do not need one more convenience store. But that doesn't mean
we can easily do without all convenience stres.... [Aldopt a policy
of no more stores and people will be out of work and unable to find
the things they need. Then shut down the banks, the golf courses,
the shopping malls, the parking lots, and the gas stations and watch
the costs to people's hopes and dreams rise to ever more unacceptable
heights."
Of course, people live without golf courses and shopping
malls in most parts of the world, so the debate about protecting
the habitat of endangered species may reduce to a debate about
the kind of society in which we want to live.69 Such decisions
must be made by the citizens of Albany, Austin, the Pacific
Northwest, and most other areas throughout the United
65. See id. at 83-85, 100-01.
66. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Endangered Status for Nine Plants from the Grasslands of Mesic Areas of
the Central Coast of California, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,791, 54,802-03 (1997) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
67. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 164-75. Mann and Plummer
recognize that there were other reasons for stopping the dam. See id. at 171
(quoting former Interior Secretary and God Squad member Cecil Andrus as
saying, "I hate to see the snail darter get the credit for stopping a project that
was ill-conceived and uneconomical in the first place"); see also Zygmunt J.B.
Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and
Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 814-18 (1986).
68. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 113; cf. Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule to List the Plant Lesquerella
Thamnophila (Zapata Bladderpod) as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 3,301, 3,303
(1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. .17) (proposed Jan. 22, 1998) (worrying
that "[rlecent construction of convenience stores [near Zapata, Texas] could
stimulate urbanization that might extirpate the population" of a rare plant).
69. Compare CREATION AT RISK? RELIGION, SCIENCE, AND ENVI-
RONMENTALISM 28 (Michael Cromartie ed., 1995) (assertion by Ronald Sider,
president of Evangelicals for Social Action, that "[ulsually the choice is be-
tween increased affluence or wiping out species," not between killing humans
or killing species), with id. at 31 (response by Ronald Bailey, executive pro-
ducer of New River Media, that "affluence saves human lives" and "[alffluence
is a human good almost without limits").
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States. More than 200 million people live near a species that is
listed as endangered or threatened;7" so even though endan-
gered species cluster in certain areas," one day many of us may
have to choose whether to preserve land for endangered species
habitat or to use it for some other purpose.
The hardest cases occur when the preservation of an en-
dangered bird or animal comes at the cost of forgoing some
other critical endeavor. Protecting the Oklahoma habitat of
the American burying beetle has blocked the construction of a
highway connecting a Native American community to the
nearest hospital on the other side of the mountains; the beetle
may also destroy the coal mining jobs of poor families.72 The
residents of Wilton, New York, must live with mosquitoes
during the summer because the easiest way of controlling them
would harm the Karner blue butterfly. 3 The butterfly also
lives on a camp that the Boy Scouts want to sell to fund pro-
grams for urban children, thereby preventing the sale.74 The
70. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 15.
71. See A.P. Dobson et al., Geographic Distribution of Endangered Species
in the United States, 275 SCIENCE 550, 551 (1997) (study concluding that en-
dangered species are concentrated in 'hot spots" in California, Florida, Ha-
waii and a few other states); see also Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer,
The Geography of Endangerment, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1993, at 101
(commenting that "protected species are spread unevenly and often unexpect-
edly," noting that there are no listed species in the Bronx but seven in nearby
Suffolk County on Long Island). For maps indicating the distribution of en-
dangered species and candidates for the endangered species list by state, see
Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations,
U.S. Senate, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1363-64 (1994); Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN.
L. REV. 305, 311 (1997). A similar concentration of species exists worldwide.
See Conservation International, Hotspots Map Offers Solutions to Global
Species Extinction Crisis (Feb. 13, 1997) (press release, on file with author)(reporting on a map prepared by Conservation International that shows that
50% of biological diversity is contained within less than 2% of the earth's land).
72. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 15-24, 237; see also National
Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(describing how a planned county hospital had to be relocated to avoid the
habitat of the endangered Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly).
73. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 95-97, 103-04, 114; see also
Riverside ESA Hearing, supra note 45, at 43 (testimony of Carolyn Powers,
Tijuana River Valley Task Force) (describing a similar conflict between mos-
quito controls and the endangered Bell's vireo); 143 Cong. Rec. S9412 (daily
ed. Sept. 16, 1997) (remarks of Sen. Kempthorne) (reporting that a boy in
Laramie, Wyoming, contracted encephalitis from a mosquito after the com-
munity's mosquito abatement program was suspended because of the ESA).
74. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 104.
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black-capped vireo delayed the redesign of a dangerous Texas
highway where two dozen people were killed in recent years. 5
And those are only the choices recorded in Noah's Choice.76
Once we move outside our borders into developing countries
that struggle to feed their people, the required choices between
endangered wildlife and basic human needs become more fre-
quent and more frightening.
Nor is the conflict limited to the use of any particular piece of
land. It is also between using scarce funds to protect endangered
species and using those funds for other purposes. Endangered
species programs are not the only worthwhile endeavors facing
declining government appropriations. Environmental pollution,
crime prevention, inadequate education, poverty, and a host of
other needs compete with endangered species for money and
attention.' To cite but one drastic example, one county official
has recounted how five of his colleagues left a meeting crying
when they could not fund an immunization program for infants
at a time when they were required to spend millions for en-
75. See fd. at 197. Mann and Plummer have also described how a plan to
fix another dangerous highway depends on anticipated tax revenues from a
development that has stalled amidst California gnatcatcher habitat. See
Mann & Plummer, supra note 45, at 45-47.
76. For others, see Catron County Bd. of Comn'rs, N.M. v. United States
Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1432-33 (10th Cir. 1996) (claim that re-
serving water to protect the threatened spikedace and loach minnow would
cause flooding of county road, bridges and fairgrounds); Virgin Islands Tree
Boa v. Witt, 918 F. Supp. 879, 885-91 (D.V.I. 1996), affd mner., 82 F.3d 408,
408 (3d Cir. 1996) (allegation that the construction of emergency housing in
the aftermath of Hurricane Marilyn would harm an endangered snake); Mora-
torium on the Listing Provisions of the Endangered Species Act: Hearing Be-
fore the Subcomm. on Drinking Water, Fisheries, and Wildlife of the Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, 104th Cong. 11, 78-79 (1995)
[hereinafter ESA Listing Moratorium Hearing] (statement of Sen. Hutchison)
(describing a conflict between protecting the Arkansas River shiner and as-
suring the public water supply for residents of west Texas); Endangered Spe-
cies: NMFS Lists California Coho Salmon Under ESA, Governor Wilson Pro-
tests, 1996 Daily Env't Rep., (BNA) 209 (Oct. 29, 1996), available in
WESTLAW, BNA-DEN Database (quoting Governor Wilson as complaining
that the listing of the coho salmon "could result in a virtual shutdown of log-
ging, mining, ranching and other agricultural activity over large parts of Cali-
fornia"). See generally Texas Shrimp Ass'n v. Daley, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17875 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 1997) ("It is an unfortunate reality in our modern
world that the interests of humans and the other creatures of the world
sometimes clash. Normally, in these situations, humans win. The ESA, how-
ever, was enacted to level this playing field.").
77. See Harry T. Edwards, Goals in Life Worth Pursuing, 10 FLA ST. U.
L. REV. 517, 521 (1983) (observing that "the solutions for certain of these
problems are the causes of others").
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dangered species preservation.78 Necessarily, then, any deci-
sion to pay more for endangered species means that we pay a
little less for everything else. That is the inevitable choice
identified in Noah's Choice.9
The result is that we can probably save any species, but we
cannot save every species. 0 The successful efforts to save the
American bald eagle demonstrate that we have the ability to
preserve a species when we commit the resources necessary to
do so. But the bald eagle is only one species. Other birds have
gone extinct in the United States despite the ESA, and many
78. See Endangered Species Protection Hearing, supra note 43, at 61-62
(testimony of Sam Sharp, Supervisor, Imperial'County, California).
79. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 25-26 ("Inevitably, the
money for [protecting endangered species] would come from some other de-
serving project, frustrating some other human aspiration."); id. at 101
(preserving land in Albany for the Karner blue butterfly "would eliminate a
sizeable chunk of tax revenues, a big concern to a small city scrambling to pay
for schools, libraries, hospitals, and roads"); id. at 204 ("By paying for biodi-
versity, [the residents of the Austin area] would be cutting into their ability to
fund other programs in years to come--paying for the future of species in-
stead of the future of schools, in other words."); id. at 213 ("[Society cannot]
extract money from developers and give it to black-capped vireos that need
protection.., and simultaneously ensure that good housing is available and
affordable to everyone. Or good health care, for that matter, or a good educa-
tion."); see also id. at 174 (quoting similar remarks by Senator Jake Gain, Re-
publican of Utah).
80. See MANN & PLUZMMER, supra note 11, at 113 (referring to "[tlhe
practical impossibility of saving everything"); id. at 229 (claiming that "the
ark is not big enough" for all living things); BRYAN G. NORTON, WHY
PRESERVE NATURAL VARIETY? 243, 257 (1987) (admitting that the resources
available to preserve endangered species cannot save all species); Holly
Doremns, Patching the Ark: Improving Legal Protection of Biological Diver-
sity, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 305 & n.260 (1991) (explaining why we cannot pro-
tect every species "at least in the absence of drastic reductions in human
population and drastic changes in human lifestyles"); Zygmunt J.B. Plater,
The Embattled Social Utilities of the Endangered Species Act-A Noah Pre-
sumption and Caution Against Putting Gasmasks on the Canaries in the
Coalmine, 27 ENVTL. L. 845, 864 (1997) ("[T]he potentially large numbers of
listable species make it impossible even to consider, never mind reverse, every
anthropogenic threat of species extinction."); Elizabeth Royte, On the Brink:
Hawaii's Vanishing Species, NATL GEOGRAPHIC 2, 36 (Sept. 1995) ("[Slcience
cannot save every endangered species. There is never enough time, never
enough money."); Mark Sagoff, On the Preservation of Species, 7 COLuM. J.
ENVTL. L. 33, 34-35 (1980) (agreeing that "[ilt is impossible, or at least im-
practical" that we can preserve every species "no matter how inconsequential
the benefits or how great the costs"); Martin L. Weitzman, On Diversity, 107
QUARTERLY J. ECON. 363, 363 (1992) ("We cannot preserve everything....
Given our limited resources, preservation of diversity in one context can only
be accomplished at some real opportunity cost in terms of well-being forgone
in other spheres of life. .. ").
more birds (and mammals, and insects, and fish and plants)
remain endangered. We lack the resources and the willingness
to take the steps that are required to assure the recovery of all
of those species. There are even times when the actions neces-
sary to protect one endangered species actually harm another
endangered species.8 ' If those limits exist, then "we must
choose." 2
II. THE CURRENT PRACTICE
OF CHOOSING AMONG SPECIES
The common image of the ESA is that it prohibits any
choices among species. Mann and Plummer, for example,
complain that the law prevents any balancing between endan-
gered species and other societal needs.83 In their view, the ESA
dictates that all endangered species must be treated equally,
and that all endangered species are more important than every-
thing else.
They exaggerate. To be sure, the protections of the ESA
extend to any species that is endangered or threatened by ex-
tinction. Yet the ESA itself makes some distinctions among
species. Plants and insects receive less protection than mam-
mals, fish, birds, and reptiles. The controversial prohibition on
"taking" endangered species applies to fish or wildlife, not to
plants." Instead, endangered plants on federal land cannot be
removed, maliciously damaged, or destroyed; the protection of
endangered plants on other land is subject to the strictures of
state law.85 Insects receive less than complete protection, too.
81. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 19 (1997) (explaining how "efforts to protect a single species may
sometimes have adverse effects on other species or on ecosystems"); Melanie
J. Rowland, Bargaining for Life: Protecting Biodiversity Through Mediated
Agreements, 22 ENVTL. L. 503, 508 (1992) (citing a telephone conversation in
which Michael Bean of the Environmental Defense Fund described how in-
creasing the water flow in the Everglades will benefit the woodstork even as it
harms the Everglades kite).
82. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 214 (emphasis in original).
83. See, e.g., id. at 175 (arguing that Congress "decided to fix an inade-
quate balancing mechanism by jettisoning the notion of balance altogether").
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994). See generally Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2415
(1995) (upholding a broad FWS interpretation of the statutory "take" prohibi-
tion).
85. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994). Plants do, however, receive the
same protection as other species from federal actions that would jeopardize
the continued existence of a species. See Ruhl, supra note 8, at 1119.
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Subspecies of insects are not protected by the ESA.86 The Sec-
retary of the Interior may decide not to preserve an endan-
gered insect species that "constitute[s] a pest whose protection
under the [ESA] would present an overwhelming and overriding
risk to man.87
Nor does the ESA protect all animals, birds, or fish. The
ESA offers no help to deer and cardinals and dolphins because
they are not endangered or threatened with extinction; there-
fore, a landowner can "take" a deer without threat of federal
sanction. More importantly, the ESA protects only those spe-
cies that have been formally listed as endangered or threat-
ened.8 No species were listed during most of 1995 and the be-
ginning of 1996 because Congress and President Clinton
approved a temporary moratorium on the listing of any addi-
tional species.89 The moratorium serves as a reminder that the
ESA operates to protect species only once they are formally
listed, no matter how endangered they may be in fact.
Other parts of the ESA establish priorities among species.
The FWS's guidelines for listing species and for recovery plans
give greatest priority to protecting species in danger of extinc-
tion, second priority to maintaining the status quo, and lowest
priority to actually promoting the recovery of a species. 0 Fed-
86. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (1994).
87. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994).
88. Here is the exception: an unlisted species may be protected by the
ESA if it closely resembles a listed species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(e) (1994).
The ESA contains an emergency listing provision that enables the govern-
ment to respond immediately to evidence that a previously unlisted species is
in danger of becoming extinct. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (1994).
89. See Pub. L. No. 104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86 (1995); see also Environmental
Defense Center v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 872 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
moratorium prevented the Secretary of the Interior from performing his
statutory duty to act on the proposed listing of a species). Congress author-
ized the President to lift the moratorium in April 1996, see Omnibus Consoli-
dated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess., § 2901(c), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-159 (1996), and President
Clinton immediately decided to do so, see Suspension of the Proviso Limiting
Implementation of Subsections (a), (b), (c), (e), (g), or (i) of the Endangered Species
Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C. § 1533) Contained in the Omnibus Consolidation Rescis-
sions and Appropriations Act of 1996 (H.R. 3019), 61 Fed. Reg. 24,667 (1996).
90. See Endangered and Threatened Species Listing and Recovery Prior-
ity Guidelines, 48 Fed. Reg. 43,098, 43,104 (1983) [hereinafter FWS 1983 Pri-
ority Guidelines]. The guidelines, and the agency's application of them, are
discussed in Houck, supra note 52, at 347-49. Special, but similar, guidelines
governed the listing of species in the aftermath of the 1995 listing morato-
rium. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Restarting the
Listing Program and Final Listing Priority Guidance, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,722
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eral funds for state endangered species programs are distrib-
uted in part based on the relative urgency of the threat to the
survival of the species that will benefit from such funds. 1 The
protection that a species receives also depends in part on the
likely impact of human economic activities. When establishing
recovery plans, the agency must give priority to species most
likely to benefit from such a plan, particularly if a species con-
flicts with an economic development project." When deciding
whether or not to designate critical habitat for a species, the
FWS must determine that the benefits that such a designation
would provide to a species outweigh the social and economic
benefits of not designating any critical habitat.3
None of those criteria make any value judgments about
the intrinsic worth of any particular species. Those provisions
of the ESA may result in some species receiving less protection
than others, but that judgment is made based on the impact on
the species, not the qualities of the species itself. For example,
the critical habitat designation can be influenced by the fact
that all of the habitat lies in prospective residential lots in Or-
ange County, but the ESA does not ask whether such habitat is
for an endangered kangaroo rat or an endangered bald eagle.
The actual implementation of the ESA reveals a different
story. Tulane Professor Oliver Houck has described how each
aspect of the ESA-listing, designating critical habitat, consul-
tations to avoid jeopardizing a species, the God Squad exemp-
tion process, recovery plans, and the prohibition on takings-is
applied in a manner that affords the government broad discre-
tion in enforcing the law. Indeed, Houck concludes that the
ESA "has, in effect, been substantially amended through
regulations and practice, transforming it from an act of specific
requirements into a more discretionary permit system." 4 With
such discretion, the government (and others) can choose among
species. And they do, to the frustration of environmentalists
(who favor strict enforcement of the law) and developers (who
complain that they do not know the rules of the game) alike.
Consider the ways in which we make choices among species
already. First, the FWS must decide the order in which species
will be considered for listing. The limited resources and
(1996).
91 See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(d)(1)(E) (1994).
92. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1)(A) (1994).
93. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
94. Houck, supra note 52, at 358.
11951998]
MINNESOTA LAW REWEW
threats of congressional reprisals tempt the agency to list species
that are noncontroversial, either because they are popular with
the public or because their protection will not require great
sacrifices. The first species that the agency listed after Con-
gress passed the ESA in 1973 were three types of Australian
kangaroos, none of which would conflict with projects in the
United States.95 The agency strained to avoid listing the snail
darter precisely because it feared the fish would undermine
public support for the ESA itself.96 It resisted listing the
northern spotted owl as endangered, doing so only after a court
order, and then using a threatened (instead of endangered)
listing to minimize the impact in some areas.97 It may have
had a similar strategy in mind when it designated the Cali-
fornia red-legged frog as threatened in the first addition to the
list after the moratorium expired.9 Frogs have some popular
appeal, albeit not as great as grizzly bears and bald eagles, but
this particular frog was memorialized by Mark Twain as the
Celebrated Jumping Frog of Calaveras County.9 Likewise, the
1996 listing of seventy-five Hawaiian plants was criticized as
"perfectly calculated for an election year" because it would not
adversely affect many people."° By contrast, very few insects
95. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 163. For a chart indicating
the number of species added to the list each year between 1967 and 1992, see
ESA FACTS, supra note 36, at ch. 1.
96. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 166 (quoting the head of the
FWS's Office of Endangered Species as saying that "[ilt was inevitable that
the outcome would be to weaken the act, and I didn't want to save the snail
darter at the expense of the law"); see also Michael J. Bean, Looking Back
over the First Fifteen Years, in KOHM, supra note 51, at 41 (providing several
other examples of the FWS declining to list a species because of political pres-
sure).
97. See Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 629 (W.D.
Wash. 1991) (finding the failure to designate critical habitat for the northern
spotted owl arbitrary and capricious); Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F.
Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (finding the failure to list the northern
spotted owl arbitrary and capricious); see also Ruhl, supra note 8, at 1124
(noting that "recently FWS has attempted to manage politically contentious
species listing actions by making a threatened status listing followed by a
specialized section 4(d) rule").
98. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Threatened Status for the California Red-Legged Frog, 61 Fed. Reg. 25,813
(1996).
99. See MARK TWAIN, COLLECTED TALES, SKETCHES, SPEECHES, &
ESSAYS: 1852-1890, at 588, 589 (Louis J. Budd ed., 1992).
100. Chafee Asks Babbitt if Politics Are Delaying New ESA Listings, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA) (Oct. 16, 1996), available in WESTLAW, BNA-DEN Data-
base (quoting James McClure, Chairman of the National Endangered Species
Act Reform Coalition and former Senator from Idaho). McClure elaborated
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were listed during the 1980s, probably because there were no
invertebrate specialists at the FWS's headquarters in Wash-
ington and because field office staff resist such listings.10' The
bigger picture shows that today there are 331 mammals and
274 birds listed as endangered or threatened, but only forty-
one insects, twenty-three snails, and nineteen crustaceans.0 2
The FWS enjoys even greater discretion once a species is
listed. It must decide whether to designate critical habitat for
a species. It must also conclude how much money to devote to
developing and implementing a recovery plan for a particular
species. Additionally, it must resolve which habitats it can
purchase under the section 5 land acquisition program and
which habitat conservation plans to encourage and to approve.
Lastly, the FWS (or the God Squad) must determine which
projects are subject to section 7's prohibition on federal actions
that would jeopardize the continued existence of the species.
Experience shows that the agency makes some of those
decisions with an eye toward the species that is at stake. Indeed,
one writer has indicated that the FWS follows "an informal hi-
erarchy in which mammals are often given priority over birds,
birds over cold-blooded vertebrates, and cold-blooded verte-
brates over invertebrates-with plants trailing behind them
all."'0 3 Government spending patterns support that claim. A
recent study identified a "spending preference to the 'higher'
animals in the following order: mammal-bird-fish-reptile-
amphibian.""' Plants do not even make that list.'5 More spe-
that the listing allowed the Clinton Administration to "claim that it has listed
eighty-five species since the moratorium was lifted but avoid taking any ac-
tions that may burden potential voters in politically important states like
California or that may adversely affect private landowners in any number of
states." Id. Remember that the ESA's prohibition on habitat destruction by
private parties does not apply to endangered plants. See supra text accompa-
nying note 84.
101 See Dennis D. Murphy, Invertebrate Conservation, in KOHM, supra
note 51, at 183.
102. See FWS Box Score, supra note 34, at 1-2.
103. Murphy, supra note 101, at 185; see also Doremus, supra note 80, at
311-12 (asserting that the FWS "has responded to political pressures by con-
centrating their listing and recovery efforts on highly visible, charismatic
species, as well as on those close to recovery"); Karkkainen, supra note 81, at
20-21 (describing the ways in which the application of the ESA has generally
favored "high-profile 'charismatic' species").
104. Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in En-
dangered Species Preservation, 72 LAND ECONOMICS 1 (1996), available in
1996 WL 101118563.
105. See Endangered Species Act Implementation: Oversight Hearing Be-
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cifically, federal and state agencies spent at least $10 million
between 1989 and 1991 on each of the following ten species:
the bald eagle, the northern spotted owl, the Florida scrub jay,
the West Indian manatee, the red-cockaded woodpecker, the
Florida panther, the grizzly bear, the least Bell's vireo, the
American peregrine falcon, and the whooping crane."6 Over
$30 million was spent on the bald eagle alone. Cumulatively,
the top ten species account for over half of all spending on en-
dangered species preservation. And almost all of the species in
the top ten are large, popular mammals or birds. By contrast,
less than $10,000 was spent on such species as the Texas blind
salamander, the sand skink, and the Alabama cave fish, even
though they are much more genetically distinct or much more
in danger of extinction.'017
The money provided to state endangered species programs
pursuant to ESA section 6 shows a similar bias. The FWS re-
cently announced that it had awarded $2.7 million for the ac-
quisition of habitat necessary to satisfy HCPs in four states. 8
The announcement noted the funds would be used to protect
the bald eagle, the peregrine falcon, sea turtles, and a number
of songbirds. While nearly one hundred other endangered
species would be helped by the money distributed to the states,
the FWS press release neglected to identify any of those pre-
sumably less popular species.
fore the House Comm. on Resources, 104th Cong. 18-20, 119-22 (1996)
(testimony of Dr. Faith Campbell recounting the ways in which plants receive
a low priority in the implementation of the ESA); 142 CONG. REC. E807 (daily
ed. May 15, 1996) (statement of Rep. Forbes) (complaining that 'few Federal
dollars have been used to protect the habitat of critically imperiled plant spe-
cies").
106. See Metrick & Weitzman, supra note 104, at 1; see also THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY, THE WORKINGS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A
SUMMARY OF OUR FINDINGS 3 (1995) (referring to "the historic overemphasis
on recovery programs for charismatic megafauna"); Ruhl, supra note 8, at
1115 n.35 (relying on Metrick and Weitzman's study to conclude that "FWS
has been criticized for spending the vast majority of its recovery planning and
implementation budget on 10 popular 'calendar species"); Suzanne Winckler,
Stopgap Measures, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, at 77 (suggesting that the
majority of funding goes to species that "are among the most beautiful on
earth").
107. Id.; see also Mann & Plummer, supra note 40, at 59 (noting that in
1990 the government spent $3.8 million on the Florida panther and $500 on
the northeastern beach tiger beetle even though both species rated the same
priority according to the FWS's formal guidelines).
108. First Four Awards in $6 Million Habitat Conservation Fund Land Ac-
quisition Program Are Announced for California, Florida, Texas and Utah
(Feb. 14, 1997) (press release issued by the FWS).
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The same pattern can be seen in the application of the
section 7 prohibition on federal projects that would jeopardize
the continued existence of a species. Professor Houck's study
of ninety-nine instances in which the FWS formally deter-
mined that a federal project would jeopardize a species indi-
cates that the species most frequently at risk were as follows:
NUMBER OF'%
9 West Indian Manatee
8 Bald eagle
6 Piping plover
5 American peregrine falcon
3 Arctic peregrine falcon
3 Gray wolf
3 Whooping crane
3 Red cockaded woodpecker
Only five plants, one butterfly, and no other insect were found
to be in jeopardy by one of these projects.' The bias also
shows up in the designation of critical habitat. 0
Private environmental groups, state and local govern-
ments, and other interested parties face the same considera-
tions-though they are under no obligation even to pretend to
treat all species equally. The symbol of the World Wildlife
Fund is the giant panda, not the kangaroo rat. Audubon
magazine has referred "ecocelebrities'--like the bald eagle, the
whooping crane, and the gray wolf-that dominate the news."'
One supporter of increased funding for endangered species
suggests that "[t]he few high-profile mammals and birds we
109. See Houck, supra note 52, at 359-70 (appendix summarizing 99 bio-
logical opinions finding jeopardy to a listed species). Note that several of the
projects involved multiple, unidentified species.
110. See James Saltzman, Evolution and the Application of Critical Habi-
tat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 332(1990) (table showing that 47% of fish, 39% of reptiles, 33% of amphibians,
29% of crustaceans, 27% of mammals, 14% of plants, 12% of birds, and no
snails or clams listed as endangered or threatened had designated critical
habitat as of 1988).
111. Don Stap, Returning the Natives: Bringing Endangered Species to the
Wild Involves More than Just Opening a Cage Door, AUDuBON, Nov. 21, 1996,
at 54.
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have pushed to the very brink of extinction may be able to
survive on voluntary contributions.""2  At each point, the
money committed to protecting endangered species plays a
powerful role in determining how much protection that species
gets.
The favoritism for the most popular species is not uniform.
The species protected by the first seven HCPs approved by the
Interior Department include the mission blue butterfly, the
callippe silverspot butterfly, the Coachella Valley fringe-toed
lizard, the Stephens' kangaroo rat, the desert tortoise, the San
Joaquin kit fox, and the valley elderberry long-horned beetle."3
The species for which recovery plans have been developed seem
almost inversely related to the prominence of the species: re-
covery plans exist for 78% of endangered and threatened snails
but only 12% of endangered or threatened mammals."' Like-
wise, the species covered by the most expensive recovery plans
include the blunt-nosed leopard lizard, the swamp pink, and
other species unknown to the public at large."5
Other factors besides charisma must explain why some
species are preferred more than others. The most obvious ad-
ditional variable is the presence of an economic activity that
would be threatened by the protection of an endangered species.
This cuts both ways. Developers, economic interests, and
many government officials may want to minimize the legal ob-
ligations imposed by the ESA. Environmentalists, by contrast,
often seize upon the ESA's powerful mandates to block a proj-
ect that threatens broader environmental values. Besides
these economic conflicts, preferences among species may de-
pend upon mere awareness that the species exists and is en-
112. Campbell, supra note 51, at 145; see also James Drozdowski, Note,
Saving an Endangered Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Con-
servation Efforts, 45 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 553, 574 (1995) (noting that
"species that manage to fall within the good graces of a prominent environ-
mental organization tend to receive a greater deal of protection under the
ESA").
113. See BEAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 7-9.
114. The complete picture is as follows: recovery plans exist for 80% of
arachnids, 78% of snails, 71% of ferns and certain other plants, 69% of clams,
62% of fishes, 58% of flowering plants, 57% of insects, 44% of amphibians,
33% of crustaceans, 27% of reptiles, 26% of birds, 25% of conifers, and 12% of
mammals. The calculations are based on the statistics contained in FWS Box
Score, supra note 34, at 1-2.
115. See H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 370 (fact sheet on endangered
species).
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dangered and upon the perceived utilitarian value of the spe-
cies.
The formal explanation for choices among species lies in
the express policy of the FWS itself. The agency "recognizes
that it is necessary to assign priorities to listing, delisting, re-
classification, and recovery actions in order to make the most
appropriate use of the limited resources available to implement
the [ESA]."1"6 Therefore, in 1983 the FWS issued regulations
that detail the priorities to be followed when deciding which
species should be listed and which species should receive the
greatest assistance."' The regulations give greatest priority to
the species that are most in danger, as measured by both the
magnitude and the immediacy of the threat to the species."' A
secondary priority accrues to species with the greatest taxo-
nomic distinctiveness-in other words, species that possess the
most unique characteristics. ' 9 The decision as to which recov-
ery plans to implement is also weighted to favor those species
116. FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,098.
117. See id. The 1983 guidelines responded to a 1979 amendment to the
ESA that required some kind a ranking system among species. See Act of
Dec. 28, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225-26 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1533(h)(3)); see also FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,102-
04 (discussing the background of the 1983 guidelines). In December 1996, the
FWS adopted guidelines establishing priorities among the various listing re-
sponsibilities imposed on the agency by the ESA. See FWS 1997 Priority
Guidance, supra note 53. The guidelines give priority in descending order to(1) emergency listing actions, (2) the processing of final decisions on proposed
listings, (3) resolving the status of candidate species and the processing of pe-
titions regarding listings, and (4) critical habitat determinations and delist-
ings. See id. at 66,479-80; see also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants; Extension of Listing Priority Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997, 62 Fed.
Reg. 55,268-69 (1997) (extending the effectiveness of the 1997 priority guid-
ance until shortly after the Department of the Interior's fiscal year 1998 ap-
propriations are approved). Most recently, the FWS proposed a new guidance
that will remain in effect through fiscal year 1999. See Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Listing Priority: Guidance for Fis-
cal Years 1998 and 1999, 63 Fed. Reg. 10,931 (1998), available in 1998 WL
90269 (F.R.) [hereinafter FWS 1998 Proposed Priority Guidelines]. That
guidance is similar to the existing priorities except that it raises the priority
of delisting actions. See id. at 10,934 (explaining that "prompt delisting of re-
covered species and the reclassification of recovering species (from endangered
to threatened status) is necessary to keep the public and other interested par-
ties informed of a species' conservation status").
118. See FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,103; accord
FWS 1997 Priority Guidance, supra note 53, at 64,477 ("It has been long-
standing Service policy that the order in which species should be processed for
listing is based primarily on the immediacy and magnitude of the threats they
face.").
119. See FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,103.
1998] 1201
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
whose preservation would conflict with economic activities, in
an effort to resolve such conflicts as soon as possible.'20 The
priorities are not absolute, but are instead intended to be ap-
plied flexibly. 2'
The formal preferences of the FWS and the apparent
practical preference for the most popular species both disprove
the claim that the ESA prevents any choices among species.
The statute does not specifically direct the government how to
allocate its limited resources when deciding which of many de-
serving species to list, what land to buy, or what enforcement
actions to pursue. Thus the inflexible law portrayed by the
statute's critics conflicts with the discretion exercised by the
government when actually implementing the law. The ESA
has permitted choices between species; it has allowed us to
play God.
III. THE UTILITARIAN REASONS
FOR NOT CHOOSING AMONG SPECIES
Therein lies the paradox: we cannot protect every species,
we distinguish among species in practice, but we are unwilling
to write the statute to guide such decisions or even to acknowledge
that they are being made. Even to suggest that some species are
more valuable and deserving of more protection than others is
anathema to ecologists. That, however, may be what Congress
and the public want. The Congress that enacted the ESA in
1973 was thinking primarily (if not exclusively) of the most
charismatic species.' Most writers presume greater support for
120. See id. at 43,103-05.
121. See id. at 43,098 ("[T]he priority systems presented must be viewed as
guides and should not be looked upon as inflexible frameworks for determin-
ing resource allocations."); see also id. at 43,101 (rejecting the suggestion
made by the Pacific Legal Foundation that the guidelines should be strictly
followed by the FWS).
122. The examples offered during the floor debate on the ESA in 1973 in-
cluded whales, leopards, alligators, whooping cranes, wolves, falcons, cougars,
the California condor, the bald eagle, and similar popular species. See, e.g.,
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, As AMENDED IN 1976,
1977, 1978, 1979 AND 1980, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., at 192, 371, 387, 403
(1982). For other assertions that the 1973 Congress was thinking of the most
popular species, see 142 CONG. REC. S6340 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement
of Sen. Gorton) (assuming that Congress intended the ESA to "protect our
Nation's symbol of freedom, the bald eagle, and the other precious and unique
creatures that we identified with as Americans"); Bakersfield ESA Hearing,
supra note 4, at 61 (statement of Rep. Pombo) (complaining that "somehow we
got from protecting bald eagles and grizzly bears to protecting fairy shrimp
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protecting bald eagles than spiders." Zygmunt Plater has ob-
served that "[e]ndangered species had the good fortune to be
represented by such mediagenic figures as the bald eagle, the
polar bear, whales, and whooping cranes, all of which were sen-
timentally appealing, fairly remote from market considerations
affecting most people, and dramatic or beautiful."124 The studies
and beetles"); Louisiana & Texas ESA Hearings, supra note 7, at 136
(statement of Rep. Chenoweth) (noting that the original purpose for the ESA
was "to save the great blue whale and the bald eagle"); (testimony of Wayne
Wyatt, Manager, High Plains Underground Water Conservation District)
(regretting that he originally supported the ESA thinking that "all we were
trying to do was to protect the American Eagle, seals, maybe grizzly bears,
some of the real species that were important"); Plater, supra note 80, at 850(agreeing that "[tihe original images in the minds of members of Congress, as
well as the public, probably were indeed... protection of 'warm fuzzy' creatures");
Snape, supra note 59, at 34 (noting that "many senators and representatives
believed that the act was to be a legislative tool that primarily addressed
charismatic megafauna like the bald eagle and American alligator").
123. See Drozdowski, supra note 112, at 572 ("In general, species that are
viewed favorably in the public eye stand the best chance of survival under the
present scheme."); Lawrence H. Goulder & Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosys-
tem Services: Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in NATURE'S
SERVICES 23, 36 (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) [hereinafter DAILY] ("People
seem to care more about eagles and panthers than about mosses and bacte-
ria."); Alan Randall, Human Preferences, Economics, and the Preservation of
Species, in THE PRESERVATION OF SPECIES: THE VALUE OF BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY 79, 87-88 (Bryan G. Norton ed., 1986) [hereinafter NORTON]
(noting human preference for species providing utilitarian benefits and "those
which have become the stuff of legends and patriotic symbolism, as well as
those which are 'pretty,' 'nice,' or 'cute and cuddly"); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in
the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Pros-
pects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 68 (1993) ("[H]ow would Americans re-
spond to the question 'Do we have to save them all?, when the vast majority of
'them' are insects and other creatures Americans regularly step on without so
much as a second thought?" (citation omitted)). But see Roper Center of Con-
necticut, Public Opinion Online, survey conducted for Los ANGELES TIMES,
Nov. 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (poll indicating
that of those willing to pay higher taxes in order to save endangered species,
64% would pay more taxes regardless of the species, while 31% would pay
more taxes to protect certain species). Mann and Plummer assert that while
most Americans would prefer bald eagles to a shopping center, "feelings are
much less certain when it comes to canceling a $100 million golf course to
save a bug nobody has heard of," Mann and Plummer, supra note 40, at 48.
But a poll asking a very similar question revealed that a butterfly would defeat
a golf course by a 53% to 37% margin. See Roper Center of Connecticut, Pub-
lic Opinion Online, Survey Conducted for TIMES MIRROR MAGAZINES, Na-
tional Environmental Forum Survey, Mar. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File.
124. Plater, supra note 67, at 822; accord Plater, supra note 80, at 851
(describing "the paradigmatic images of the ESA" as "the large brown eyes of
a baby seal or tiger or elephant, the fragile finery of an endangered crane, the
brave splashing flukes and quavering underwater songs of humpback
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of Yale Professor Stephen Kellert have yielded similar conclu-
sions. "' As two critics of the ESA have written:
[Another] flaw with the ESA is that it does not discriminate between
the protection afforded a bear or a beetle. When the average Ameri-
can considers the issue of endangered species, he thinks of eagles and
manatees. These are the species that attract support: the warm and
cuddly animals, the gentle woodland creatures. However, with the
exception of plants, the act gives the same protection to all endan-
gered species. Recognizing how this can create public relations
problems, one National Park Service manual says that "from an edu-
cational standpoint, popular plants and animals can be used as a
spoonful of sugar to make the medicine go down." Itls a classic case
of bait and switch: financial and political clout are gathered for fuzzy,
likable mammals like pandas, but the law is then applied to anything
that crawls.
26
Such complaints have become increasingly common as frustra-
tion with the strictures of the ESA led some to ask the 104th
Congress why we protect all species alike." 7
whales"); id. at 851 & n.25 (adding that "[t]he images deal with macrofauna,
particularly with photogenic macrofauna," and that "endangered plants seem
to receive little intuitive allegiance from the contemporary human psyche,
redwoods and saguaro cactus to the contrary notwithstanding, and endan-
gered bugs and beetles receive even less attention or sympathy").
125. See Stephen R. Kellert, Social and Perceptual Factors in the Preserva-
tion of Animal Species, in NORTON, supra note 123, at 50 (indicating that the
percentage of respondents who would modify an energy project to protect an
endangered species ranged from 89% for a bald eagle, 73% for a mountain
lion, 71% for an agassiz trout, 70% for an American crocodile, 64% for a sil-
verspot butterfly, 48% for a furbish lousewort, 43% for an Eastern indigo
snake, and 34% for a Kauai spider); accord STEPHEN R. KELLERT, THE VALUE
OF LIFE: BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND HUMAN SOCIETY 170 (1996) (figure
showing same survey results); Stephen R. Kellert, Social and Perceptual Fac-
tors in Endangered Species Management, 49 J. WILDLIFE MGMT. 528, 531(1985) [hereinafter Socioeconomic Factors] (same). Kellert asserts that
"people are most inclined to protect endangered species that are large, aes-
thetically attractive, phylogenetically similar to human beings, and regarded
as possessing the capacities for feeling, thought, and pain." Id. at 533; see
also id. at 532 (noting lack of concern for most endangered invertebrates);
Richard P. Reading & Stephen R. Kellert, Attitudes Toward a Proposed Rein-
troduction of Black-Footed Ferrets (Mustela nigripes), 7 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 569, 571 (1993) ("It is far easier to garner support for species with
high public appeal, the 'charismatic megafauna,' than for lesser-known, 'lowef
life forms." (citation omitted)). For Kellert's thorough examination of how
Americans view wildlife, including the different attitudes held by those of dif-
ferent age, sex and ethnicity, see KELLERT, THE VALUE OF LIFE, supra, at 37-
63.
126. Robert Gordon & James Streeter, Salamander the Great, POLICY
REV., Winter 1994, at 56, 59.
127. See Louisiana & Texas ESA Hearings, supra note 7, at 73 (statement
of Rep. Metcall) (asking whether the ESA could be changed to include
"significant species that are endangered, instead of all" species); id. at 136-37,
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Three bills introduced in 1995 would permit such choices.
Senator Gorton, for example, refused to assume that all species
are equally important; rather, he asserted that "we need [a
government] official to explain to us why the species is impor-
tant."12 Thus, his bill (like the other two) would require the
Secretary of the Interior to determine the appropriate conser-
vation goal for each individual species. The Secretary would
consider a number of factors to make that determination, in-
cluding the biological significance of the species and all of the
direct and indirect economic and social impacts of protecting
the species.2 9 If those factors do not support efforts to assure
329-30 (testimony of Wayne Wyatt, Manager, High Plains Underground Wa-
ter Conservation District) (proposing that the ESA be limited to "keystone"
species); id. at 149 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith) ("Under the current way
that the Endangered Species Act is interpreted and enforced, aren't we put-
ting cockroaches on the same level as Whooping Cranes and Bald Eagles and
isn't that part of the problem? We're not setting priorities, we're not saying
what's really important to protect and whats not."); Bakersfield ESA Hearing,
supra note 4, at 12 (testimony of Thomas N. Clark, Kern County Water
Agency) (asserting that "somebody who shoots ten condors is different than
somebody that disks up two rats"); id. at 35-36 (statement of Rep. Dooley)
(asking if there should be a system of prioritization among species that con-
siders "the importance of that particular species or sub-species to the entire
environment," suggesting that it is "intellectually dishonest" to try to protect
every species, and arguing that "we might in effect accomplish nothing" if we
try to protect every species with our limited resources); Washington ESA
Hearing Part I, supra note 7, at 30 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (suggesting
that a cave dwelling spider should receive less protection than the bald eagle,
and criticizing a FWS official who disagreed); id. at 31-32 (statement of Rep.
Edwards) (insisting that "most of us would agree that [a fly] is not quite as
valuable as a bald eagle that is a symbol for our country"); ESA Listing Mora-
torium Hearing, supra note 76, at 18 (statement of Sen. Hutchinson)
(asserting that "[tihere is a big difference between eagles and condors and
grizzly bears and bait fish and concho snakes and kangaroo rats"); see also
142 CONG. REC. S3747 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1996) (statement of Sen. Coverdell)(noting the finite amount of money available to protect endangered species
and asking whether all species are equally valuable). Mann and Plummer
make the same argument throughout Noah's Choie. See MANN & PLUMMER,
supra note 11, at 215 ("[T]he time has come to question the goal that under-
lies the act: Save every species, no matter what the cost."); id. at 229(proposing a biodiversity advisory board that could decide which species are
most worth protecting); id. (asserting that "no one is better equipped [than
biologists] to decide which species, communities, and ecosystems are more
necessary than others"); id. at 233 (acknowledging that "legitimizing trade-
offs would of necessity afford different species different levels of protection");
id. at 235 (proposing a national biodiversity trust such that "Noah would have
a budget and a bottom line, reflecting indirectly the priorities of people with
differing aspirations").
128. 142 CONG. REC. S6343 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gor-
ton).
129. See S. 768, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1995) (adding new section
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the complete recovery of a particular species, then the ESA
would not require the recovery of that species."' The end re-
sult would be that some species would receive greater protec-
tion than others.
Such a system would have parallels elsewhere in environ-
mental law. Federal statutes afford some environmental
amenities greater protection than others. The list of permissible
activities varies greatly in Yosemite National Park and in un-
reserved public land managed by the Bureau of Land Man-
agement. The Clean Water Act allows states to decide that
some rivers and lakes must be suitable for swimming while
other rivers and lakes need only be suitable for industrial
uses.'"' Superfund sites do not need to be cleaned up to the
identical level of purity.'
The implication of these proposals is that choosing among
species may be difficult, but it is not as impossible as many be-
lieve. This claim is crucial. If choosing among species is inevi-
table (as I argued in Part I), and if we choose in practice al-
ready (as described in Part II), then perhaps we should openly
allow such choices. There are only two arguments against a
system that expressly chooses among species. We could continue
to hide the choices that we make among species because we are
afraid of the consequences of a public admission that we are
making such choices. I am skeptical of such concerns about
candor, for reasons I explain below.'33 But the second argu-
5(d) to the ESA); S. 1364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (adding new section
5(b)(6) to the ESA); H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1995) (adding
new section 5(b)(2) to the ESA). Environmentalists claim that such a provi-
sion "allows a political appointee to play god by choosing either recovery or
extinction for a species." Sen. Kempthorne to Introduce Bill to Gut Endan-
gered Species Act (Oct. 25, 1995) (press release), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File (quoting William Snape, legal director for Defenders of
Wildlife); see also Christopher E. Williams & William Robert Trvin, Section-
By-Section Summary and Analysis of S. 768, The Gorton-Johnston Endan-
gered Species Act Reform Act of 1995, at 3 (visited Feb. 2, 1996)
<http'//www.eocnet.apc.org/ endangered/ gorton.html> (characterizing such a
provision as "[a]bandon[ing] the ESA's central goal of recovering threatened
and endangered species").
130. See S. 768, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a) (1995) (adding new section
5(e) to the ESA); S. 1364, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1995) (adding new
section 5(b)(3) to the ESA); H.R. 2275, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501 (1995)
(adding new section 5(b)(3) to the ESA). Each bill contains a minimum re-
quirement that the government enforce the revised taking prohibition against
private parties.
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1994).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (1994).
133. See infra text accompanying notes 314-316.
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ment against a system that chooses among species deserves
more consideration. If, in fact, there is a good reason for trying
to protect every species, then our practice of preferring some
species to others becomes problematic. It becomes necessary,
then, to analyze the reasons why we care about protecting en-
dangered species. The utilitarian justifications for the preser-
vation of species do not support the equal protection of all species,
but there are other, non-utilitarian reasons for treating all
species alike.
A. UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROTECTING ALL SPECIES
Congress stated that the ESA is necessary because
"species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the
Nation and its people."'' These are all utilitarian justifica-
tions for protecting endangered species of wildlife and plants.
The benefits are impressive:
(1) Food: People eat animals and plants, and not much
else (Cheetos excepted). This gives tasty or nutritious animals
and plants real economic value. Mann and Plummer cite the
white-tailed deer, the example used by William Temple Hor-
naday nearly a century ago.'35 Two million deer, each provid-
ing ten dollars of meat, result in a resource worth $20 million
dollars per year.'36 Today "the constant infusion of genes from
wild plant species adds approximately $1 billion per year to
U.S. agricultural production."'37 Producing food provides jobs
for millions of Americans. If an edible species disappears, so
does the food and jobs it provides. Thus, some members of the
Pacific Northwest's salmon industry are among the ESA's big-
gest supporters.'
134. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1994).
135. See WILLIAM T. HORNADAY, WILD LIFE CONSERVATION IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 103-110 (1914); WILLIAM T. HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILD LIFE:
ITS EXTERMINATION AND PRESERVATION 236-43 (1913). Hornaday was the
chief taxidermist of the Smithsonian Institution and later the first director of
the Bronx Zoo. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 119.
136. These are 1914 numbers; on the other hand, Mann and Plummer
point out that Hornaday neglected to consider the cost of obtaining that meat.
See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 266 n.120.
137. Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 190 (statement of
the National Wildlife Federation); see also Norman Myers, Biodiversity's Ge-
netic Library, in DAILY, supra note 123, at 256-59 (describing how wild corn,
wild rice, and other rare species can provide food to humans).
138. See H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 74 (statement of Glen Spain,
Regional Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermens Associations)
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(2) Medicine: Plants and animals are an important source
of drugs and other medical treatments. Numerous exotic
plants have yielded life-saving drugs.' Scientists are examin-
ing numerous plants as they search for a cure for AIDS. 1' °
Animals, fish, amphibians and insects possess medical value
as well. 4' And we are only beginning to study most species to
learn if they possess any medical value.142
("Every time you extinguish a salmon run in Idaho or Montana or Oregon or
Washington, you are extinguishing a job and a source of jobs for the future.");
see also Vancouver ESA Hearing, supra note 7, at 32-33, 156-70 (statement of
Glen Spain, Regional Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Asso-
ciations); id. at 171-87 (statement of Liz Hamilton, Executive Director,
Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association).
139. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 120-21 ("Bark from the
white willow gave us salicin, an ancient version of aspirin; the Grecian fox-
glove provided digoxin, a cardiac medication; bear bile is the origin of ursodiol,
a gallstone dissolver; deadly nightshade led to atropine, an eye dilator and
anti-inflammatory; the velvet bean produced L-dopa, a treatment for Parkin-
son's disease; and everyone knows the story of penicillin, the bacteria slayer
discovered accidentally in a mold."). The species that have proven medical
value are discussed in Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 34-
36 (testimony of Dr. Kevin H. Browngoehl, Biodiversity Committee, National
Physicians for the Environment); id. at 225 (statement of Dr. Thomas Eisner,
Director of the Cornell University Institute for Research in Chemical Ecol-
ogy); Myers, supra note 137, at 263-65. See generally Medicinal Uses of
Plants; Protection for Plants Under the Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Env't and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1993) (testimony discussing the ef-
forts to obtain medicine from plants).
140. See Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 206 app.(statement of the National Wildlife Federation) ("The National Cancer Insti-
tute is now studying four plant compounds that provide effective protection
against the replication of the HIV-1 and H1V-2 virus, the precursors to AIDS,
in laboratory tests."); MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 128 (recounting
some of the possible anti-AIDS drugs).
141. See THE WILDERNESS SOC'Y FOR THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COALITION,
supra note 27, at 10 (citing the medical benefits of bats, crustaceans, mol-
lusks, insects, and snakes); Myers, supra note 137, at 265 (describing how
frogs can provide antitoxins and pain killers, an octopus produces a substance
that relieves hypertension, and insects secrete substances similar to hor-
mones).
142. See Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 35 (statement
of Dr. Kevin H. Browngoehl, Biodiversity Committee, National Physicians for
the Environment) ("Only five percent of our flowering plant species have been
studied chemically with any thoroughness to look for their medicinal value.");
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 121-22 ("[Bliologists frequently liken the
world's biodiversity to a library in which the vast majority of books have never
been read ... Reading the books in the species library once will not be
enough .... Each generation will profit from reading them over and over
again..).
PLAYING NOAH
(3) Aesthetics & tourism: People enjoy visiting, photograph-
ing, painting, and just looking at wildlife. The aesthetic value
of a beautiful animal or plant often produces a tangible eco-
nomic value in the form of ecotourism. Grizzly bears attract
millions of people to Yellowstone and Glacier National Parks
annually. Whales bring visitors to California, Hawaii, and
New England. Tourists travel to numerous areas to visit bald
eagles. These visits produce substantial economic value. The
FWS recently reported that the seventy-six million Americans
who watched, photographed and fed birds and other wildlife in
1991 spent $18.1 billion on those activities.'43 Another report
calculated that birdwatching alone is a $15 billion dollar busi-
ness annually.'"4 These general economic benefits also result
from endangered species in particular. Whooping cranes and
other wildlife generate $5 million annually to the economy of
the area surrounding the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge in
Texas.'45 A rancher in the Texas Hill Country earned $14,000
from groups that came to see the endangered golden-cheeked
warbler and black-capped vireo.1 Large numbers of boaters,
divers, snorkelers, and swimmers visit the west coast of Flor-
ida to see an endangered manatee-indeed, the number has
become so large that the FWS recently found it necessary to
create a new sanctuary to further protect the manatees from
the people who want to see them.47 The aesthetic appeal of
143. JAMES D. CAUDILL, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERViCE, 1991 ECONOMIc
IMPACTS OF NONCONSUMPIVE WILDLIFE-RELATED RECREATION 6-7 (1997). The
report further noted that the economic impacts extended to nearly $3 billion
in tax revenues and the support of 766,000 jobs. See id.
144. See Soaring: Hobby of Bird-Watching Takes Off, Along With Feed
Stores and Festivals, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, July 10, 1996, at 6SC; see
also Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 192-93 (statement of
the National Wildlife Federation) (listing examples of the tourism benefits of
wildlife); Washington ESA Hearing Part I, supra note 7, at 20-21 (statement
of Rep. Morella) (describing how numerous communities benefit from visiting
birdwatchers); id. at 87 (statement of Rep. Brewster) (estimating that the
Conservation Reserve Program produces $4.1 billion in wildlife viewing bene-
fits). To be sure, protecting endangered species can harm tourism in certain
situations. See Vancouver ESA Hearing, supra note 7, at 45 (statement of
Olivia F. James, President, The River Company) (complaining that ESA re-
strictions to protect endangered salmon limit outfitting businesses).
145. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 125-26.
146. See Louisiana & Texas ESA Hearings, supra note 7, at 104
(statement of J. David Bamberger, environmentalist rancher).
147. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Emergency Rule
to Establish an Additional Manatee Sanctuary in Kings Bay, Crystal River,
FL, 62 Fed. Reg. 63,036 (1997).
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many endangered species extends to those who never see such
a species in the wild, or who never will.
1 48
(4) Ecological assistance: Animals and plants also provide
benefits to the ecosystem as a whole, benefits that indirectly
help human society. Mann and Plummer note that
species play a vital role in such essentials as maintaining the quality
of the atmosphere (forests act as air filters), controlling the climate(vegetation takes in carbon dioxide from the atmosphere), regulating
freshwater supplies (trees absorb and release water), generating soil
(microorganisms crumble rock), and disposing of wastes (American
burying beetles inter dead mice).'4 9
Birds have long been valued for eating troublesome insects
and the seeds of unwanted weeds.' The endangered Alabama
beach mouse protects coastal housing from hurricanes. 5' The
list of natural services also includes flood and drought control,
pollination of crops, protection from ultraviolet rays, and the
dispersal of seeds and nutrients.'52 Perhaps we could secure
these benefits from other sources, but we would pay far more
than the free use of the natural resources we depend upon now.
(5) The "canary in the mine": The loss of one species may
serve as an early warning that the rest of the ecosystem is in
danger. "Endangered species are the 'miners' canaries' for the
health of something larger, which we have not yet attempted to
protect in a more holistic way."'53 Many environmentalists, for
148. See Goulder & Kennedy, supra note 123, at 25 (identifying non-use
values as those "that do not involve any actual direct or indirect physical in-
volvement with the natural thing in question").
149. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 123; see also PAUL & ANNE
EHRLICH, EXTINCTION 86-95 (1981) (noting similar benefits); Bakersfield ESA
Hearing, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Arthur D. Unger, Kern-Kaweah
Chapter of the Sierra Club) (noting that flies can be used to control wasps).
150. See HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILDLIFE, supra note 135, at 213-33.
151. See 143 CONG. REC. E1596 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Miller) (explaining that the Alabama beach mouse "plays an important role in
the beach dune ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico by dispersing the seeds of the
sea oat-its principal food source-which, in turn, forms the basis for the for-
mation of dunes and protects them from erosion. The dunes protect inland
housing from coastal flooding and hurricanes.").
152. See Gretchen C. Daily, Introduction: What Are Ecosystem Services?, in
DAILY, supra note 123, at 3, 3-4. For an exhaustive account of many of these
services, see DAILY, supra note 123, at 93-251 (chapters written by different
specialists on ecosystems values related to soil, pollination, pest control and
provided by marine ecosystems, freshwater ecosystems, forests, and grass-
lands).
153. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What
Does That Say About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect
Them Constitute "Takings"?, 80 IOWA L. REV. 297, 301 (1995). The metaphor
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example, view the decline of the northern spotted owl as a sign
of the decline of the old growth forests in which it lives.' 4 The
dangers of the pesticide DDT were first learned from the de-
cline of the bald eagle.'55 We ignore such warnings at our peril.
There are many other utilitarian services provided by a
wide range of plant and animal species.'56 Collectively, such
benefits supply a powerful case for protecting the environment.
B. LIMITS OF UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PROTECTING
ALL SPECIES
These utilitarian benefits do not, however, prove that we
cannot live without any particular species. The justifications
for protecting endangered species usually make an unspoken
move from why we need to protect endangered species to why
we need to protect each endangered species. Here again,
Noah's Choice is devastatingly effective in undermining the
ecological orthodoxy that all species are of equal value. Mann
and Plummer begin by turning each justification around to
show that it is possible to distinguish the value of different
species. People depend upon about "fifteen to twenty" species
for most of their food, but even considering that another 3,000
plant species may be a source of food, that still leaves many
species with no nutritional value for humans.'57 Efforts to
identify plants and animals with medicinal uses have identi-
fied far more "useless" species than helpful ones.'58 Beauty
may be in the eye of the beholder, but if we are willing to des-
ignate certain areas like the Grand Canyon or the Everglades
refers to the coal miners who would take canaries into deep mine shafts to de-
tect dangerous gases. See id. at 301 n.20.
154. See Vancouver ESA Hearing, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of
Gretchen Starke, Vancouver Audubon Society); Victor M. Sher, Travels with
Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PuB. LAND
L. REV. 41,43 (1993).
155. See Washington ESA Hearing Part I, supra note 10, at 191 (statement
of the National Wildlife Federation).
156. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 137, at 266-70 (explaining how industrial
production, scientific research, and biotechnology benefit from various species).
157. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 129. Mann and Plummer
add that "[allthough it is important to maintain genetic diversity among these
[fifteen to twenty] species, and even wild cousins to help future farmers ward
off new pests, saving the vast majority of plant species cannot be justified by
appealing to their edibility; similar reasoning applies to animals." Id.
158. See id. at 127-29.
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as worthy of special protection because of their unique features,
why not make such distinctions among plants and animals?
Tourists make such choices daily: whatever abstract argu-
ments can be made about their aesthetic appeal, Yellowstone
National Park attracts far more visitors than the Maplewood
Municipal Park a few blocks from my home. Plants are neces-
sary to produce organic carbon molecules, but "because so
many species produce these molecules in so many different
ways, huge numbers would have to vanish before the world ex-
perienced a failure of photosynthesis."'59 Moreover, scientists
are increasingly able to measure the contributions of individ-
ual species in stabilizing the ecosystem and other species.'"
Many of the species discussed at length in Noah's Choice do not
possess any of these utilitarian values.' 6'
Mann and Plummer further contend that what we don't know
about biodiversity could just as easily cut against protecting a
species as it could counsel for it. Is the unknown monkey in Ama-
zon rainforest the source of the cure for AIDS, or is it the bearer of
the next AIDS virus? If we don't know, they ask, why should we
assume the former instead of the latter? Mann and Plummer go
so far to suggest that "treating biodiversity in the way environ-
mental activists would like to treat chemicals would suggest
automatically banning species we don't know about."'62 They ad-
mit the idea is ludicrous, but they insist that arguments based on
ignorance cannot carry the day.
The canary-in-the-mine justification is much harder to
dismiss. Mann and Plummer note that the interdependence of
ecosystems supports protecting the individual components of
159. Id. at 130; see also id. at 129 (the indirect ecological benefits "tend to
come from biodiversity in toto, rather than from individual species"); see also
id. at 24 (acknowledging that "we will ... exterminate ourselves" if we ex-
terminate all living things, but arguing that particular individual species
seem "expendable").
160. See Claire A. Montgomery et al., The Marginal Cost of Species Preserva-
tion: The Northern Spotted Owl, 26 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 111, 112 (1994).
161. As Mann and Plummer often point out. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra
note 11, at 23-27 (suggesting that the American burying beetle is not edible,
will not cure the common cold, and does not serve any irreplaceable ecological
functions); id. at 91 (observing that the Karner blue butterfly "has no known
food or medicinal value"). For similar critiques of the utilitarian value of in-
dividual species, see REED F. Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING
NATURE'S LEGACY: PROTECTING AND RESTORING BIODIVERsITY 19-20 (1994),
and Doremus, supra note 80, at 275-81.
162. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 133; accord Elliott Sober, Philo-
sophical Problems for Environmentalism, in NORTON, supra note 123, at 175-
77 (rejecting the ignorance argument).
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ecosystems,'63 but they devote less attention to this argument
than to the other utilitarian arguments that they canvass.64
This omission is odd because many others have emphasized
the canary-in-the-mine concern during the recent debate over
the ESA. The FWS's pamphlet on the ESA spends more time
discussing the canary-in-the-mine argument than any other ra-
tionale for saving endangered species. '65 Numerous speakers at
the 1995 hearings on the ESA relied on the argument. 66 The
analogy has been offered in many other forums as well. 67
163. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 122 (citing an estimate that
"the loss of one species of plant eliminates en passant ten to thirty other spe-
cies"); id. at 130-31 (discussing the idea of the environment as a "web of life");
accord Washington ESA Hearings Part II, supra note 10, at 40, 194
(statement of the National Wildlife Federation) (citing the FWS for the
proposition that the loss of one species can lead to the extinction of 30 other
species).
164. See Plater, supra note 80, at 864 (indicating that the author explained
the canary-in-the-mine argument to Mann and Plummer in an extended tele-
phone interview, and suggesting that they ignored the argument because to
acknowledge it "would have opened the door to recognizing potential general
benefits of species protection that directly contradicted the book's mission").
165. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., WHY SAVE ENDANGERED SPECIES? 1
(1993).
166. See Louisiana & Texas ESA Hearings, supra note 7, at 73-74
(testimony of Paul Davidson, President, Louisiana Wildlife Federation)
(observing that "wildlife of all sorts is an indicator of quality of life. And when
we see species getting into trouble, it is sort of a red flag for us to sort of take
note."); Bakersfield ESA Hearing, supra note 4, at 27 (statement of Arthur D.
Unger, Kern-Kaweah Chapter of the Sierra Club) ("[Wihen a species declines,
it means the conditions they live under are vanishing. When a place becomes
too crowded or toxic for one kind of life, might it soon not become too crowded
or toxic for us?"); Vancouver ESA Hearing, supra note 7, at 33 (statement of
Glen Spain, Regional Director, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Asso-
ciations) (viewing the ESA as the messenger of the decline of the ecosystem
containing endangered salmon); id. at 67 (testimony of Mitch Friedman, Ex-
ecutive Director, Greater Ecosystem Alliance) (contending that "the Endan-
gered Species Act is a smoke alarm; habitat destruction is the fire"); Washing-
ton ESA Hearing Part I, supra note 7, at 33 (statement of Rep. Furse)
(arguing that "we have been legally forced to admit that something is wrong
and that our stewardship is inadequate" because of the listing of three species
of salmon as endangered); H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 465 (testimony
of the Sierra Club) (referring to "the Endangered Species Acefs function as the
proverbial 'canary in the coal mine"); ESA Listing Moratorium Hearing, su-
pra note 76, at 7 (statement of Sen. Boxer) ("A species in decline is a symptom
of larger environmental problems that will surely lead to problems for all of
us."); id. at 9 (statement of Sen. Lautenberg) ("Each time a species is listed, it
sends out a warning signal that some part of the ecosystem is in danger."); id.
at 82 (testimony of Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior) ('The Endan-
gered Species Act is a warning light. When one species in an ecosystem's web
of life starts to die out, all species may be in peril").
167. See, e.g., Oregon Natural Resources Council, Inc. v. Kantor, 99 F.3d
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Mann and Plummer acknowledge the existence of so-called
"keystone" species-such as beavers and mangroves-that the
rest of an ecosystem depends upon. They conclude, however,
that such species "are rare and are overwhelmed by the legions
of the fungible.' 62 Fair enough, but that misses the point.
Keystone species are different from "indicator" species-those
species whose health tracks the health of the ecosystem in
which they live.'69 The early warning signal of ecosystem de-
cline is sent by any declining indicator species, not just those
species that are most important to the ecosystem. That pres-
ents the best utilitarian argument for protecting many other-
wise unremarkable species.
Nonetheless, the canary-in-the-mine argument does not
explain why we need to protect a species once it sounds the
warning about the ecosystem. If the species lacks any of the
other utilitarian values, or if the ecosystem (or an adequate
approximation) can be preserved without this one species, or if
there is no utilitarian reason for saving the ecosystem itself,
then there is no utilitarian reason to save the species whose
decline alerted us to the problem. As J.B. Ruhl has written:
334, 339 (9th Cir. 1996) ("The decline of one of our fellow travelers on this
planet .... may also be a tocsin which tells us that we are doing something
very wrong."); 142 CONG. REC. S1612 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Reid) (describing the Florida black bear as "an umbrella threshold spe-
cies, whose own population well-being is reflective of the health of the rest of
the habitat area and the other species in that same ecosystem"); Houck, supra
note 153, at 321-31 (defending the canary-in-the-mine justification for the
ESA); THE WILDERNESS SoC'Y FOR THE ENDANGERED SPECIES COALITION
ENDANGERED SPECIES COALITION, supra note 27, at 9 (advancing the canary-
in-the-mine argument); Aaron Gallegos, Sinking Noah's Ark: Christians and
the Endangered Species Act, SOJOURNERS MAG., May-June, 1996 <http'/
www.sojouners.com/960541b.html> (characterizing the ESA as a barometer of
the health of ecosystems).
168. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 131. They continue by quoting
ecologist David Ehrenfeld, who once wrote that "[i]f the California condor disap-
pears forever from the California hills, it will be a tragedy .... But dont expect
the chaparral to die, the redwoods to wither, the San Andreas fault to open up,
or even the California tourist industry to suffer-they won't." David Ehrenfeld,
Why Put a Value on Biodiversity, in BIODIVERSrrY 215 (E.O. Wilson ed., 1988).
169. See Ruhl, supra note 43, at 591 (distinguishing indicator species and
keystone species). Ruhl uses the Barton Springs salamander as an example of
an species that indicates the health of hidden subterranean species by re-
sponding to changing water quality conditions. See id. at 592-93 n.100. See
generally Peter B. Landres et al., Ecological Uses of Vertebrate Indicator Spe-
cies: A Critique, 2 CONSERvATION BIOLOGY 316, 316-24 (1988) (discussing in-
dicator species); Reed F. Noss, From Endangered Species to Biodiversity, in
KOHM, supra note 51, at 231-35 (distinguishing among indicator species, key-
stone species, umbrella species, flagship species, and vulnerable species).
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The problem with the indicator species approach biologically is that it
leads to a static view of ecosystems. The fact that a species acts as an in-
dicator of the health of an ecosystem does not necessarily mean that the
species's health is essential to the health of the ecosystem, or even that
the ecosystem for which it serves as an indicator is a particularly desir-
able one in terms of the species community and ecosystem functions. 7'
Moreover, as Mark Sagoff argues, "[i]f ecosystems are un-
structured, transitory, and accidental in nature, it would seem
to follow that no general economic or utilitarian grounds exist
for protecting them from change."71 Even Zygmunt Plater,
perhaps the greatest champion of the canary-in-the-mine ar-
gument, acknowledges that it does not justify the protection of
every endangered species. 17 2 We may want to save ecosystems,
but for different reasons than why we want to protect individ-
ual species-reasons that do not require us to protect every
species.173
In short, "biodiversity as a whole has overwhelming utili-
tarian value, but most individual species do not."'74 If the
170. J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive
System: How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environ-
mental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933, 972 (1997).
171. Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence
Meets the Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 931-32
(1997); see also id. at 893-900 (noting the difficulties inherent in defining an
ecosystem).
172. Plater, supra note 80, at 875; see also id. (suggesting that the canary-
in-the-mine function of endangered species supports a Noah Presumption in
favor of the protection of a species).
173. See infra at text accompanying notes 290-291 (discussing the inde-
pendent value of ecosystems).
174. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 133. Even some enthusiastic
supporters of the ESA seem to agree. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LIFE's Do-
MINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIiDUAL
FREEDOM 75 (1993) (arguing that none of the utilitarian arguments for pro-
tecting endangered species "rings true"); HOLMES ROLSTON I, ENvI-
RONMENTAL ETHIcS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD 130
(1988) (admitting that "[a] substantial number of endangered species have no
resource value"); Victor B. Flatt, Should the Circle Be Unbroken? A Review of
the Hon. Stephen Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation, 24 ENVTL. L. 1707, 1722 (1994) (concluding that the ESA "would
not apply to certain species (like the snail darter) that provide no aestheti-
cally pleasing appearance or potential for health treatment breakthroughs" if
only utilitarian benefits mattered); Houck, supra note 153, at 298
(acknowledging that "endangered species are, for the most part, no more aes-
thetically attractive than other species, provide little historical insight, and
are on the margins of recreational demand and scientific discovery"); Krueger,
supra note 17, at 2 (arguing that "the utilitarian perspective on endangered
plant and animal species represents a valid but feeble and currently ineffec-
tive argument'); Plater, supra note 80, at 851, 853 (describing the utilitarian
reasons as "makeweights," and suggesting that the utilitarian arguments are
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stated purpose of the ESA is to preserve the utilitarian value of
endangered species, and if that value varies from species to
species, then we should decide which species we are willing to
protect and which we are not. The resource constraints de-
tailed above appear to make such choices imperative, and that
approach is precisely what many recommend.'75 But if Con-
gress was wrong-if the utilitarian arguments fail to exhaust
our reasons for preserving biodiversity-then choices among
species become problematic.
IV. PLAYING NOAH
A host of writers have advanced theories establishing
moral, ethical, and religious duties to preserve all species."6
Their theories are different in many respects-simply because
there is no consensus about morality, ethics, or religion-but they
share one thing in common. Any of these theories would confound
a system that allows us to choose to protect some species but not
others. One of them-the claim that the biblical story of Noah
compels us to provide legal protection to all species-deserves
special consideration. That ancient story occupies a unique place
in our consciousness, whether or not one believes that it is true.
"valid, but seem to be somewhat leveraged, grasping at straws. The vast ma-
jority of endangered species probably will not cure cancer."); Plater, supra
note 67, at 824 (noting that "it is very difficult to show the particular utility of
many species").
175. See supra text accompanying notes 127-130.
176. In addition to the sources relied upon in the following discussion, see,
for example, ROBIN ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENvIRONMENTAL CONCERN 166-
84 (2d ed., 1991); ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 217-69 (1966);
LEWIS G. REGENSTEIN, REPLENISH THE EARTH: A HISTORY OF ORGANIZED
RELIGION'S TREATMENT OF ANIMALS AND NATURE-INCLUDING THE BIBLE's
MESSAGE OF CONSERVATION AND KINDNESS TOWARD ANIMALS (1991);
WILSON, supra note 27, at 343-51; Nicholas Agar, Valuing Species and Valu-
ing Individuals, 17 ENVTL. ETHICS 397 (1995); Eric T. Freyfogle, The Ethical
Strands of Environmental Law, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 839-40 (1994); Law-
rence E. Johnson, Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosys-
terns, 14 ENvTL. ETHICS 145 (1992); Plater, supra note 67, at 823-25; Andrew
E. Wetzler, Note, The Ethical Underpinnings of the Endangered Species Act,
13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 170-74 (1993). See generally ROGER S. GoTrLIEB,
THIS SACRED EARTH: RELIGION, NATURE, ENVIRONMENT (1996) (presenting
essays that discuss environmental issues from a variety of religious perspec-
tives); Chuck D. Barlow, Why the Christian Right Must Protect the Environ.
ment: Theocentricity in the Political Workplace, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
781, 797-819 (1996) (describing biblical examples including Jesus, Adam,
Noah, and Joseph's "common sense environmentalism through command-and-
control regulation"); David E. DeCosse, Beyond Law and Economics: Theologi-
cal Ethics and the Regulatory Takings Debate, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
829, 837-43 (1996).
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The tale of Noah and his ark resonates with young children and
government officials alike, it continues to inspire book titles (e.g.,
Noah's Choice) and fundraising campaigns to protect wildlife; and
it has played an unexpected role in the recent debate over the fu-
ture of the ESA. For these reasons, I want to focus on the lessons
that supporters of the ESA have learned from Noah, and how
critics of the law have responded.
The story of Noah appears in chapters six through nine of
the book of Genesis. Genesis tells us that God regretted the
creation of humanity because people had become wicked and
evil, so God decided to remove all people and all other living
things from the face of the earth. Noah, however, was a righteous
man who found favor before God, and God decided to spare him
and his family. God instructed Noah to build an ark-a proto-
type houseboat-that he and his family could use to survive
the impending flood. Additionally, God directed Noah "to bring
into the ark two of all living creatures, male and female, to
keep them alive with you. Two of every kind of bird, of every
kind of animal and every kind of creature that moves along the
ground will come to you to be kept alive."'7 Noah obeyed God's
command. The promised flood destroyed all living things on
the earth except for the occupants of the ark. Then the waters
receded, the ark struck dry land, and God told Noah to "[blring
out every kind of living creature that is with you-the birds,
the animals, and all the creatures that move along the
ground-so they can multiply on the earth and be fruitful and
increase in number upon it."'78 Finally, God promised Noah,
his descendants, and every other living creature that he would
never destroy the earth again.
That story features prominently in the defenses of the ESA
offered by Secretary Babbitt, EEN and other Christian and
Jewish groups, and even secular proponents of biodiversity.
God "did not specify that Noah should limit the ark to two
charismatic species, two good for hunting, two species that
might provide some cure down the road, and, two that draw
crowds to the city zoo."'79 Noah invested much time, money,
177. Genesis 6:19-20 (New Intl). The ensuing verses report that God in-
structed Noah to take seven clean animals and birds but only two unclean
animals. See Genesis 7:2-3 (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 189-
191); see also NEW GENEvA STUDY BIBLE 20 (New King James) (R.C. Sproul et
al. eds., 1995) (interpreting the same passage to refer to seven and two pairs
of clean and unclean animals, respectively, and seven pairs of birds).
178. Genesis 8:17.
179. Babbitt, supra note 14, at 5; accord Babbitt, Between the Flood and
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and resources in building the ark and collecting all of the spe-
cies. '8 The resulting covenant between God and Noah "was
made to protect the whole of creation, not for the exclusive use
and disposition of mankind, but for the purposes of the Crea-
tor." '' Some have even suggested that the story implies that
the Rainbow: Stewards of Creation, supra note 15, at 500; The NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer (public television broadcast, June 3, 1996), available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File (statement of Secretary Babbitt). Others who
have made the same point include 142 CONG. REC. S1842 (daily ed. Mar. 12,
1996) (statement of Sen. Chafee) ("God did not direct [Noah] to select only the
most beautiful animals or those plants that might have some particular use to
mankind."); RICHARD A. YOUNG, HEALING THE EARTH: A THEocENTRIc
PERSPECTIVE ON ENviRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS 92-93(1994) ("If Noah were a modem, he would probably balk at the expense of
building an ark to save swine. Noah, however, was not concerned with the
utility of the animals .... ); SUSAN POWER BRATTON, CHRISTIANITY,
WILDERNESS, AND WILDLIFE: THE ORIGINAL DESERT SOLITAIRE 305 (1993)(indicating that Noah teaches "that all creation should be saved together; bits
and pieces won't do"); Holmes Rolston HI, Wildlife and Wildlands: A Chris-
tian Perspective, in AFTER NATURE'S REvOLT: ECO-JUSTICE AND THEOLOGY
122, 139 (Dieter T. Hessel ed., 1992) (observing that Noah "was not taking on
board only those species with economic, agricultural, medical, industrial, and
recreational value"); Tony Campolo & Ron Sider, All Creatures Great and
Small, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 18, 1996 ("There's no record [that]
Noah... couldn't be bothered with animals that were seemingly
insignificant.'"); Calvin B. DeWitt, The High Price of Gopher Wood, GREEN
CROSS, Winter 1996, at 4 (noting that Noah did not question "the significance
or worthiness of each species"); Loren Wilkinson, A Theology of the Beasts,
GREEN CROSS, Winter 1996, at 6 (1996) (reminding that "all living creatures
were to be saved from the Flood, not just the ones that were useful."). But ef.
DICK MORRIS, BEHIND THE OVAL OFFICE 117 (1997) (reporting that President
Clinton jokingly remarked to Vice President Gore that "there were no snail
darters on the ark.").
180. See YOUNG, supra note 179, at 92-93 (noting that Noah was not con-
cerned about "building an ark that size"); DeWitt, supra note 179, at 4(observing that God "asked Noah to build a large boat out of gopher wood at
great cost of time, energy and materials to save not only himself and his fam-
ily, but also the other creatures. Concerns about time or money apparently
were not raised by Noah."); Mark Matthews, Christians Preach Environ-
mental Gospel, 28 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 19, 1996
<http:/www.hcn.org/1996/feb19/dir/Western-Christians.html> (reporting that
the leader of Christians for Environmental Stewardship emphasized the re-
sources and time spent by Noah and concluded that "[w]hen it comes to a
choice between jobs and species ... God's mandate seems to be to save species").
181. Babbitt, supra note 14, at 5; see also 142 CONG. REC. S1907 (daily ed.
Mar. 13, 1996) (statement of Sen. Reid) (quoting letter from EEN leaders rely-
ing on "the everlasting covenant between God and all living creatures of every
kind on Earth"); STEvEN BOUMA-PREDIGER & VIRGINIA VROBLESKY, AS-
SESSING THE ARK: A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON NON-HUMAN CREATUREs
AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 23 (Crossroads Monograph Series on
Faith and Public Policy, Keith J. Pavlischek & Heidi Rolland Unruh eds.,
1997) ("Like a drumbeat, six times in verses 8-17 the text declares that God's
PLAYING NOAH
"God was more concerned about preserving animal species
than sinful people.""2 Moreover, the flood confronted by Noah
has been compared to the flood of people and pollution that
threatens biodiversity today.'83 In short, "Noah's ark was
really the first Endangered Species Act.""8
covenant is with 'every living creature."); AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE
245 (1992) (emphasizing that God's covenant was "made not only with Noah
but with 'all living creatures"); JAMES A. NASH, LOVING NATURE: ECOLOGICAL
INTEGRITY AND CHRISTIAN RESPONSIBILITY 100-02 (1991) (describing God's
covenant with Noah); MAX OELSCHLAEGER, CARING FOR CREATION: AN
ECUMENICAL APPROACH TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 138 (1994) ("The
Noah story... readily lends itself to an ecotheological rationale that human-
kind is mandated by God to protect all species on earth, if for no other reasons
than God's love of his creation and the covenant itself."); FRED VAN DYKE ET
AL., REDEEMING CREATION: THE BIBLICAL BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
STEWARDSHIP 72, 76-77 (1996) (contending that God's covenant with Noah
makes the protection of endangered species essential); Matthews, supra note
180 (quoting the leader of Christians for Environmental Stewardship as say-
ing that "God made a covenant with Noah to protect every living creature on
Earth for all the generations to come"); Judson Stone, Vital to Keep our Ark
from Sinking; God's Covenant with Humanity Demands Protection for Nature,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Mar. 18, 1996, at 9A (Baptist minister writing that
the covenant following the flood shows that "God has made it clear that pre-
serving all life is the divine intention"). The covenant is described in Genesis
8:20-9:17.
182. A Word on Animals and Endangered Species, GREEN CROSS, Winter
1996, at 14; see also Calvin B. DeWitt, Christian Environmental Stewardship:
Preparing the Way for Action, (visited July 8, 1996) <httpl/www.
sal.cs.uiuc.edu/%7Ebeckman/ivcf.paper.htm]> (asserting that the story of
Noah shows that "[slaving animal lineages was more important to God than
saving those who were destroying what God ordained," but adding that
"[pleople are more important than other creatures because they are given the
unique character and responsibility to image God's love").
183. See GORE, supra note 181, at 245 ("[Dloes God's instruction have new
relevance for those who share Noah's faith in this time of another worldwide
catastrophe, this time one of our own creation?"); Rolston, supra note 179, at
139 (referring to the imminent "floodlike threat" posed by humans to other
species); DeWitt, supra note 179, at 5 (asserting that a human tide is sweep-
ing the world); Evangelical Group Launches Environmental Campaign,
CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS, Feb. 1, 1996 <http'//www.cwnews.com/news
/viewrec.cfm?RefNum=4> (describing an EEN advertisement that proclaims
that "today, God's creatures are threatened by our own great flood-of pollu-
tion or habitat destruction"); Campolo & Sider, supra note 179 (writing that
"we are the human flood that is sweeping across the world."). But see Robert
Whelan, Greens and People, in ROBERT WHELAN ET AL., THE CROSS AND THE
RAIN FOREST: A CRITIQUE OF RADICAL GREEN SPIRITUALITY 90 (1996)
("Because Christians believe in the unique nature of every human being,
made in the image and likeness of God, it becomes impossible to subscribe to
the notion that human beings can ever be a form of pollution.").
184. Diane Tennant, God's Green Earth Casting Aside Long-Standing
Theological Differences, Diverse Faiths Come Together in a Basic Belief That
Man Must Care for God's Creation, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Aug.
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Perhaps those advocating choices among species could not
have anticipated the prominence that Noah would achieve in
the debate over the ESA, thanks to Secretary Babbitt and EEN
and others, but the story is not exactly new. We face a seem-
ingly unsolvable dilemma if the story of Noah teaches the les-
sons suggested above. Imitating Noah means that we should
preserve all species, but our limited resources prevent us from
doing so. That dilemma could be avoided, though, if the objec-
tions to reliance on the story of Noah as a justification for ex-
tending legal protection to all species alike are persuasive.
There are three such objections. The first objection claims
that the story of Noah fails to provide a religious or moral duty
to protect all species. Noah's example allows for some uncer-
tainty about whether he (and God) intended to protect all of
the species that we recognize today, and the balance of the
scriptural record indicates a more nuanced relationship be-
tween people and the world in which we live. The claim that
Noah imposes a duty to protect all endangered species, how-
ever, remains sound. This is true regardless of the authority
(if any) one attributes to Genesis because Noah also supports
moral, nonreligious theories of species preservation. The sec-
ond objection rejects reliance on Noah's example as the basis
for creating a legal duty, and specifically the precise legal obli-
gations imposed by the ESA. A legal duty to protect biodiver-
21, 1996, at El, available in 1996 WL 10860173 (quoting Paul Gorman, Ex-
ecutive Director of the National Religious Partnership for the Environment);
accord 141 CONG. REC. S6340 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gor-
ton) (stating that the 1973 "Congress, in all its wisdom, decided that it could,
in fact, become Noah"); The Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery and Eco-
nomic Stability Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 858 Before the Subcomm. on For-
ests and Forest Health of the House Resources Comm., 105th Cong. (1997)
(statement of Michael B. Jackson) (I revere the Endangered Species Act as
an imperfect human expression of God's admonition to Noah to preserve each
species of life on earth."); Rolston, supra note 179, at 137 (describing Noah
and his ark as "the first recorded endangered species project"). For other ref-
erences to Noah's relevance to endangered species, see DWORIKN, supra note
174, at 79 (citing God's command to Noah to "to honor his designs by keeping
species, not individual animals, alive in the ark"); Neil Gotanda, Chen the
Chosen: Reflections on Unloving, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1607 n.90 (1996);
Houck, supra note 59, at 978-79; Kelly Nolen, Residents at Risk: Wildlife and
the Bureau of Land Management's Planning Process, 26 ENVTL. L. 771, 780(1996); Anna R.C. Caspersen, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impos-
sibility of 'Takings" by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 358 (1996);
Kevin D. Batt, Note, Above All, Do No Harm: Sweet Home and Section Nine of
the Endangered Species Act, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1187 (1995). See generally
Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REv.
1261, 1332 n.7 (1995) (collecting sources).
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sity seems inevitable because of the pressures on species today,
though the equivalence between the story of Noah and the ESA
is much more debatable. The third objection contends that the
religious and moral nature of the story makes it unconstitu-
tional to rely on it as a justification for a law like the ESA. But
a law based on Noah would probably survive constitutional at-
tack, if for no other reason than the difficulty in distinguishing
a statute protecting endangered species from other statutes
allegedly based on purely moral concerns. In short, each of the
concerns about relying on the story of Noah to justify the ESA's
formal protection of all species alike merits serious attention,
but I remain convinced that Noah's example teaches that the
law should protect all endangered species alike.
A. THE RELIGIOUS OR MORAL DUTY ESTABLISHED BY THE
STORY OF NOAH
The invocation of the story of Noah by Secretary Babbitt
and other supporters of the ESA has prompted complaints
from those who question the lessons of that story for the pro-
tection of endangered species. The easiest way out is to dis-
miss the authority of the scriptures, though even then Noah's
example can support a moral argument for species preserva-
tion.' 5 The task is trickier for opponents of the ESA who wish
to remain faithful to the scriptural commands as they dispute
the relevance of the story of Noah. Assume for a moment,
therefore, that faithfulness to God includes a desire to follow
Noah's example. That assumption notwithstanding, the con-
clusions that Secretary Babbitt and others have drawn from
Noah's example have been challenged as contrary to the bal-
ance of the scriptural teachings on the environment.
To begin with, it is not clear that Noah understood species
as we do today. The word that is sometimes translated
"species" in Genesis is more often translated as "kind."'86 The
modern conception of species derives from the eighteenth cen-
tury work of Carl Linnaeus, who constructed the elaborate
scheme dividing the natural world into kingdoms, classes, or-
ders, genuses, and species.8 7 There is no evidence that Noah
anticipated that classification scheme as he prepared to collect
185. See infra text accompanying notes 221-229.
186. See, e.g., Genesis 7:3 (Revised Standard) (indicating that the animals
were placed on the ark "to keep their kind alive upon the face of the earth").
187. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 31-32. The current classifi-
cation scheme adds phylums and families. See id. at 32.
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the animals for the ark. Indeed, we do not know what "kinds"
of animals Noah saved: he might have used a broader test that
admitted a pair of squirrels onto the ark but not a pair of each
different type of squirrel, or he might have used a narrower
test that admitted lots of different squirrels based on more re-
fined characteristics than biologists rely upon today.
Whatever Noah's understanding of "species," he made a
few distinctions between them. Fish were seemingly left off
the ark to fend for themselves, though a flood hardly presents a
mortal threat to the survival of most fish.'8  Perhaps more
significantly, more clean animals were brought on the ark than
unclean animals,'89 a distinction that could suggest that differ-
ent species possess different value. The apparent explanation
for the extra numbers of each clean species appears in the next
chapter of Genesis, where Noah used clean animals for an offering
to God.'90 Additionally, after Noah and his cargo survived the
flood, God allowed people to eat meat for the first time-but
only the meat of clean animals. 9' This episode offers some
support for the utilitarian claim that species that are most useful
for food (or for sacrifices) are most deserving of preservation ef-
forts today. Moreover, literal adherence to Noah's example
would require us to save only one mating pair of each species. 19
Such a two animal minimum would offer little solace to those
188. But see Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 162 (1978)
(citing the Interior Secretary's view that the snail darter would become ex-
tinct if the Tellico Dam was completed because the streams preferred by the
fish would be flooded once the dam was closed); Endangered and Threatened
Wildlife and Plants; Proposed Rule to List Three Aquatic Snails as Endan-
gered, and Three Aquatic Snails as Threatened in the Mobile River Basin of
Alabama, 62 Fed. Reg. 54,020 (1997) (observing that the construction of dams
had decimated the large number of freshwater snail species in the Mobile
River Basin).
189. See Genesis 7:2-3 (instructing Noah to take seven pairs of each clean
animal and each bird, but only one pair of each unclean animal); see also
ROLSTON, supra note 174, at 139 (making this observation). By contrast,
God's initial instruction to Noah required two of every species, see Genesis
6:19-20, and the actual progression of animals onto the ark occurred "two by
two," see Genesis 7:9.
190. See Genesis 8:20 (New Intl) ("Then Noah built an altar to the LORD,
and took of every clean animal and of every clean bird, and offered burnt of-
ferings on the altar.").
191 See Genesis 9:3-4.
192. The broader reading of the story of Noah is that it imposes an obliga-
tion to protect species "in numbers sufficient to preserve their fruitfulness."
BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 22. For an argument
that Christianity imposes a duty to protect individual animals in addition to
species as a whole, see NASH, supra note 181, at 179-81.
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concerned about the ESA, though, because it still acknowl-
edges a duty to protect every species. Furthermore, the actions
necessary to protect the last two members of a species are
likely to be nearly as expensive and burdensome as preserving
a larger number.
The fact remains, however, that Noah sought to preserve
all "kinds" of animals by placing them on the ark, and the few
qualifications on that effort were quite modest. Perhaps,
though, the story was not meant to be normative. The flood
was a one time occurrence; maybe Noah's actions were unique,
too. There is no indication that Noah realized he was estab-
lishing a precedent. A related concern objects to the use of the
story of Noah as a "proof text," plucking a biblical teaching out
of context to support a point it was never intended to make.
Perhaps Robert Booth Fowler's observation that "it is hard to
avoid the sense that some liberal Protestant environmentalists
try much too hard to discern an ecological Bible" best summa-
rizes this concern.'93 To be sure, there is no biblical verse that
commands "thou shalt preserve every species on earth," nor
does species preservation figure prominently elsewhere in the
scriptures. But to dismiss the story of Noah so readily ignores
that God must have had a reason in commanding Noah to take
every species onto the ark. Indeed, the story of Noah shows
that God was concerned enough about the preservation of
every species to require Noah to go to extraordinary lengths to
save them. The rest of the scriptures offer no suggestion that
God's interest in biodiversity has waned over time. The reason
for Noah's burden would appear to apply equally to his descen-
dants today. Moreover, to the extent that Noah was concerned
about saving himself, not just the animals, it is possible that
our fate is linked to the survival of the life around us, too.9 4
Maybe we are in the same boat as Noah after all.
193. ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER, TE GREENING OF PROTESTANT THOUGHT 38
(1995).
194. See Endangered Species Protection Hearing, supra note 43, at 68
(statement of Mollie Beattie, Director of the FWS) ("If we are creating a world
which is so inhospitable that hundreds and even thousands of species cannot
survive, ultimately we will find our own survival threatened as well."); En-
dangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to List Three
Aquatic Invertebrates in Comal and Hays Counties, TY, as Endangered, 62
Fed. Reg. 66,295, 66,299 (1997) (arguing that protecting three tiny aquatic in-
vertebrates "will have a positive effect to humans in that it will ensure the
persistence of the water resource" on which humans depend); Houck, supra
note 59, at 978-79 ("[We need the animals as much as Noah did. If we ignore
them, we sink. If we focus on saving them, they will bring us home.").
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Those seeking to avoid a duty to protect every endangered
species are more likely to turn to other parts of the scriptures.
Genesis records that God entrusted man with dominion over
the earth, a notoriously difficult passage for environmental-
ists.95 Genesis further directs man to "fill the earth and sub-
due it."'96 Former Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan cited the
dominion command to justify actions that could result in the
loss of a species.197 Representative Dannemeyer has com-
plained that the ESA "has reversed" God's grant of dominion so
that "[a]nimals today are more important than people."'98 Rep-
resentative Cooley has expressed his belief that "we are going
against God" by protecting endangered species, adding that
"maybe we might be the higher creatures of God's creation."'9
195. See Genesis 1:26 (Then God said... let [man] have dominion over
the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, over all the
earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.'); Genesis 1:28
(commanding man to "fill the earth and subdue it; have dominion over the fish
of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on
the earth"); see also Jeremiah 27:6 (indicating that God gave the wild animals
to serve Nebuchadnezzar, the king of Babylon); Psalms 8:6 ("You have made
him to have dominion over the works of Your hands; You have put all things
under his feet.") (emphasis in original). The classic example of the argument
that such passages are to blame for modern environmental problems is pre-
sented in Lynn White, Jr., The Historical Roots of our Environmental Crisis,
155 SCIENCE 1203 (1967); see also George Cameron Coggins, Snail Darters
and Pork Barrels Revisited: Reflections on Endangered Species and Land Use
in America, in KOHM, supra note 51, at 72 n.1 ("In Genesis, God commanded
Man to assert dominion 'over every thing that moves.' This injunction has
been observed much more closely than other biblical lessons.").
196. Genesis 1:28 ("Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it;
have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over
every living thing that moves on the earth.").
197. See Ted Gup, The Stealth Secretary, TIME, May 25, 1992, at 58.
198. 138 CONG. REC. H10707 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Dannemeyer).
199. Washington ESA Hearing Part II, supra note 10, at 25 (statement of
Rep. Cooley); see also Houck, supra note 37, at 698 (contending that "the ESA
is simply a gratuitous act of insanity" for those who believe that "God gave
this world to human beings and not to snail darters or wolves"). For some of
the many remarks about the relative position of people and endangered spe-
cies made during the recent debate over proposed legislation to exempt cer-
tain flood projects from the ESA, see 143 CONG. REc. H2289 (daily ed. May 7,
1997) (statement of Rep. Chenoweth) (complaining that the ESA results in
"laws of the beetle, by the beetle, and for the beetle"); id. at H2291 (statement
of Rep. Bishop) (asserting that the majority of his constituents believe that
"the preservation of human life should take priority over the preservation of
endangered species"); id. at H2299 (statement of Rep. Bonilla) (expressing
disbelief that anyone could think that bugs and beetles and snails are more
important than people); id. at H2308 (statement of Rep. Chenoweth) (asking
"when are we going to put humans and human property above the lives of a
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Likewise, the head of the National Association of Evangelicals
has worried that "[there is a certain pantheistic element in all
this," contrary to the biblical mandate.2"
The gist of such statements is that people are more impor-
tant than animals. One possible corollary of that assertion is
that the value of each species is measured by its value to humans.
But such an effort to justify choices among species conflicts
with other biblical texts that indicate that all parts of creation
have value to God independent of their utilitarian value.' In
any event, while the superior position of people to other forms
of life could influence the resolution of conflicts between humans
and animals, it would not necessarily support distinctions be-
tween different kinds of non-human life. In other words, even
though God may be most concerned about people, there is no
scriptural evidence that God prefers some animals or birds to
others. Indeed, the whole issue of the relative position of humans
vis-A-vis the rest of the world-while exceptionally controver-
sial in environmental and theological circles2°2-- is a red her-
ring when considering choices among endangered species.
beatle [sic] or a snail or various other species?"); id. at H2311 (statement of
Rep. Lewis of Cal.) (asserting that "the extreme environmental groups place
species protection over the protection of humans"); id. at H2283 (statement of
Rep. Young of Alaska) (contending that "the professional environmentalists"
are "favoring beetles and their habitat over the protection of human life,
property, and environment).
200. Kloehn, supra note 16, at 1 (quoting Rev. Robert Dugan); accord Lo-
ren Wilkinson, New Age, New Consciousness, and the New Creation, in
TENDING THE GARDEN: ESSAYS ON THE GOSPEL AND THE EARTH 28 (Wesley
Granberg-Michaelson ed., 1987) [hereinafter GRANBERG-MICHAELSON](admitting that "[wle Christian environmentalists have perhaps come danger-
ously close to making biblical Christianity a kind of worship of the earth").
But see DeWitt, supra note 182 (distinguishing Christian environmental
teaching from pantheism). For other criticisms of the effort to connect Chris-
tianity with environmentalism, see, for example, WHELAN, KIRWAN &
HAFFNER, supra note 183; David Gelernter, The Immorality of Radical Envi-
ronmentalism, CrrIZEN, Feb. 17, 1997, at 1; Gayle M.B. Hanson, To Green
Fundamentalists, Earth is a Close Second, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996; Gor-
don Kanner, 01' Time Religion Meets New Age, NATL L.J., Jan. 6, 1997.
201. See, e.g., Genesis 1:10, 12, 18, 21, 25 (recording God's description of
creation as "good"); Matthew 6:26 (noting that God feeds the birds even
though they "neither sow nor reap nor gather into barns"); Matthew 6:28(praising the beauty of the lilies of the field despite the failure of lilies to do
any useful work); see also BRATIoN, supra note 179, at 291 (concluding that
Genesis teaches that all creatures "have inherent worth because they were
made by God"); Liberating Life: A Report to the World Council of Churches, in
GOTTLIEB, supra note 176, at 255 ("Before and apart from the creation of hu-
man beings, God sees that the animals are good.").
202. See infra at text accompanying note 219.
19981 1225
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
While balancing human needs versus the needs of biodiversity
lies at the heart of current disputes over the ESA, the official
position of the ESA is that the particular species at issue is ir-
relevant to the proper balance to be achieved.
There is a more basic problem, though, with such lines of
argument. The dominion of which Genesis speaks should not
be understood as a license for humans to do whatever they
want to the world for whatever purpose they happen to have in
mind. The word "dominion" is used elsewhere in the scriptures
to refer to a peaceful rule designed to serve those living subject
to it. 23 Conversely, those who exercise dominion in a way that
serves only their own desires received harsh criticism.2°
A better understanding of the implications of the dominion
command of Genesis can be gleaned from three models pre-
sented in the biblical account. Dominion as kingship reflects
the just, righteous rule that God expected of Israelite kings.05
Dominion as servanthood imitates the way in which God pro-
vides for creation and the kind of rule that Jesus described in
the New Testament. 26 Dominion as stewardship posits that
203. See, e.g., Leviticus 25:43 (instructing that "[ylou shall not rule over
[your slaves] with rigor, but you shall fear your God"); 1 Kings 4:24
(describing a king who had dominion and who "had peace on every side all
around him"); see also Lloyd H. Steffen, In Defense of Dominion, 14 ENVTL.
ETMICS 63, 64-66 (1992) (analyzing other scriptural uses of the word
"dominion").
204. See Ezekiel 34:4 (New International) (prophet observing that "[tihose
who are sickly you have not strengthened, the diseased you have not healed,
the broken you have not bound up, the scattered you have not brought back,
nor have you sought for the lost; but with force and with severity you have
dominated them" (emphasis added)); see also NASH, supra note 181, at 103
(asserting that the dominion mandate does not support "oppression" or
"despotic, totalitarian rule over nature").
205. See NEW GENEVA STUDY BIBLE, supra note 177, at 8 n.26 (describing
the command to exercise dominion as a "cultural mandate to rule the creation
as benevolent kings"); NASH, supra note 181, at 104 (listing the affirmative
obligations of Old Testament rulers); YOUNG, supra note 179, at 172 (detailing
the obligations imposed on rulers by God throughout the Old Testament);
William Dyrness, Stewardship of the Earth in the Old Testament, in
GRANBERG-MICHAELSON, supra note 200, at 53 (contrasting the rule of He-
brew kings with those of the ancient Near East).
206. God's provision for creation is illustrated throughout the scriptures.
See, e.g., Psalms 36:6 ("0 LORD, You preserve man and beast."); Psalms 147:8-
9 (New Intl) (observing that God "supplies the earth with rain and makes
grass grow on the hills"); Matthew 6:26, 28 (noting that God feeds the birds
and clothes the grass). Likewise, the New Testament states that dominion
belongs to Jesus Christ, see 1 Peter 4:11, and that Jesus taught that
"[w]hoever wants to become great among you must be your servant, and who-
ever wants to be first must be your slave." Matthew 20:26-27 (New Intl); see
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God is the owner of creation who has asked us to serve as a
trustee responsible for managing the earth on God's behalf.2 7
Stewardship is the prevalent model. God's status as the
owner of creation is confirmed throughout the scriptures and
elsewhere: Genesis reports that God created all species," 8 other
biblical passages refer to the resulting creation (including
wildlife) as belonging to God,' ° and references to all endan-
gered species as "God's creatures" occur frequently in the de-
bate over the ESA.210 Like other trustees, people should not act
also Jim Ball, Jesus Christ, Creation and the Protection of God's Creatures,
GREEN CROSS, Winter 1996, at 8-11 (describing Jesus's concern for the protec-
tion of wildlife). The servanthood model for dominion is discussed in YOUNG,
supra note 179, at 171; SUSAN POWER BRATrON, SIX BILLION & MORE: HUMAN
POPULATION REGULATION AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 106-07 (1992); Bruce J.
Nicholls, Responding Biblically to Creation: A Creator-Centered Response to
the Earth, 17 EvANGELICAL REv. OF THEOLOGY 209, 218 (1993); see also
DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, CREATION AND FALIUEMPTATION 43 (1997) ("ere is
no dominion without serving God.").
207. See, e.g., THOMAS SIEGER DERR, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND
CHRISTIAN HUMANISM 22 (1996) (characterizing stewardship as "the real, or-
thodox Christian attitude toward nature" which teaches that "wie are trus-
tees for that which does not belong to us"); FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, POI
LUTION AND THE DEATH OF MAN: THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF ECOLOGY 70 (1970)
(contending that "we are to exercise our dominion over these things not as
though entitled to exploit them, but as things borrowed or held in trust);
YOUNG, supra note 179, at 173-77 (noting that stewardship implies delegated
authority akin to a trust, contradicts human autonomy, implies moral respon-
sibility, requires proper use and management, and involves human creativity).
For criticisms of the stewardship model as human centered or hierarchial, see
MICHAEL S. NORTHCOTT, THE ENVIRONMENT AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 129-30
(1996); Clare Palmer, Stewardship: A Case Study in Environmental Ethics, in
THE EARTH BENEATH: A CRITICAL GUIDE TO GREEN THEOLOGY 67-86 (Ian Ball
et al. eds., 1992); see also BILL MCKIBBEN, THE COMFORTING WHIRLWIND 51
(1994) (complaining that "the idea of 'stewardship' is so lacking in content as
to give us very little guidance about how to behave in any given situation").
See generally FOWLER, supra note 193, at 76-90 (1995) (surveying a range of
Protestant views of stewardship).
208. See Genesis 1:20-25. The implications of the creation story for biodi-
versity preservation are discussed in PETER DEVOS ET AL., EARTHKEEPING IN
THE NINETms: STEWARDSHIP OF CREATION BY THE FELLOWS OF THE CALVIN
CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN SCHOLARSHIP, CALVIN COLLEGE 39-40, 237-54 (rev.
ed. 1991); Barlow, supra note 176, at 797-812; Rolston, supra note 179, at 137,
140.
209. See, e.g., Deuteronomy 10:14 (New Intl) ("Behold, to the LORD your
God belong the heavens, even the highest heavens, the earth and everything
in it."); Psalms 24:1 (New Intl) ('The earth is the LORD's, and everything in
it, the world, and all who live in it"); Psalms 50:10-12 (New Int'l) (quoting
God as proclaiming that "every animal of the forest is Mine... the creatures
of the field are Mine," and "the world is Mine, and all that is in t").
210. See, e.g., 142 CoNG. REC. S1845 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1996) (statement
of Sen. Lieberman); 142 CONG. REC. E33 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1996) (statement of
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to further their own best interests, but instead to best serve
the owner. And God-the owner-values each part of crea-
tion.21' God also values the diversity of creation.212 Moreover,
the biblical account anticipates a world that is to thrive in its
own right and that will eventually be redeemed.213 This stew-
ardship model is further supported by the instruction given by
Rep. Rahall); ESA Listing Moratorium Hearing, supra note 76, at 7, 33
(statements of Sen. Boxer); DWORKIN, supra note 174, at 79 (describing how
many people want to protect endangered species because they view them as
"God's creatures"); see also 143 CONG. REC. H2311 (daily ed. May 7, 1997)
(statement of Rep. Dingell) (describing the salmon as "one of God's great gifts
to the people of the Western United States"); Louisiana & Texas ESA Hear-
ings, supra note 7, at 73 (testimony of Paul Davidson, President, Louisiana
Wildlife Federation) ("[Wihen the good Lord made all these creatures, he
probably thought they were significant."). Opponents of the ESA use the
metaphor, too. See 125 CONG. REC. 23867 (1979) (statement of Sen. Baker)
(observing that the snail darter "kept the lowest profile of all God's creatures
for thousands of years until a relatively short time ago, but now he seems to
enjoy the publicity").
211. See BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 9-10
(explaining that all species are valuable simply because they are creations of
God); NASH, supra note 181, at 99 (citing biblical passages demonstrating that
the creation is valuable to God independent of any human utility); Billy Gra-
ham, Does God Care About Animals?, CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Feb. 27,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chfrpr file (proclaiming that "[t]o
drive to extinction something [God] has created is wrong, for He has a pur-
pose for everything"); Wilkinson, supra note 179, at 6 (asserting that "God de-
lights in animals for their own sakes").
212. See, e.g., Liberating Life, supra note 201, at 262 (reading Genesis to
teach that God views the "rich diversity of plant and animal life" as "very
good"); United States Catholic Conference, Catholic Social Teaching and En-
vironmental Ethics, in GOTTLIEB, supra note 176, at 645 (asserting that "[tIhe
diversity of life manifests God's glory); Arthur Waskow, What is Eco-Kosher?,
in GOTTLIEB, supra note 176, at 300 (comparing the effects of modernity on
the diversity of species and the diversity of human cultures); Ball, supra note
206, at 8 (claiming that Christians desire to live in a country "where the rich
diversity that God created is protected").
213. See Genesis 1:10, 12, 18, 21, 25 (God characterizing the creation as
"good"); Genesis 1:22 (God commanding animals and birds to "[ble fruitful and
multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let birds multiply on the earth");
Genesis 8:17 (God commanding all wildlife to "be fruitful and multiply"); Ro-
mans 8:19-20 (asserting that "the creation itself also will be delivered from
the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God").
See generally NASH, supra note 181, at 124-33 (recounting historic Christian
approaches to the consummation of creation); Richard J. Clifford, The Bible
and the Environment, in PRESERVING THE CREATION: ENVIRONMENTAL
THEOLOGY AND ETmcs 12-14 (Kevin W. Irwin & Edmund D. Pellegrino eds.,
1994) (discussing prophetic writings indicating that nature will be healed);
Loren Wilkinson, The Uneasy Conscience of the Human Race: Rediscovering
Creation in the "Environmental" Movement, in GOD & CULTURE 314-16 (D-A.
Carson & John D. Woodbridge eds., 1993) (asserting that traditional Christian
writings support a broad view of the redemption of creation).
God to Adam in Genesis to tend the earth and to "keep" it."4
The stewards of creation, therefore, must treat the creation in
a manner that reflects the value and purpose that God places
on the creation.
The proponents of the ESA and the protection of biodiver-
sity emphasize such understandings of dominion.215 Indeed, a
recent monograph written by two evangelical scholars asserts
that the duty to protect endangered species flows from a vari-
ety of biblical themes.2 6 Christians should care for endangered
species, they say, "because non-human creatures are valuable
in themselves as creations of a good and loving God, because
we as God's image-bearers are given the responsibility of
keeping creation, and because such care is a fitting response of
gratitude for the good gifts God provides." '7 In short, "we have
214 Genesis 2:15. The significance of the obligation to "keep" the earth is
revealed by other uses of that word in the scriptures. See Genesis 3:24
(describing how God placed an angel at the eastern edge of Eden to "guard"
the garden from people seeking the tree of life); Numbers 6:24 (benediction
asking the Lord to bless you and to "keep" you); see also VAN DYKE ET AL., su-
pra note 181, at 90 (commenting that "Adam probably would not have looked
at an ostrich as a large pair of drumsticks or a hippopotamus as a ton of chuck
steak'); Ronald J. Sider, Redeeming the Environmentalists, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY, June 21, 1993, at 28 ("[Olur dominion must be the gentle care of a
loving gardener, not the callous exploitation of a self-centered lord. So we
should not wipe out species or waste the nonhuman creation.").
215. See, e.g., DEVOS ET AL., supra note 208, at 275-306 (chapter on domin-
ion as stewardship); GORE, supra note 181, at 243 ('The requirement of stew-
ardship and its grant of dominion are not in conflict; in recognizing the sa-
credness of creation, believers are called upon to remember that even as they
till' the earth they must also 'keep' it."); Robert P. Meye, Invitation to Wonder:
Toward a Theology of Nature, in GRANBERG-MICHAELSON, supra note 200, at
46 (contending that dominion "does not mean... destroying a whole species");
Plater, supra note 67, at 825 n.66 ("The Biblical story of Noah... also repre-
sents the concept that humanity's dominion over nature is tempered by a duty
of stewardship for future generations."); Krueger, supra note 17, at 2 (arguing
that the dominion command provides the basis for a duty to preserve endan-
gered species); Wilkinson, supra note 179, at 6-7 (reading the dominion com-
mand as consistent with God's interest in preserving endangered species); cf.
H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 420 (testimony of Rev. John D. Paarlberg)
("[Ihe task of 'dominion' does not have to do with exploitation and abuse. It
has to do with securing the well-being of every other creature and bringing
the promise of each to fifll fruition." (quoting WALTER BRUEGGERMANN,
GENEsIS 32-33 (1982))); id. at 89 (statement of Rep. Chenoweth) (interpreting
Psalm 8 to direct man "to have dominion and to care for all the works of the
earth" and "to be very, very good stewards").
216. See BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 9-38 (finding
a duty to protect biodiversity in creational integrity and dependence, crea-
tional finitude, human finitude and -faultedness, creational fruitfulness, the
concept of the Sabbath rest, earthkeeping, and righteousness).
217. Id. at 6.
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a prima facie duty to protect and preserve non-human spe-
cies.2
The broader scriptural context, therefore, supports the
duty to preserve biodiversity implicit in the story of Noah. But
even when they are properly understood, the biblical com-
mands-especially the command to exercise dominion-conflict
with ethical theories that treat people and other species in an
identical fashion. The claim of "speciesism"-a discriminatory
preference for the human species over all other species-has
been leveled against Christian environmentalists and others
who acknowledge a higher ethical position for humanity."9
The balance between human needs and the needs of animals
will be set differently by someone seeking to adhere to the bib-
lical account and by someone seeking to treat all species
(including humans) alike. The dilemma that those advocating
animal rights face when choosing between the survival of a
human baby or a dog is not a dilemma at all according to the
teachings of Genesis. 0 Yet it is not true that the balance be-
tween human needs and animal needs taught by Genesis al-
ways tips in favor of human needs. The story of Noah expend-
ing tremendous time and resources "to keep the species alive
on the face of all the earth" is simply the most dramatic exam-
ple of the scriptural imperative for preserving biodiversity.
The creation story, God's command to Adam to "keep" the land,
and numerous passages throughout the whole Bible provide
similar evidence of the duty to act in a manner that protects all of
creation, even if human desires must be sacrificed in the process.
All of this assumes a desire to imitate Noah because of relig-
ious conviction. Of course, one could possess a religious conviction
that adheres to the general teachings of scripture while question-
ing whether the story of Noah and the ark is literally true. Efforts
to imagine how all of the world's animals fit on the ark have oc-
cupied writers for centuries, with no obvious answer immediately
218. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted).
219. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 189-202 (2d ed. 1990);
Martha Ellen Stortz, Ethics, Conservation, and Theology in Ecological Per-
spective, in COVENANT FOR A NEW CREATION: ETHICS, RELIGION, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 196-211 (Carol S. Robb & Carl J. Casebolt eds., 1991). But see DERR,
supra note 207, at 24 (describing speciesism as an "awful term" and rejecting
Singer's argument as contrary to biblical teaching).
220. See, e.g., GARY L. BAUER, OUR HOPES OUR DREAMS: A VISION FOR
AMERICA 126 (1996) (reporting that when asked whether she would save a
baby or a dog, an animal rights activist answered "that depends on whether it
was my baby or my dog").
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at handl' But the lessons of the story of Noah do not depend
upon whether it records an historic event or not. There must be a
reason why Genesis includes the story, and while that reason may
not be clear, it does not appear to change depending upon the ac-
tual occurrence of the flood and Noah's response to it.
For those who deny the authority of the scriptures, the
story of Noah does not instill a religious obligation to preserve
all species. Nevertheless, the relevance of the story for the
preservation of endangered species cannot be so easily dis-
missed. Noah's example can be understood to establish a
moral principle, not a uniquely religious one. Zygmunt Plater
asserts that "we should adopt a Noah Presumption, a strong
presumption in favor of protecting all endangered species,
rather than a dismissive Noah's Choice, unless human neces-
sities clearly outweigh the importance of doing so. "m Simi-
larly, biologist David Ehrenfeld affixes the label the "Noah
Principle" to the claim that "[1]ong-standing existence in Na-
ture is deemed to carry with it the unimpeachable right to
continued existence."m In particular, Noah provides "an excel-
lent precedent" because "[not a single species was excluded on
the basis of low priority, and by all accounts not a single spe-
cies was lost."' 4 All species, therefore, have a right to exist.
Mann and Plummer call the Noah Principle "unethical and
impracticable."' They explain:
It is unethical, because trying to save every species perfectly would
force our society to destroy many or all of its other accomplishments, an
act of self-immolation that the ecologically concerned cannot force on
22L See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 30-31 (recounting some of
the theories about the presence of every species of animal aboard the ark).
222. Plater, supra note 80, at 847.
223. DAvID EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 208 (1978).
"Existence," adds Ehrenfeld, "is the only criterion of the value of parts of na-
ture." Id. Ehrenfeld emphasizes the limits of relying on economic values (or
even assigned economic values) as a rationale for protecting all species. See
id. at 179-204. But Ehrenfeld finds other values-non-economic, religious
values-capable of championing all living species. See id. at 204-11.
[WIhen a community or species has no known economic worth or
other value to humanity, it is as dishonest and unwise to trump up
weak resource values for it as it is unnecessary to abandon the effort
to conserve it. Its non-humanistic value is enough to justify its pro-
tection-but not necessarily to assure its safety in this human-
obsessed world culture.
Id at 210.
224. Id. at 204; see also id. at 208 (noting that the principle is named "after
the person who was one of the first to put it into practice").
225. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 216.
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others, who may have different but equally worthy goals. And it is im-
practicable, because this perfect duty is impossible to fulfill, even if our
society were willing to turn back three hundred years of its history.'
In one respect this argument is misplaced. Mann and
Plummer see the ESA as the embodiment of the Noah Principle,
but the implementation of the law reveals that the ESA coun-
tenances choices among species. 7 Mann and Plummer further
oppose the Noah Principle because it prevents any constructive
debate about conflicts between endangered species and other
interests."s They worry that reliance on the principle makes it
impossible for us to play Noah, but that is incorrect. Mann and
Plummer's real objection is that the ESA's apparent acceptance
of the Noah Principle does not allow us to play God.
The existence of a moral duty to preserve all species does
not depend upon our ability to satisfy that duty. A moral obli-
gation is not extinguished by a lack of resources.29 Nor are
conflicting moral obligations unusual. Faced with multiple
demands on our limited time and resources, we are frequently
required to choose among many worthy causes that we ac-
knowledge a duty to support. Mann and Plummer characterize
the Noah Principle as unethical because it precludes such
choices. And they endorse the methods of resolving the ethical
dilemmas posed by resource limitations articulated in Guido
Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt's famous book, Tragic Choices.20
226. Id. at 143.
227. See supra Part II.
228. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 25 ("To embrace the Noah
Principle is to deny that we can legitimately choose against nature. On moral,
ethical, and spiritual grounds, we must preserve biodiversity above all else
... "); id. at 137 ("By denying that species may be distinguished on pruden-
tial grounds, [the Noah Principle] provides no practical guidance in a world
distinguished by choice-it is a switch that is always stuck on yes, no matter
what else may be happening."); id. at 143 ("Reverence for biodiver-
sity ... stands alongside other values, and we must negotiate among them.");
id. at 158 (describing the absence of a legal balancing mechanism as "a Noah
Principle law"); see also ESA Reauthorization Hearing, supra note 12, at 185
(testimony of Mark L. Plummer) ("The time has come to question the goal
that underlies the Endangered Species Act: Save every species, no matter
what the cost."); Mann & Plummer, supra note 40, at 52 ("The choice is ines-
capable-but the Endangered Species Act, in its insistence that we save every
species, implicitly rejects this responsibility.").
229. Nor, for that matter, is a legal duty. See Environmental Defense Cen-
ter v. Babbitt, 73 F.3d 867, 871 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the FWS retained
a legal obligation to list a species as endangered notwithstanding a statutory
ban on any federal spending on listing programs, but acknowledging that the
agency could not act until the spending ban expired).
230. GuIDo CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978); see
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Yet Calabresi and Bobbitt exempt certain kinds of duties-
including religious duties-from their general approach to allo-
cating valuable but scarce resources depending upon their
costs . 1 Thus, the difficulty of preserving biodiversity does not
eliminate the duty itself.
The claims that Noah's example requires us to protect en-
dangered species survive the attacks against them. While we
may not know exactly which animals Noah acted to save, we do
know that God asked him to save all kinds, and that Noah did
so. That effort is consistent with other scriptural teachings on
the obligation of people to care for what God has created. Or,
seen through a different lens, Noah's ark provides a compelling
example capable of sustaining a moral duty that fits with sci-
entific teaching about the operation of ecosystems and the sig-
nificance of individual species. Either way, Noah's effort to
preserve biodiversity supports a similar effort on our part today.
B. THE LEGAL DuTY ESTABLISHED BY THE STORY OF NOAH
Even if we should try to imitate Noah, it is not self-evident
that the duty suggested by Noah's example (or any other
moral, ethical, or religious duty for protecting endangered
species) must be translated into a legal duty. The books con-
taining the story of Noah-the Bible in general and Genesis in
particular-include countless other commands and stories that
have never been adopted in statutory law. None of the propo-
nents of an ESA based on Noah has explained why this is one
of the commands demanding legal recognition.
There are, moreover, countless ways to protect endangered
species wholly apart from governmental action. The Nature
Conservancy is famous for using private funds to purchase
lands that serve as habitat for endangered species; the Noah
Conservancy has been established by Christian environmental-
ists to accomplish the same purpose. Private landowners often
manage their property in a manner best designed to protect
rare wildlife or plants, notwithstanding their limited economic
incentive to do so. The small percentage of endangered species
that live on public land 2 and the limited ability of the gov-
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 213-14 (discussing TRAGIC CHOICES).
231 See CALABREsI & BOBBrrr, supra note 230, at 20 (indicating that the
costs of achieving a socially desirable outcome should affect the willingness to
achieve that outcome unless the preferred outcome "has been arrived at by
reference to some external absolute-a religious command, for example").
232. For various estimates of the percentage of endangered species that
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ernment to enforce laws against harming endangered species 3
make the actions of such private landowners essential to the
preservation of many species. Private environmental groups
fund efforts to study and protect endangered species around
the world. Under such circumstances, the creation of a legal
duty to protect endangered species will not be sufficient to as-
sure the survival of such species; some would go further and
say that a legal duty is unnecessary, too.
Unfortunately, the pressures on endangered species indi-
cate that private efforts will be inadequate. Private developers
cannot be expected to forgo tremendous economic profits in or-
der to preserve a field that is home to an endangered bird or
butterfly. For their part, governmental agencies have not
demonstrated any greater willingness to sacrifice their pri-
mary mission in order to protect an endangered species. The
Tennessee Valley Authority was more interested in the pre-
sumed benefits of the Tellico Dam than the survival of the
snail darter. More recently, the Army reluctantly searched for
training grounds that did not threaten an endangered spe-
cies."4 The intentional killing or capture of rare wildlife and
plants continues to present a serious threat to the survival of
many species in the United States and around the world. The
live on public land, see David S. Wilcove et al., Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a
More Effective Endangered Species Act for Private Land (1996) (visited March
2, 1998) <http'/www.edf.orgpubs/Reports/help-esa/indexhtmn> (Environmental
Defense Fund report stating that between one-third and one-half of all pro-
tected species do not occur at all on federal land); Dana Clark & David Dow-
nes, What Price Biodiversity? Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conserva-
tion in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 9, 10 (1996), available in
LEXIS Lawrev Library Aflrev File (indicating that 50% of the species listed
under the ESA live only on private lands); Thompson, supra note 71, at 310
(stating that almost 80% of endangered species live on at least some private
land and that more than a third of endangered species do not live on any fed-
eral land).
233. See John Copeland Nagle, Why Chinese Wildlife Disappears as CITES
Spreads, 9 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 435-39 (1997) (describing the diffi-
culty that China has experienced in enforcing endangered species laws);
Joonmoo Lee, Note, Poachers, Tigers and Bears... OhMy! Asia's Illegal
Wildlife Trade, 16 Nw. J. NTL L. & BUS. 497, 497 (1996), available in LEXIS,
Lawrev Library, Allrev File (reporting the extent of poaching and smuggling
of endangered species in the United States and throughout the world).
234. See, e.g., Endangered Species Conservation Programs at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina, and at the Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge, Virginia
Beach, Virginia: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
104th Cong. 1-49 (1995) (discussion of the conflict between the habitat of the
endangered red cockaded woodpecker and Army training and construction
activities at Fort Bragg).
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incentives to destroy endangered species-directly or indi-
rectly, intentionally or accidentally-are often too powerful to
be stymied by a moral duty alone. Hence the call for laws to
preserve endangered species.
Perhaps, however, the legal duty suggested by the story of
Noah should simply inspire us to try to protect all species.
Even if we cannot actually save every species, we may still
want to try to do so because we think that is an important as-
piration."5 The environmental laws are full of aspirational
provisions that we know that we cannot meet. The discharge
of pollutants into the water did not end in 1985, no matter
what the Clean Water Act says. 6 This argument, however,
neglects the fact that the ESA is more than symbolic legislation.
A person who cuts down a tree that looks attractive to a spot-
ted owl risks being sent to a real jail, not a symbolic one. The
ESA goes far beyond stating aspirational goals: criminal fines
of $50,000 and civil penalties of $25,000 indicate that the law's
command cannot be followed only when convenient.27  The
symbolic legislation explanation does not fit such provisions.
And symbolic provisions alone cannot be expected to preserve
endangered species. Noah was motivated by his desire to obey
God, and many today seek to protect the values of biodiversity
that they find important, but a legally enforceable economic in-
centive or civil sanction will be more persuasive to those who
do not share such values.
235. That is the Clinton Administration's position:
I think we should continue to have an Endangered Species Act which
sets a goal of striving to protect from going extinct all species in the
United States, at least strive to protect them from extinction at the
hands of human causes. That doesn't mean that we ultimately can
hope to achieve that goal. Whether we can achieve that goal depends
on, among other things, the status of some of those species, the
amount of money that is appropriated for the program, the extent to
which we are creative in structuring partnerships,... between gov-
ernment and private landowners and some of the tradeoffs that we
make between species protection and socioeconomic factors.
H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 33 (testimony of George T. Frampton, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary, Fish & Wildlife & Parks, Department of the Interior).
Mann and Plummer would not necessarily object to such a goal. See MANN &
PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 175 ("A wish to save all endangered species may
be ethically tenable if we choose practicable means for striving to come as
close as we can to the goal.").
236. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1994). For a criticism of such symbolic
environment statutes, see John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legisla-
tion, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
237. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(a)(1), (b)(1) (1997).
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To say that the story of Noah provides the basis for impos-
ing a legal duty to protect every species is not to say that the
ESA itself has attained scriptural status. Even if the biblical
account supports endangered species legislation, it does not
mandate the precise terms of the ESA. Thus numerous writers
have questioned whether the analogy between the ESA and
Noah's example is appropriate. One ESA critic has noted that
"Noah did not seize anyone's property to build the ark, nor did
he tax anyone to finance the operation."28 Representative La-
mar Smith has asserted that "Noah could have been con-
demned as an animal hater, fined and kept from launching his
ark" under the ESA.P9 Senator Kempthorne doubts that Noah
could have gotten the necessary ESA permits before the flood
wiped out the earth.' °
238. Marlo Lewis, Jr., EPA Would Have Arrested Noah, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 1996, at A21, available in LEXIS, NewsLibrary, Wtimes File. Accord
David W. Neuendorf, Evangelical Environmentalists Are Wrong (visited Mar.
2, 1998) <http://www.seidata.com/-neusys/colmO044.html> ("[Tihe Evangeli-
cal Environmentalists are ignoring the very real violations of God's law that
the Endangered Species Act has brought about."); Kanner, supra note 200, at
A23 (objecting that religious arguments for environmental protection in gen-
eral and "disregard the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Commandment as
well"); All Things Considered, supra note 16 (Reformed Theological Seminary
Professor Ron Nash commenting that "there are enormous costs that go with
[the ESA] as radical environmentalists in the government use this legislation
to deprive people of property rights and to handicap people in fulfilling other
dimensions of God's dominion mandate").
239. Louisiana & Texas ESA Hearings, supra note 7, at 79.
240. 142 CONG. REC. S1848 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kempthorne); accord Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the House Re-
sources Comm., 104th Cong. 43 (1996) (testimony of Sherry L. Colyer, Brun-
eau Valley Coalition) ("If Noah had to go through the petitioning, permitting,
and consulting process of the current Endangered Species Act, I am fairly cer-
tain that out of total frustration, he too, would have left some of God's crea-
tures behind."); Lewis, supra note 238, at A21 ("The supreme irony is that if
Noah were alive today, he would be put in jail under the ESA for capturing
and transporting endangered species without a federal permit."); Step Out of
the Ark with Your Hands Up, WASH. TImEs, May 21, 1997, at A14 (editorial),
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wtimes File ("One can only conclude that
if the biblical Noah had had to abide by the Endangered Species Act, the
world would be a pretty empty place now. Today's Noahs have constructed an
ark of unworkable, even unfathomable rules."). But see 143 CoNG. REC.
H2300 (daily ed. May 7, 1997) (statement of Rep. Vento) ("Blaming the floods
of 1997 on the Endangered Species Act would have been like Noah blaming
the great flood on the animals he brought with him on the ark."); Statement
by Secretary Bruce Babbitt on the "Endangered Species Conservation and
Management Act of 1995" (Sept. 7, 1995) (press release) (visited Mar. 19,
1997) <http://yoda.ucc.uconn.edu/users/holsingerk/babbitt.html> (criticizing
proposed legislation to amend the ESA by contending that "[i]f Noah had to
follow all the rules in this bill, he wouldn't have needed an ark. He could have
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The consistency of the requirements of the ESA with the
broader scriptural teachings has divided the religious commu-
nity. Consider some of the conflicts described above. Should
we protect butterflies or people from mosquitoes? A beetle or a
highway to a hospital? The piping plover or a beach for off-
road vehicles? Some find a scriptural preference for the hu-
man needs in all such circumstances. An article published by
Focus on the Family-a prominent evangelical organization-
seized upon a conflict between southern California farmers and
the endangered kangaroo rat to assert that "[tlhere couldn't be
a clearer sign of upside-down morals than a law favoring rats
over humans." 1 A Baptist leader has dismissed the ESA as
"an unmitigated disaster."2 Such criticisms object to the sac-
rifices that the ESA demands that people make for the sake of
biodiversity. Defenders of the ESA respond that Noah did not
complain about the tremendous amount of time and money
that he was asked to spend to preserve species.243
The resolution of this dispute depends upon contested un-
derstandings of the value of human life, the value of non-
fit all the animals he was allowed to save in a canoe.").
241. Gelernter, supra note 200, at 4. Gelernter added that "forcing your
fellow man to accommodate the interests of every endangered species on the
block is no instance of excessive virtue. It isn't virtuous at all. Ifs depraved."
Id. For sharply contrasting accounts of the role of efforts to protect the kan-
garoo rat in the destruction of southern California farms by forest fires, com-
pare Ike C. Sugg, California Fires-Losing Houses, Saving Rats, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 10, 1993, at A20, arguing that FWS efforts to save the kangaroo rat in-
terfered with efforts to save homes from fire, with Michael Allan Wolf, Over-
taking the Fifth Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmen-
talism, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 637, 644-45 (1995), debunking the claim that
protection of the kangaroo rat caused the destruction of any homes.
242. Randy Frame, Greening of the Gospel?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 11,
1996, at 82, 84 (quoting Richard Land, president of the Southern Baptist
Christian Life Commission); see also LARRY.BURKEM, WHAT EVER HAPPENED
TO THE AMERICAN DREAM? 98-103 (1993) (President of Christian financial
ministry criticizing the impact of the ESA).
243. See supra note 179; Campolo & Sider, supra note 179 (asserting that
"There's no record of Noah having protested that another kind of lumber
might be more cost-effective."); see also BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, su-
pra note 181, at 16, 94 (contending that "[ilt is simply false to pit endangered
species against hungry people," and concluding that "the ESA, while not per-
fect, does not generate unacceptably high or inequitable costs"). But see
MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 235 (speculating that today "Noah would
have a budget and a bottom line"). For more systematic efforts to reconcile a
biblical duty to protect endangered species with human needs, see NASH, su-
pra note 181, at 190 (identifying six instances in which species preservation
can be superseded by other goals, including the satisfaction of basic human
needs and the realization of valuable human benefits).
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human life, and the cost of protecting each. Note that while
the biblical account indicates an unmistakable preference for
human life, the story of Noah demonstrates a high value for
the preservation of every species, too. And the costs involved-
the cost of the actual steps necessary to protect a species, the
loss of available resources for other purposes, and the cost of
not protecting a species-are rarely clear. Such conflicts be-
tween the needs of endangered species and the needs of hu-
mans have caused much of the current controversy over the
ESA. But whatever the appropriate balance between people
and endangered species that is prescribed by the story of Noah,
that balance does not affect the suggestion that Noah's example
requires that we treat all species of wildlife equally, or that the
law require that we do so.
C. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION BASED UPON THE
STORY OF NOAH
The creation of a legal duty to protect-or at least not to
harm-rare wildlife and plants based on the story of Noah
faces criticism from those who object to basing a law on a bibli-
cal imperative. Idaho Representative Helen Chenoweth has
been particularly outspoken against the invocation of Noah as
a justification for the ESA, protesting the incorporation of per-
sonal beliefs into laws that punish those who do not share
those beliefs.2" Secretary Babbitt has been criticized for imply-
ing that opposition to the ESA equals opposition to God.245
244. See 142 CONG. REC. H1002-05 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Chenoweth) (objecting to Secretary Babbitts speech, characterizing en-
vironmentalism as a religion, and concluding that "this religious vision is not
shared by every American and no American should be forced to promote a re-
ligious vision contrary to their own beliefs"); see also 134 CoNG. PEc. 18582
(1988) (criticizing the ESA as an effort to change moral attitudes by "the sheer
brute force of Government"); The Thoreau Institute, Fixing the Endangered
Species Act (visited Apr. 3, 1998) <http'//www.teleport.com/-rot/ esaafsee.htmI]>
(comparing the ESA to Lenin's efforts to force the evolution of ethics).
245. See 1997 Interior Appropriations Hearings, supra note 23, at 1082
(remarks of Rep. Taylor) (quoting a speech in which Babbitt said that con-
gressional opponents of the ESA are "deeply disturbed by the prospect of re-
ligious values entering the national debate" over the ESA and telling Babbitt
that the speech "implies that if you're not on your side, you're against God");
see also Kanner, supra note 200, at A23 (complaining about Babbitt's reliance
upon religious values and asserting that the use of such values violates both
the Fifth Amendment and the Eighth Commandment (against stealing)); John
Elvin, Is the Interior Secretary Running a Tent Show?, WASH. TIME, July 29,
1996, at 17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (asserting that
Babbitt "is inclined to see the effort [to protect the environment] more as a
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Additionally, many critics of the ESA characterize much of con-
temporary environmentalism itself as a form of religious belief.2
These complaints are often cast in constitutional terms.
Critics of Secretary Babbitt's vision of the ESA contend that
his efforts violate the Establishment Clause. 47 Indeed, the Es-
tablishment Clause has been interpreted to preclude statutes
enacted for a religious purpose and without any secular justifi-
cation.' Laws.based on the book of Genesis have been espe-
cially susceptible to Establishment Clause objections.249 Other
cases, however, indicate that the religious motivation of those
supporting a statute does not render it unconstitutional pro-
vided that there is a plausible secular purpose for the law.21
mission of God"). Indeed, some ESA advocates are quite confident in the di-
vine approval of their work. See, e.g., Philip R. Pryde, Biblical Support for
Environment Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRM., Sept. 3, 1997 (concluding that "if
God were in Congress... it seems like he'd be sponsoring the bill" to reau-
thorize the ESA).
246. See, e.g., Godliness and Greenness: Thou Shall Not Covet the Earth,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1996, at 108, 108 (describing "a worldwide move-
ment in which the boundary between religion and environmentalism is becom-
ing increasingly blurred"); Kanner, supra note 200, at A23 (asserting that
"W[the latest trendy shtick blends environmental law enforcement with relig-
ion and blends this resulting hash as public policy").
247. See 142 CONG. REC. H1003 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996) (statement of
Rep. Chenoweth); Alston Chase, Environmentalism Has Not So Suddenly Be-
come a Religion, DENVER POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at 5E.
248. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a Lou-
isiana statute requiring schools that teach evolution to also teach creation sci-
ence); Wallace v. Jaffiee, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama statute
authorizing a moment of silence in public schools); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S.39 (1980) (per curiam) (striking down a Kentucky statute requiring public
school classrooms to post the Ten Commandments); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating an Arkansas statute prohibiting the teaching
of evolution in public schools); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-
13 (1971) (establishing a three-part test that invalidates a statute if it does
not have a secular purpose, if its primary effect advances or inhibits religion,
or if it excessively entangles church and state); Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct.
1997, 2010 (1997) (indicating that the purpose test "has remained largely un-
changed" in recent years).
249. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 603-04 (Powell, J., concurring) ("The tenets
of creation science parallel the Genesis story of creation, and this is a relig-
ious belief."); Epperson, 393 U.S. at 103 ("The overriding fact is that Arkansas'
law selects from the body of knowledge a particular segment which it pro-
scribes for the sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular relig-
ious doctrine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis
by a particular religious group."). Laws based on Exodus haven't fared too
well either. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 39-40 (invalidating a statute requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments).
250. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248-49 (1990) (upholding
the Equal Access Act); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1988)
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Moreover, the decisions finding Establishment Clause viola-
tions emphasized the absence of any secular justification for
the statute,"' and the statutes at issue addressed topics that
impressed the Court as inherently religious-school prayer,
the Ten Commandments, and creation versus evolution. Thus,
some scholars have advanced Establishment Clause theories
that would call into question a broader group of statutes moti-
vated by religious beliefs. Abner Greene, for example, reads
the Establishment Clause to bar legislation actually enacted
for the dominant express purpose of advancing values com-
manded by religion, whether or not a secular defense can be
made for the law. m2 Greene even posits a case in which a law
protecting endangered species would be unconstitutional. 3
(upholding the Adolescent Family Life Act); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
319-20 (1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment's denial of federal funding for
abortions); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452-53 (1961) (upholding a
Maryland statute requiring stores to be closed on Sundays); Cammack v.
Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding a Hawaii law making
Good Friday a state holiday); see also Edwards, 482 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("We surely would not strike down a law providing money to feed
the hungry or shelter the homeless if it could be demonstrated that, but for
the religious beliefs of the legislators, the funds would not have been ap-
proved."); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
,ment) (indicating disagreement with an Establishment Clause theory under
which "the State could not criminalize murder for fear that it would thereby
promote the Biblical command against killing").
25L See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (holding that the state "identified no
clear secular purpose for the Louisiana Act"); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 (holding
that "the First Amendment requires that a statute must be invalidated if it is
entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion," and finding that Ala-
bama's moment of silence statute "had no secular purpose"); id. at 65 (Powell,
J., concurring) ("Alabama's purpose was solely religious in character."); Stone,
449 U.S. at 41 ("Kentucky's statute requiring the posting of the Ten Com-
mandments in public school rooms has no secular legislative purpose."); Ep-
person, 393 U.S. at 107 ("No suggestion has been made that Arkansas' law
may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious
views of some of its citizens.").
252. See Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses,
102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); see also Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitu-
tion, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293, 303-05 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Is Re-
ligion Special? A Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, U. ILL. L. REV. 535 (1994). For
other theories of the permissibility and constitutionality of religious argu-
ments for public legislation, see, for example, KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 114 (1988); Larry Alexander, Liberal-
ism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763(1993); Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment
Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991); John H. Garvey, A Comment on Religious Con-
victions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1288 (1986); Frederick Schauer,
May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 1075 (1986).
253. See Greene, The Irreducible Constitution, supra note 252, at 305-06
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Reliance upon the story of Noah does not appear vulner-
able to an Establishment Clause challenge under any of these
approaches. Initially, most of those citing Noah are trying to
prevent the ESA from being changed, and there is no precedent
for finding an Establishment Clause violation in a refusal to
enact a law. It is conceivable, though, that Noah could be ex-
propriated for affirmative ends-to support legislation provid-
ing greater funding for the ESA, or to amend the ESA to give
greater protection to endangered species. The Establishment
Clause issue raised in such instances would depend upon the
role that the story of Noah played in the legislative process,
though I conclude that any imaginable endangered species law
based on Noah's example would be constitutional.
Consider four possible scenarios: (1) some members of
Congress cited the story of Noah as the justification for the
law, but most members of Congress voted for the law because
of the other utilitarian and moral arguments for preserving
biodiversity; (2) the law was actually motivated by the story of
Noah, but it was publicly defended by utilitarian arguments
for the preservation of biodiversity; (3) the law was expressly
based on a predominantly moral use of the story of Noah; and
(4) the law was expressly based on a predominantly religious
use of the story of Noah. The law resulting from the first scenario
survives under any theory of the Establishment Clause. Such
a law is not based on a religious purpose, let alone a dominant
one, because the majority of those voting for it did so for rea-
sons wholly unrelated to religious beliefs. This scenario best
describes the current use of the story of Noah. While Secretary
Babbitt and others cite the story of Noah as a reason for pro-
tecting endangered species, other defenders of the ESA rely
upon a host of utilitarian and moral arguments to reach the
same conclusion. To date, the secular environmentalists de-
fending the ESA have far outnumbered those supporting en-
dangered species legislation because of Noah's example or
other religious obligations. Nor does any proposed legislation
to expand protections for endangered species cite adherence to
the story of Noah as a purpose of the law.
(suggesting that an Endangered Species Act enacted by a state in which
"Ev]irtually all of the legislators are observant Christians, and virtually all of
the legislative arguments for the Act invoke religious authority" would violate
the Establishment Clause); see also Conkle, supra note 252, at 18 (contending
that an endangered species law that "depends upon a religious belief that is
inerrantly held" violates the Establishment Clause, while a similar law based
upon a non-inerrant religious belief is constitutional).
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Likewise, the law resulting from the second scenario would
satisfy the Establishment Clause according to both the Supreme
Court and Professor Greene. The existence of a secular justifi-
cation for a law is sufficient under current Establishment
Clause doctrine, regardless of the religious motivations of the
supporters of the law.14 Greene's objection to the use of relig-
ious beliefs to support a law explicitly encourages legislators to
transform their religious beliefs into secular arguments.25
Many of the religious groups defending endangered species
legislation have offered the same kinds of utilitarian argu-
ments as secular environmentalists, indicating that the use of
the story of Noah would withstand an Establishment Clause
challenge even if the imitators of Noah constituted a majority
of the Congress.26
Nor does the third scenario present a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause. The First Amendment prohibits the establish-
ment of religion, not morality. The Court has never held that a
law based on nonreligious moral arguments violates the Estab-
lishment Clause.257 Moreover, the story of Noah can be read to
provide a moral argument instead of an argument based upon
a religious command. Secretary Babbitt and religious leaders
invoking the example of Noah have emphasized that the story
appeals to people of all (or no) religious faiths.28 Thus, an en-
254. See supra notes 250-251.
255. See Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra note
252, at 1621 (finding no Establishment Clause problem "if the religious be-
lievers are willing to translate their religious source of value into secular
terms, because then the nonbeliever perceives that she can participate in the
debate").
256. See, e.g., Pope John Paul H, The Ecological Crisis: A Common Re-
sponsibility, in GOTTLIEB, supra note 176, at 230, 235 (emphasizing the aes-
thetic value of creation); Stone, supra note 181, at 9A (Baptist pastor agreeing
that "W[there are economic, scientific, and medical reasons" for opposing pro-
posed bills that would narrow endangered species protections); Campolo &
Sider, supra note 179 (observing that 'the long-term monetary costs of losing
endangered species and their habitats may be enormous").
257. Note, however, that reliance upon moral arguments can pose other
constitutional problems. See infra text accompanying notes 266-277.
258. See 1997 Interior Appropriations Hearings, supra note 23, at 1074
(testimony of Secretary Babbitt) (appealing to "American citizens from every
walk of life and every conceivable religious persuasion" to "make this connec-
tion between their personal beliefs and values and the importance of protect-
ing creation"); Rolston, supra note 179, at 139 ("The Noah story is quaint and
archaic, despite its profound insights. It is parable more than history.");
Charles Honey, Earning Our Spot on the Ark: Environmentalists, Religious
Ideals Can Fit Together, Activist Prove, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Jan. 11, 1997,
at B1 (quoting Christian environmentalist Calvin DeWitt as saying that "[a]
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dangered species statute could survive even if most members of
Congress acted in reliance upon the story of Noah.
The law described in the fourth scenario would probably
survive, too, though it presents the hardest case. Cases like
Edwards v. Aguillard"9 and scholarly theories like Professor
Greene's would strike down a law enacted for a dominant relig-
ious purpose as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The
Court and Greene part ways, though, on the significance of a
law's alternative, secular purposes. The presence of secular
purposes alongside religious ones is irrelevant to Greene if the
religious purposes predominate;10 the presence of secular pur-
poses normally saves a law under the Court's test.21
There are, of course, many nonreligious reasons for pro-
tecting endangered species. While there may not be an obvious
utilitarian reason for protecting a particular endangered spe-
cies, 2 there will always be a nonreligious moral reason for pro-
tecting an endangered species. Moreover, while one can
imagine members of a legislature voting for an endangered
species statute because of religious motivation, the purpose of an
endangered species statute is not inherently religious. Such a
statute, therefore, is different from the statutes found uncon-
stitutional because the very aim of those statutes struck the
Court as limited to religious ends.263 Accordingly, while Greene
may invalidate a law like that described in the fourth scenario,
the Court would probably uphold it, and the law would not
person doesn't even have to believe there was a Noah to believe there is a
principle").
259. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
260. See supra note 252.
261. See supra note 251 (citing cases). Greene reads the Court's prece-
dents as establishing a dominant express religious purpose test. See Greene,
The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra note 252, at 1624. To be
sure, there is language in several of the Court's decisions suggesting that the
religious purpose of a statute can be less than total and still violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 590-93 (referring to the law's
"preeminent" and "primary" religious purpose"); id. at 599 (Powell, J., con-
curring) (opining that "[tihe religious purpose must predominate"); Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (concluding that "[tihe pre-eminent purpose
for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is plainly religious in
nature"). But in each case emphasizing the purpose of a statute, the Court
determined that there was no secular purpose for the statute--the legisla-
ture's only purpose was religious. See supra note 248 (citing eases).
262. See supra Part III.B (describing how the utilitarian arguments for
protecting endangered species fail to provide a justification for protecting
every endangered species).
263. See supra note 248.
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raise an issue at all for those judges and scholars who contend
that the religious purpose of a statute is irrelevant under the
Establishment Clause.2" In short, the only plausible Estab-
lishment Clause objection to the story of Noah presupposes
that a majority of Congress feels a religious obligation to sup-
port endangered species legislation and that the Court will
strike down an environmental statute regardless of the ab-
sence of any religious effects. That seems pretty unlikely.
But the Establishment Clause does not exhaust the po-
tential constitutional obstacles to reliance upon the story of
Noah. The free exercise clause may override the ESA for indi-
viduals whose religious beliefs demand the taking of a particu-
lar endangered species.265 A different sort of constitutional ar-
gument confronts the story of Noah if it is viewed as creating a
moral obligation instead of a religious one. Other laws based
on contested moral arguments have not fared well recently.2
Remember, too, that the government possesses limited ability
264- See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 614-15 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-09 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. L. REV. 795, 802-04 (1993); see also Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
115, 144 (1992) ("Left undefined, the purpose prong is an invitation to mis-
chief-a not-so-subtle suggestion that those whose understandings of justice
are derived from religious sources are second-class citizens, forbidden to work
for their principles in the public sphere," but rejecting the complete abandon-
ment of the purpose prong).
265. The free exercise argument was raised unsuccessfully in United
States v. Lundquist, 932 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Or. 1996) (Native American
charged with possessing bald eagle feathers), and United States v. Billie, 667
F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (Native American charged with possess-
ing panther parts). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) could
yield a different result. See United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225
(D.N.M. 1997) (upholding a RFRA challenge to the criminal prosecution of a
Native American who shot a bald eagle for use in a religious ceremony). But
see United States v. Jim, 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995) (rejecting a RFRA
challenge to the conviction of a Native American who killed several bald ea-
gles). RFRA no longer limits the actions of states, see City of Boerne v. Flores,
117 S. Ct. 2157, 2171-72 (1997), but the applicability of the statute to federal
government actions may well remain intact, see In re Young, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 7348 (8th Cir. Apr. 13, 1998) (post-Flores decision holding that RFRA
still governs federal actions); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through
It: Religious Freedom and the U.S. Code, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 249, 253 (1995)
(arguing that RFRA operates as a "super-statute" that supersedes any federal
obligations contrary to religious freedom unless the government possesses a
compelling state interest).
266. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating state consti-
tutional amendment that prohibited protected status for homosexuals).
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to determine which living organisms are worthy of legal pro-
tection.
267
Several legal scholars have labored to distinguish laws
protecting endangered species from other laws based on moral
arguments, especially laws concerning abortion or homosexual-
ity. Ronald Dworkin has argued that endangered species legis-
lation can be distinguished from abortion legislation.268  He
agrees that the case for protecting endangered species must
rest on moral arguments instead of utilitarian arguments-
indeed, he accepts the government's ability to legislate to protect
intrinsic values u9 Abortion is different, Dworkin contends, for
two reasons. First, the effect of governmental coercion on
women who desire an abortion is far greater than the effect of
governmental coercion on those affected by the ESA. Second,
our beliefs about human life are far more fundamental to our
own selves than our beliefs about endangered species.' The
first point depends upon the second. The reason why the ex-
perience of carrying a child to term is unlike any other activity
267. See Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 444 (1990) (concluding that "a State may not adopt one theory of when
life begins" to justify its regulation of abortions); Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 504-06 (1989) (declining to decide the constitu-
tionality of a state statutory finding that "the life of each human being begins
at conception"); id. at 566-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part) (indicating that such a finding violates the Establishment Clause be-
cause it lacks any secular purpose); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973)
(invalidating state abortion law because the state cannot choose among con-
tested views of when life begins).
268. See Dwonxu=, supra note 174, at 75-81, 149-59.
269. See id. at 75-81, 149.
270. See id. at 154. Dworkin adds that endangered species legislation
"might well be unconstitutional" if it, too, could "destroy a woman's life." Id
Some believe that the ESA satisfies that test. See 139 CONG. REC. E719 (daily
ed. Mar. 19, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hansen) (asserting "the current appli-
cation of the Endangered Species Act" relies upon "policies that destroy hu-
man lives").
27L See DWORKIN, supra note 174, at 154-55 ("[Olur convictions about
how and why human life has intrinsic importance, from which we draw our
views about abortion, are much more fundamental to our overall moral per-
sonalities than our convictions about culture or endangered species, even
though these too concern intrinsic values."); id. at 155 ("Very few people's
opinions about conserving the artifacts of a culture or saving endangered
species are as foundational to their moral personality, as interwoven with the
structural choices of their lives [as our beliefs about human life]."); id. at 158
(asserting that procreative decisions are different from other political deci-
sions that seriously affect certain individuals because "the moral issues on
which they hinge are... touching the ultimate purpose and value of human
life itself").
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that a woman will ever encounter is because of the unique
value that most of our society places on human life. We view
the pregnant woman's experience in a different light than a
pregnant animal's experience precisely because we care more
about people than animals. But this superior position of human
life compared to other life is what some moral theories for pro-
tecting endangered species protest.2 If all forms of life are
equally valuable, then why should human experience matter
more than the experience of animals? Dworkin's argument
presupposes the very moral distinction that some environmen-
talists find so distasteful.
Once the primacy of human life is accepted, Dworkin is
right that the coercion involved in abortion legislation is
greater than the coercion in endangered species legislation.
But the interest at stake is also greater. The high value on
human life that causes Dworkin to treat the abortion decision
as unique is also the reason why many want to protect the
growing human life. Nor can it be said that the coercion
worked by the ESA is trivial. The ESA can dictate where and
how one lives, works, and worships. Although not at all the
same as bearing a child, it requires a persuasive governmental
justification nonetheless.
Similarly, Kent Greenawalt has acknowledged the po-
tential tension between laws regulating endangered species
and laws regulating homosexuality. On the one hand, he ar-
gues that "prohibiting wrongs per se is barred by premises of
liberal democracy," and therefore, laws restricting homosexuality
(or other consensual sexual acts) are impermissible.273 On the
other hand, Greenawalt insists that "protecting the environ-
ment for its own sake is consistent with the premises of liberal
democracy."2 74 If forced to choose between the positions, Gre-
enawalt would side with his first assertion against laws pro-
hibiting wrongs per se, 71 but that would doom any effort to rest
272. See supra notes 219-220.
273. GREENAWALT, supra note 252, at 114; see also id. at 87-95 (arguing
that it is inappropriate to legislate against consensual sexual activity based
on a belief that such activity is sinful).
274. Id. at 114.
275. See id. (explaining that "the view that society could appropriately
prohibit any disturbance of the metaphysical order would be so sweeping in
its implications"); see also Garvey, supra note 252, at 1292 n.12 (noting that if
values can be based on concern about the life cycle of animals, than values
regulating homosexuality can be based on concern about the life cycle of the
human species).
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the ESA on moral arguments once the utilitarian arguments
are exhausted.
This debate travels into theories of liberal democracy, con-
stitutionalism, and ultimate views of the good that transcend
the arguments about specifically religious arguments. My sole
point here is to identify the parallels between moral arguments
for endangered species legislation and similar moral argu-
ments for a variety of other laws.2 6 I would sustain the consti-
tutionality of endangered species legislation based on the story
of Noah for the same reasons why the Court's precedents
questioning reliance on moral arguments strike me as prob-
lematic. But if I am wrong about those precedents, then en-
dangered species laws are jeopardized as well.
Admittedly, preserving biodiversity appeals to a different
constituency than the laws whose moral justifications were in-
adequate to save them from constitutional attack. Also, few
decisions have engendered more passionate debate than Roe v.
Wade and Romer v. Evans. To extend such rulings to a law
designed for such a popular cause as wildlife preservation is
highly unlikely, whether or not the analogy is appropriate.2'
The presence of utilitarian justifications for preserving biodi-
versity as a whole further diminishes the likelihood that the
absence of such justifications for some species and the reliance
on the story of Noah (or other religious or moral arguments)
will serve to invalidate the statute. That said, the constitu-
tional ramifications of moral and religious arguments for envi-
ronmental statutes deserve more attention, but I would not expect
such arguments to carry the day.
V. PLAYING GOD
So the dilemma remains. We cannot protect every species,
we do not protect every species, but the story of Noah (like any
of a number of other moral or religious arguments) says that
we have to. Suppose, however, that Noah was forced to choose
between species. What would he have done? Or perhaps more
276. See John Copeland Nagle, Endangered Species Wannabees, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1998) (comparing the rhetoric for protecting
rare wildlife with the rhetoric for opposing abortion).
277. Cf Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1757 (1997)
(asserting that a formal analysis of existing Indian law precedents can "result
in deceiving conclusions" unless it is accompanied by "a heavy dose of histori-
cal perspective and legal realism).
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importantly, how should those who seek to imitate Noah today
decide which species should live and which should disappear
forever?
The answer must remain uncertain, simply because Noah
did not give us an example of how to choose among endangered
species. That omission itself should give us pause. The re-
source constraints that appear so daunting to us pale in com-
parison to the task confronted by Noah. Perhaps, then, fidelity
to Noah's example requires us to work to save all species
trusting that God will enable us, like Noah, to accomplish a
seemingly impossible feat. But that approach does not help
the FWS, the Nature Conservancy or other groups that must
decide how to allocate a fixed budget among many endangered
species. Nor does that approach account for the human needs
that cry out for additional money and attention-and that
sometimes conflict with the needs of endangered species.27
Noah was responsible for eight people, not six billion.279 For
these reasons, even those defenders of the ESA who consider
the scriptures authoritative recognize the need to balance bio-
diversity and other concerns." Indeed, some Christian writers
have attempted to develop priorities for species preservation in
a world where not all species can be saved.28" ' Thus, while
choices may be necessary, any decision to choose among species
should be reached with great reluctance, recognizing that the
278. See supra text accompanying notes 72-79.
279. See Genesis 6:18 (quoting God telling Noah that "you shall go into the
ark-you, your sons, your wife, and your sons's wives with you"); see also
Genesis 6:10 (reporting that Noah had three sons); Genesis 10:1 (stating that
Noah's sons had children after the flood). The total number of eight people on
the ark assumes that each of Noah's sons had one wife.
280. See H.R. 2275 Hearing, supra note 8, at 87 (testimony of Rev. Paarl-
berg) (acknowledging that "there are difficult choices that need to be made on
occasion," and that "we need to do the hard work of working out those bal-
ances"); DEVOS, supra note 208, at 48-49 (asking-but not answering-
questions about how to balance biodiversity and human needs in specific
situations); Rolston, supra note 179, at 140 (arguing that "God wills for spe-
cies to continue, subject to natural processes, consonant with human develop-
ment" (emphasis added)); News: Eco-Evangelical Movement Works to Preserve
Environment, supra note 16 (EEN member Ron Sider acknowledging that "we
need to keep a proper balance" between species and human needs); The New-
sHour with Jim Lehrer, supra note 179 (Multnomah Bible College spokesman
indicating that "I can conceive of some situations where [the ESA] would need
to be suspended in favor of helping a fellow man or woman or child, some
other person who has intrinsically greater value to God than does some other
created being").
28L See BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 64-66, 68;
NASH, supra note 181, at 181-82.
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failure to preserve a species is also a failure to imitate Noah,
whose own efforts were rewarded by God."2
A. THE LESSONS OF NOAH FOR HOW TO CHOOSE AMONG
SPECIES
My guess is that Noah would have tried to save as many
different kinds of species as possible. Noah protected all species,
regardless of their size or appearance or apparent value, be-
cause that is what God told him to do. Imitating Noah would
seem to require us to come as close to that result as we can.
Moreover, to the extent that we are unable to protect every
species, Noah's example suggests that the diversity of species
has value in itself.283 Genesis teaches that God created many,
many different species, and when Noah heeded God's command
to save them all, the importance of the diversity of life was re-
emphasized.
That goal suggests certain priorities for choosing among
endangered species. First, the more species the better. Efforts
to save an endangered species that will also benefit other en-
dangered species would rank highest. Saving multiple species
at one time is easily accomplished by focusing on the habitats
of many different species live, instead of the individual species
themselves. Many writers recommend that efforts to protect
multiple species by protecting broader ecosystems merit high
priority."' The current FWS priority scheme, by contrast, does
282. See Genesis 9:1-17 (describing the blessing that God bestowed upon
Noah once the flood subsided).
283. See supra note 212 (citing sources describing the value that God
places on the diversity of species within creation).
284. See 1998 Interior Appropriations Hearing, supra note 61, (testimony
of Mary Beth Beetham, Legislative Associate, Defenders of Wildlife)
(indicating that the Defenders of Wildlife would give greatest priority to key-
stone species whose survival is crucial to the survival of other species and the
habitat itself); BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 68
(Christian writers asserting that "priority should be given to listing a species
when that listing would also benefit other species within that ecosystem");
Mark E. Eiswerth & J. Christopher Haney, Allocating Conservation Expendi-
tures: Accounting for InterSpecies Genetic Distinctiveness, 5 EcoLOGICAL
ECON. 235, 238-41 (1992) (analyzing a proposal to allocate funding for species
preservation depending upon the number of species who live in a certain
area); Houck, supra note 59, at 870 ("One of the more rational conclusions to
emerge from America's experience with the Endangered Species Act is that
we need to manage ecosystems and protect biological diversity on a scale
larger than individual species on the brink of doom."); Malcolm L. Hunter, Jr.,
Coping with Ignorance: The Coarse-Filter Strategy for Maintaining Biodiver-
sity, in KOHM, supra note 51, at 266-79 (explaining the advantages and disad-
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not expressly prefer species whose preservation will also save
other species."5 The agency has demonstrated a de facto pref-
erence for HCPs that protect the most species, 26 but that policy
has not been codified in the FWS's regulations or in the ESA
itself. The agency recently proposed giving higher priority to
proposed listings covering multiple species-essentially creat-
ing a preference for a species whose listing happened to be
proposed in the same rulemaking as other species-but that
rule is not yet in effect.87
The desire to save as many species as possible also sup-
ports consideration of more controversial factors such as the
cost of preservation and the likelihood of success. Consider
three ecosystems that contain 300 endangered species evenly
distributed so that 100 species live in each ecosystem. If it
would cost $50 million to preserve ecosystem A, $25 million to
preserve ecosystem B, and $25 million to preserve ecosystem
C-and if only $50 million is available for species preservation-
then the preferable course would be to save ecosystems B and
C and the 200 species that they contain. Similarly, if two
songbirds are endangered but one is far more likely to recover,
then the preservation of the songbird that is likely to recover
should take priority. Some writers have endorsed the consid-
eration of the cost and likelihood of success of recovery efforts
in establishing priorities among species-like the triage sys-
tem employed by wartime hospitals.288 Such cost/benefit pro-
vantages of giving priority to the preservation of areas that contain many dif-
ferent kinds of species); Noss, supra note 169, at 233-35 (recommending that
priority be given to saving keystone species and "umbrella species" whose
large area requirements assure that other species will be protected, too);
Laura Spitzberg, The Reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act, 13
TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 193, 214 (1994) (according second priority to top
predators because protecting them will aid other species); Wilcove, supra note
232, at 10 (advocating priority for indicator species in order to "enhance the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and declining species depend").
285. See supra text accompanying notes 116-121 (discussing the FWS spe-
cies priority guidelines).
286. See Thompson, supra note 71, at 316-19, 380 (describing how both
individual permit applications and recent HCPs favor multiple species).
287. See FWS 1998 Proposed Priority Guidelines, supra note 117, at 10,933
(indicating that "[p]roposed listings that cover multiple species facing high-
magnitude threats have priority over single-species proposed rules unless the
Service has reason to believe that the single-species proposal should be proc-
essed first to avoid possible extinction").
288. See MYERS, supra note 30, at 43-44 (defending a triage system for de-
ciding which endangered species can be saved); NORTON, supra note 80, at
255 ("Efforts should be expended on species that are in trouble but salvage-
able and on species that can be saved inexpensively."); Doremus, supra note
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jections fit with the goal of saving as many species as possible,
but the calculations make me squeamish in this context, and
they certainly find no precedent in Noah. Nor does the FWS
adhere to such an approach. The agency does give some prior-
ity to species that are most likely to recover, but that priority
cannot override the mandate to try to prevent any species from
going extinct, however unlikely it is to recover. "9
Note that the emphasis here is on saving as many species
as possible, not on saving ecosystems themselves. Of course,
saving an entire ecosystem may well save a significant number
of endangered species, but the two goals could diverge. A
whole ecosystem may lack any endangered species; a small
fragment of an ecosystem could contain many endangered species.
In such instances it makes a difference whether ecosystem pro-
tection is the means to the end of saving endangered species, or
vice versa. A number of writers would give priority to saving
species in order to achieve their real goal of saving ecosys-
tems.2 0 Such concern for the larger environment finds support
80, at 330 ("Scarce resources should not be expended on species not likely to
be saved by extraordinary measures."); Drozdowski, supra note 112, at 594-
600 (proposing a modified cost/benefit analysis and triage system); William
Ramsay, Priorities in Species Preservation, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 595, 613 (1976)
(recommending a comparison of the priority of a species with the cost of sav-
ing it); Randall, supra note 123, at 102-03 (advocating a priority system rely-
ing on a cost/benefit analysis, albeit with particular attention to fully stating
the benefits of preserving a species). But see David H. Bennett, Triage as a
Species Preservation Strategy, 8 ENVTL. ETHICS 47, 58 (1986) (attacking triage
systems as overemphasizing human interests); Houck, supra note 37, at 701
(criticizing proposed legislation for requiring "a triage that no scientist with a
smidgeon of integrity would consider attempting").
289. Compare FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,101
(stating that "species and projects that offer the greatest potential for success"
will be given priority in listing decisions), and id. at 43,104 (repeating that
"[p]riority for preparing and implementing recovery plans would go to species
with the greatest potential for success"), with id. at 43,102 (indicating that
"regardless of this recovery potential, the Service will strive to undertake for
every high threat species those minimum survival efforts which will at least
stabilize its status and prevent its extinction").
290. See RICHARD TOBIN, THE EXPENDABLE FUTURE: U.S. POLITIcS AND
THE PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 77 (1990) (describing a ranking
system based on the proposition that "habitats rather than individual species
have biological value and thus deserve protection"); Doremus, supra note 80,
at 330 (proposing that keystone species and indicator species should be given
priority); Randall, supra note 123, at 103 (suggesting that species "valued for
habitat and ecosystem services" and species "which serve key roles in valued
ecosystems" should be given priority); Donald H. Regan, Duties of Preserva-
tion, in NORTON, supra note 123, at 195, 212 (stating that species that "play
special roles in complex and unusual ecosystems" deserve special considera-
tion); Sagoff, supra note 80, at 48-49 (discussing the protection of species in
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in much scriptural teaching. Genesis records that God de-
scribed all of creation as good, not just particular animals and
plants. 29' In contrast, the story of Noah omits any such ecosys-
tem focus. In fact, Noah saved every species even as all of the
earth's existing ecosystems disappeared around him. Imitating
Noah, then, means putting species before ecosystems in the
unlikely event such a choice becomes necessary. This is one
instance, though, where following Noah's example may not
necessarily lead to the same actions as fidelity to the balance of
the biblical record.
Priority number two emphasizes diversity among species.
Such diversity can be achieved by favoring preservation efforts
that benefit species in different biological classifications. As
Donald Regan has written:
[O1ther things being equal, a species is made more valuable by be-
longing to a sparsely populated genus or family or order. Taxonomi-
cally isolated species are likely to represent unusual modes of adap-
tation. Their existence increases the diversity of nature. That means
both that there is more to know about what exists, and that a com-
plete knowledge of what exists entails a greater knowledge of na-
ture's possibilities.'
order to protect the value of the ecosystem); Edwin M. Smith, The Endan-
gered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 361, 403
(1984) (advocating the protection of species "based on their identifiable func-
tional values within an ecosystem"); Spitzberg, supra note 284, at 213-14(favoring priority for keystone species and indicator species in order to protect
the overall ecosystem).
29L See supra note 201.
292. Regan, supra note 290, at 212; see also NORTON, supra note 80, at
246-47 (recommending that priority be given to species with greater taxo-
nomic distinctiveness); TOBIN, supra note 290, at 73-74 (endorsing a priority
scheme that maximizes the importance of genetic diversity because such di-
versity is crucial to the development of ecosystems); Eiswerth & Haney, supra
note 284, at 241-42 (analyzing how the genetic distinctiveness of a species can
be used to establish priorities among species); Goulder & Kennedy, supra note
123, at 37 (suggesting that scientists are especially likely to give higher value
to genetically unique species); Randall, supra note 123, at 103-04 (advocating
lesser priority for species and subspecies that have many close relatives);
Sagoff, supra note 80, at 56-62 (discussing the protection of species that con-
tribute most to the diversity of nature); Smith, supra note 290, at 404(proposing third priority to "species that are comparatively rare" in order to
"promote the general goal of preserving biological diversity"); Spitzberg, supra
note 284, at 214 (giving some priority to "a species that is the only one in its
family"). But see ROLSTON, supra note 174, at 136-37 (questioning priorities
based on diversity because all categories besides species are artificial, the
speciation process is dynamic, and a species can only survive within a larger
context); Memorandum from Bill Snape & Mike Senatore to Interested Parties
Re: Kempthorne/Chafee Draft ESA Bill (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <http'/
www.defenders.orglesacomm.html> (stating the objections of the Defenders of
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The FWS agrees that genetically distinct species should be
favored. 293 Likewise, the Forest Service must manage national
forests to provide for "diversity of plant and animal communi-
ties."29 So while a Senate committee once commented that
"[b]iologically, it makes sense to treat all taxonomic groups
equally, or even to place some special emphasis on protecting
plants and invertebrates since they form the bases of ecosys-
tems and food chains upon which all other life depends,"295 the
FWS has emphasized that genetically unique species possess
special value independent of their impact on an ecosystem.296
Nonetheless, the FWS gives biological diversity "the lower order
of priority setting" and expects to turn to this criteria to choose
among species only rarely.297
In practice, the preference for diversity means that if the
FWS has a fixed budget to spend on implementing the recovery
plans for all endangered species, it should concentrate that
money on the whooping crane or the manatee instead of the
snail darter (which is one of 150 different species of darters)298
or the northern spotted owl (which is one of three subspecies of
the spotted owl species).2  Or suppose that an environmental
agency has $2 million dollars to spend on endangered species,
and that it would $1 million dollars each to save the Indochi-
nese tiger, the Siamese tiger, and the panda, each of which are
highly endangered. While one hopes that it would never come
Wildlife to a proposal to give higher priority to recovery plans benefiting tax-
onomically distinct species as contrary to the recommendations of the Na-
tional Research Council); Smith, supra note 290, at 404 n.243 (outlining the
controversy over the ecological role of diversity).
293. See FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,104 (stating
that "the loss of the most genetically distinct taxa is of greater significance
than the loss of less genetically distinct taxa"); id. at 43,099 (finding geneti-
cally distinct species "deserving of continuing scientific and educational at-
tention").
294. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1994).
295. S. REP. No. 97-418, at 14 (1982). The committee report was respond-
ing to a since-abandoned FWS preference for higher-level vertebrates.
296. See FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,099. For ex-
ample, "[it appears that the California condor, a monotypic genus, may have
less ecosystem impact that [sic] any of several butterfly species," but the
agency would favor the condor anyway. Id.
297. Id.
298. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 165.
299. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination
of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114
(1990) (listing the three subspecies of spotted owls as the northern, the Cali-
fornia, and the Mexican).
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to this, the diversity criteria says that priority should go to the
pandas and one of the tigers, rather than saving both of the ti-
gers and not the panda.
The third and weakest priority should attach to those species
that provide the greatest utilitarian benefits to us. Noah de-
clined to follow this course, though his preference for clean
species instead of unclean species offers slight support for con-
sideration of utilitarian values. The more controversial pas-
sages in Genesis that encourage people to use creation to sat-
isfy their own needs provide somewhat greater support for a
utilitarian priority.3°0 Most of the writers who have considered
choices among species find utilitarian concerns unnecessary
(because people will act to protect species that are valuable to
them even when there is no legal obligation to do so)"' or mis-
guided (because they disregard the independent value of a
species).0 2 While the claim that it is unnecessary to consider
utilitarian concerns is often true, it fails to account for species
that provide indirect benefits such as water purification and
climate control that are not captured by the economic market-
place.3" The claim that it is misguided to consider utilitarian
concerns in establishing priorities is disingenuous for anyone
who relies on the utilitarian arguments for the preservation of
endangered species. That claim is legitimate, though, for those
who espouse moral or religious justifications for preserving
species that attribute independent value to biodiversity.
Whether any weight should be attached to utilitarian benefits
when establishing priorities among endangered species de-
pends upon the comparative moral position of people and ani-
mals. Noah's example suggests that the utilitarian benefits of
a species should be given priority only once the numerical and
300. See supra notes 195-196.
301. See Sagoff, supra note 80, at 51 (observing that "endangered species
are not, in general, economically the most valuable ones").
302. See TOBIN, supra note 290, at 78-82 (identifying several concerns
about determining priority among species based on their utilitarian value);
Doremus, supra note 80, at 329 n.294 ("Those species which provide direct
economic benefits to man are in fact the least appropriate for protection at
government expense."). But see Cathryn Campbell, Federal Protection of En-
dangered Species: A Policy of Overkill?, 3 UCLA J. ENvTL. LAW & POLY 247,
272 (1983) (insisting that "[tihe easiest priority to determine is that of a spe-
cies from which man derives a direct commercial benefit"); Ramsay, supra
note 288, at 610 (proposing that priority be given to species with economic,
cultural and esthetic value).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 147-152 (listing the ecological
benefits provided by many species).
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diversity priorities have been satisfied, and those benefits
should be considered with the awareness that the same scrip-
tures that provide some support for considering utilitarian
concerns also emphasize that God considers all creatures to be
valuable regardless of their usefulness to us.30
B. ALTERNATE PROPOSALS ON HOW TO CHOOSE AMONG
SPECIES
That leaves several other ways that writers have proposed
for choosing among species. One possibility is to favor the
species that are the most endangered.305 The FWS proceeds on
such a "worst-first basis" when listing species.306 The degree of
endangerment certainly highlights the need to decide quickly
whether or not to try to save a species. The triage model, how-
ever, suggests that some species may be so endangered that it
is not worth investing precious resources to try to save them
instead of another species that is more likely to recover. More
importantly, unless we believe that we can save every species,
a priority for the most endangered species will simply result in
the extinction of other, not quite as endangered species. The
resources used to preserve the most endangered species will be
unavailable to preserve the next most endangered species. In
other words, focusing on the most endangered species makes
sense only if we are able to save each species as it rises to the
status of most endangered. If that is impossible, and if choosing
among species become necessary, then giving priority to the
species that are most endangered presupposes that such species
are the most valuable. There is no reason to believe that the
304. See supra note 201.
305. See BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 66 (proposing
that priority be given to "species and habitats which are most sensitive to
degradation and which are rare and/or fragile"); TOBIN, supra note 290, at 76
(noting a possible priority for species that are closest to extinction); Doremus,
supra note 80, at 330-31 (advocating a modest priority for "[sipecies currently
under a high degree of threat," though balancing that threat against the cost
and likelihood of recovery); Noss, supra note 169, at 235-36 (favoring priority
to the most vulnerable species, though not to species that are simply rare);
Sagoff, supra note 80, at 53-54 (discussing a triage system that would give
priority to the species that are most endangered); Smith, supra note 290, at
402 (recommending first priority be given to "species whose populations have
fallen to levels that pose an imminent threat to continued breeding success,
genetic variability, and adaptive fitness").
306. FWS 1983 Priority Guidelines, supra note 90, at 43,099; see also FWS
1997 Priority Guidance supra note 53, at 64,475 (noting that highest priority
will be given to "any species determined to face a significant risk to its well
being").
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species that happens to be the most endangered is by definition
the most valuable. Again, a triage system would consider both
the degree of endangerment and the likelihood of recovery,
with the goal of saving as many species as possible.3 7 Consid-
ering the degree of endangerment but not the likelihood of re-
covery will result in a lesser number and relatively random
group of species that are saved.
Another possibility is to favor species that are the most
advanced and complex in their development. 03 Such an ap-
proach is consistent with from a variety of moral theories, but
it lacks support from the story of Noah. Nor do the other
teachings of Genesis point in this direction. Christian writer
James Nash has defended a priority system that favors the
most advanced species as consistent with the biblical place-
ment of people in a higher position than the rest of creation.3
But even for those who agree that people occupy the highest
position on the earth, it does not follow that all other species
can be ranked along a continuum, with primates far closer to
people than ambersnails. The voice of the scriptures on the
unique status of people is matched by the silence of the scrip-
tures on the relative value of all other species.
Or priority could simply be given to species that are most
popular. This criteria probably best describes the actual prac-
tice of species preservation efforts today.310 Indeed, Mann and
Plummer have argued that "[i]f society prefers charismatic
megafauna, priority should be given to them without apol-
ogy."' But the idea that popularity equals priority seems out-
307. See, e.g., Sagoff, supra note 80, at 53-54; see also supra note 292
(citing other sources).
308. See NASH, supra note 181, at 181-82 (Christian writer arguing that
"[almong species, the moral significance of rights is proportionate to the
value-experiencing and value-creating capacities of their members"); Regan,
supra note 290, at 211-12 ("[M]ore complex life forms are more valuable than
less complex ones, other things being equal. A ferret is more valuable than a
centipede, which is more valuable than an amoeba."); Sagoff, supra note 80, at
57 (indicating that "priority could be given to species 'higher' in the scale of
evolution"). But see TOBIN, supra note 290, at 75-76 (stating the case for pre-
ferring species that are least developed).
309. See NASH, supra note 181, at 181-82.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 103-112.
311. Mann & Plummer, supra note 40, at 70. They added that "[i]f biolo-
gists think otherwise, it should fall to them to change public preferences." Id-
Mann and Plummer later proposed that a biodiversity advisory board could
decide among species by considering the economic value of a species, our soci-
ety's reverence for a species, the contribution of a species to the ecosystem or
whatever other factors are appropriate. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note
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of-step with any theory of the value of species. Children's books
portray the ark full of giraffes and hippos and lions, with bee-
tles and slugs and kangaroo rats nowhere to be seen, but I can
find no other indication that Noah would have conducted a
public opinion poll to determine which species to save.
There are, however, two ways in which the popularity of a
species could become relevant. First, popularity may serve as
a proxy for a utilitarian value, especially aesthetic value.
Large, charismatic, colorful species are especially likely to cap-
ture the public's eye. Or a species may be popular for cultural,
not aesthetic reasons. The bald eagle and the jumping frog
immortalized by Mark Twain are examples of species whose
popularity results from the special place they occupy in the
public memory.312 To the extent that utilitarian values such as
aesthetics or cultural importance deserve any priority, the
popularity of a species may signal aesthetic worth. Second, ef-
forts to protect popular species may promote support for efforts
to protect less visible species. The appeal of, and resources
devoted to, the preservation of endangered species as a whole
may depend upon the public's perception of whether a grizzly
bear or a snail darter is likely to benefit. Alas, it remains
equally possible that the protection of such popular species will
exhaust the public's willingness to preserve biodiversity.
Noah, therefore, may have favored the preservation of the
most species of the most different kinds-with their value to
him considered almost as an afterthought-if he was forced to
bring a limited number of species on board. Or he may have
made his choices in a different manner; we cannot know with
certainty today. But the very process of choosing among species
11, at 229-30. The role that the popularity of a species should play in estab-
lishing priorities is also discussed in NORTON, supra note 80, at 249-57;
Campbell, supra note 302, at 272-73 (approving the use of public opinion to
determine the relative value of a species).
312. See supra text accompanying note 99 (identifying Mark Twain's
"jumping frog" as endangered); see also Doremus, supra note 80, at 331
(listing the symbolic value of a species in the public mind as a possible final
criteria for establishing priorities); Regan, supra note 290, at 212 (asking
whether species such as bald eagles, bowhead whales, rabbit and deer possess
greater value because of the role they play in human culture); Spitzberg, su-
pra note 284, at 214 (giving last priority to species that have symbolic value to
the public).
313. See BOUMA-PREDIGER & VROBLESKY, supra note 181, at 66 (observing
that popular species "often enable appreciation for other less well-known or
popular species, assisting their recovery," but rejecting a priority system rely-
ing upon aesthetic appeal).
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should provide yet another argument for avoiding such choices
in the first place. When we decide that we are willing to allow
a species of tiger to become extinct in order to save the panda,
or to preside over the demise of a species of whale so that we
can save the manatee, we are in uncomfortable and uncharted
territory. We are no longer playing Noah; we are playing God.
Perhaps the only thing worse than openly determining
priorities among endangered species is to apply unstated pri-
orities to the same effect. We already choose among endan-
gered species, but we do not like to admit it. Those like Mann
and Plummer who call for an explicit statement of priorities
are often motivated by the reality that species are becoming
extinct despite our efforts.3"4 The existing, de facto priorities
favor the species that are most popular with the public, even
though more species and a broader range of species might be
saved under a more direct and focused scheme of priorities. A
formal list of priorities would also achieve the honesty that
Calabresi and Bobbitt find so important when faced with an
excruciating choice like that described here.3"5 "Averting the
eyes enables us to save some lives even when we will not save
314. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 215; see also Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, 948 F. Supp. 56, 57 (E.D. Cal. 1996) ("Sporadic and disorganized ju-
dicial interference with [the FWS'sl priorities would result in a game of musi-
cal chairs plainly disruptive to a thoughtful and reasoned allocation of [the
FWS's] limited resources."); NORTON, supra note 80, at 257 ("If formal criteria
cannot decide all priority issues, it seems that environmental managers are
doomed to making important decisions on whim and personal bias."); TOBIN,
supra note 290, at 73 (concluding that the absence of priorities "randomly
condemns helpless creatures to extinction regardless of their relative merits,
potential contribution to humans' well-being, or contribution to ecological
stability"); Doremus, supra note 80, at 332 (arguing for a ranking system in
order to make choices among species "both more explicit and more public");
John Charles Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation Under the En-
dangered Species Act, 24 ENvTL. L. 501, 566 (1994) (criticizing the establish-
ment of priorities through the happenstance of litigation); Plater, supra note
80, at 864 (stating that "implicit or explicit prioritizing and rationing are
anathema yet may inevitably be necessary, though much thoughtful effort
would have to be devoted to that end"); Ramsay, supra note 288, at 609
(suggesting that conservationist gains can be lost absent a priority scheme);
Smith, supra note 290, at 405 (observing that the alternatives to a priority
scheme are "the current inadequate efforts to preserve each and every threat-
ened or endangered species, or to adopt unplanned, ad hoc preservation ef-
forts which would grant priority without considered principles").
315. See CALABRESi & BOBBUTT, supra note 230, at 26 (asserting the need
for honesty when confronting "tragic choices" and concluding that "[hionesty
permits us to know what is to be accepted, and accepting, to reclaim our hu-
manity and struggle against indignity").
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all,"316 but we could save more lives if we fully analyzed what
we are doing. Noah did not blind himself to the task at hand,
either.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Tennessee Valley Author-
ity v. Hill,"7 holding that the ESA required the government to
protect the snail darter instead of completing the Tellico Dam,
often serves as a lightning rod for attitudes about endangered
species. Noah's Choice uses the case for that purpose when it
describes an exchange at oral argument in the Supreme Court:
"I have in my hand a darter, [Attorney General Griffin Bell] pro-
claimed, "a snail darter.... Bell handed the fish to the bench. The
test tube made its way along the line of nine justices, each of whom
solemnly peered at its contents before passing it to a neighbor ....
The attorney general stood back, satisfied, as laughter filled the
court. The laughter was halted by the quiet voice of Justice John
Paul Stevens. "Mr. Attorney General," he said, "your exhibit makes
me wonder. Does the Government take the position that some en-
dangered species are entitled to more protection than others?" Bell's
smile disappeared."
Then Bell answered "no." 3 9
That is the answer demanded by the language of the ESA,
current scientific consensus, and the many advocates of the
existing law. Yet the recent debate over the ESA has ques-
tioned that orthodoxy. If we cannot protect every species, and
if we do not protect every species, then perhaps we need not try
to protect every species. That argument may make sense from
a utilitarian perspective, but it fails to account for the relig-
ious, moral and ethical arguments for protecting every species.
The biblical story of Noah offers one such theory; undoubtedly
other religious, moral, and ethical traditions support similar
316. Id.
317. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
318. MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 11, at 147.
319. Well, sort of. Noah's Choice paraphrases Bell as answering that
"nlo ... the government was not taking the position that some species are
better than others." Id. at 168. According to another source, however, Bell
was never quite that direct. He first said he did not have to reach that point,
and then tried to shift responsibility to the lower courts holding. Finally,
when Justice Stevens asked whether the ESA "distinguish[esl as among vari-
ous priorities in the different species," Bell conceded, "[ilt does not. It looks to
the list. Once it gets on the list, it is an endangered species." See Donald S.
Cohen, Judicial Predictability in United States Supreme Court Advocacy: An
Analysis of the Oral Argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 2 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 89, 94 (1978) (quoting the transcript of oral argument).
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theories. We do not know precisely how Noah accomplished his
task, but Genesis does tell us that Noah saved all of the ani-
mals. If one wants to imitate Noah-either because of a sense
of religious obligation or because of a moral duty like the Noah
Principle-then we should try to save every species, too. Noah
offers less guidance about how to choose among species if pre-
serving them all proves to be impossible, but we can tease
some clues from his story that can help us allocate our limited
resources. The means that we should use to try to protect en-
dangered species present exceedingly difficult questions in a
society with limited resources and seemingly unlimited needs,
but the original goal of the ESA-to protect every species-
remains sound. We should keep trying to play Noah after all.
